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It is a commonplace to observe that a preoc­
cupation with the passions, amounting at times 
almost to an obsession, dominated classical 
French literature. Moreover, the interconnec­
tion between love and language is one that 
various scholars have sought to illuminate. 
But their efforts have focused primarily on 
the dazzling alexandrines of Corneille and 
Racine, and that fascinating group of writers 
known as the moralistes has not received equal 
attention. Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Mme de 
Lafayette, and, to a lesser degree, La Bruyere 
have filtered into the American curriculum; 
but a significant number of others —the 
chevalier de Mere, Saint-Evremond, Jacques 
Esprit, Guilleragues, and Mme de Sevigne— 
have been consigned to the relative obscurity 
of such pejorative critical categories as minor 
and secondary. 
The moralistes contributed to a general effort 
of the age to define—or perhaps, to redefine, 
following a cataclysmic period of history —what 
constituted the self. And it was on language 
and its power not only to explicate but also 
to create that they placed their reliance in this 
endeavor. Their writings communicate the 
urgency they so keenly felt to reform the raw 
material of human nature, and to transform the 
private and the untamed into the societal and 
the controlled. 
Professor Horowitz examines this important 
group of writers as they grappled with a subject 
that they, with the rest of their age, found 
persistent, unsettling, and absorbing—the pas­
sions and the liberation from them. The moral­
istes viewed with particular alarm the savage 
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INTRODUCTION

)HE DAZZLING ALEXANDRINE 
"verse continues to exert a virtual mo­
nopoly in the field of classical French 
literature. Once seduced by it, the 
reader may only reluctantly return to 
prose. Certain novelists, notably Mme 
de Lafayette, receive some attention, although this is 
generally limited to La Princesse de Cleves. (More stu­
dents surely read Racine's La Theba'ide, even though it is 
not included among the few truly famous plays, than read 
the lesser-known works of Mme de Lafayette: Zdide or 
La Princesse de Montpensier.) As for the moralists, with 
the sole exception perhaps of Pascal, they are traditionally 
viewed as a rather homogeneous group, whose works are 
frequently grouped together as one body of thought, their 
lack of individuality signaling their failure to captivate, to 
entice. 
Moreover, certain among these prose writers continue to 
be, at least on this side of the Atlantic, virtually neglected. 
Although Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Mme de Lafayette, 
and, to a lesser degree, La Bruyere do filter into the Ameri­
can curriculum, many other writers—the chevalier de Mere, 
Saint-Evremond, Nicole, Jacques Esprit—are consigned to 
the pejorative categories of minor or secondary. This value 
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judgment conveniently negates their possible worth and 
thus frees the student of French literature to concentrate 
on the brilliance of the classical theater. It is not my inten­
tion here to question the exceptional merit of that theater. 
Rather, in undertaking to study the moralist writers, I seek 
to show the extraordinary complexity of thought that per­
meates the individual works, a complexity that too often, 
in the face of demands for reduction, has disappeared, 
covered over by generalities. 
Considerably more is at stake than a delineation, how­
ever precise, of the thought of any one writer, a self-
evident fact from the selection of several writers. Nor does 
this study attempt to summarize the totality of these writers' 
thinking, which is also obvious from the limited length of 
each chapter. Instead, this study proposes a "sounding" of 
one particular preoccupation of the age, that which years 
later Stendhal would call Vamour-passion. No analysis of a 
single text, nor of one writer, can possibly offer the multiple 
facets of that problem in the same way as can a study of 
diverse thinkers, and the question of erotic love in classical 
French literature suffers if posed from an overemphasis 
upon an isolated text or author. To counteract such a trend, 
the opposite tendency, equally limiting, is toward generali­
zation, toward "relevancy." This series of essays concertedly 
attempts to avoid either of those directions. 
It is somewhat of a cliche to state that the preoccupation, 
the obsession even, with the passions dominated the classi­
cal experience. However, critics and students have long 
fixed upon the theater of Racine as the primary focus of 
their investigations; and whether the study has been 
couched in the heavily moralizing expression of la critique 
universitaire or in the deliberately evocative, provocative 
language of Roland Barthes, the functioning of Eros in the 
plays has been viewed as the undisputed center of that 
theater. What has been done for Racine, I seek to do here 
for several prose writers. 
From a series of related but independent essays, what 
will ideally emerge is a deepened awareness of how in­
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tensely the classical moralists experienced the problem of 
powerful emotion as a potentially destructive force—both for 
the individual and the society that enveloped him. The 
moralists' efforts did not mirror at all the ongoing reality 
of the era's sexual mores. It was, rather, the task of the 
memoir-writers to describe that reality; the moralists were 
concerned with presenting the other side of the problem: 
control of the erotic experience. 
In what terms, then, was this desire for control ex­
pressed? What methods could ensure that passion, chaotic 
and unruly, would be tamed? Reading through the classical 
moralists' works, one perceives a general movement toward 
language as one method of moderating the excesses of 
erotic love. This connection is a loose one, and not at all 
systematic. Nevertheless, from Mere through Guilleragues 
(the presumed author of the Lettres portugaises), language 
becomes an active force in the suppression of Eros. Whether 
the writer is Mme de Sevigne, whose corpus of letters to 
her daughter may be viewed as an attempt to reform or 
restructure the love relationship into a more aesthetically, 
and emotionally, satisfying experience; Saint-Evremond, 
who cultivated an emotional distance through letters of 
advice, which allowed for a flirtation with questions of love 
and sexuality while also permitting a safety zone of escape, 
the boundaries of the page; or Jacques Esprit, who favored 
the most rigorous and repressive inner "dialogue"; in all 
these cases, language became the way to mastery over the 
undisciplined self. For La Rochefoucauld, in a work re­
cently attributed to him, La Justification de I'amour, only 
love seen as a secret could maintain the code of I'honnetete, 
the moral system so carefully developed and analyzed by 
the chevalier de Mere. The fascination with I'honnete 
homme, which marks much of the literature of the grand 
siecle, and which was dependent upon the successful 
manipulation of form and style, in language particularly, 
is yet another sign of the ongoing effort to dispel the dis­
ruptive impulses of Vamour-passion. 
For two of the writers studied here, the problem goes 
[5]

LOVE AND LANGUAGE 
still further. Showing the ultimate failure of language to 
control at all, they propose, consequently, recourse to total 
silence. Mme de Lafayette and la religieuse portugaise, in 
a direct negation of the hope that the "word" can success­
fully master erotic energy, offer bitter portrayals of exactly 
that failure. Language here is viewed as unable to repress 
successfully the spontaneous impulses of love, for the two 
domains persistently refuse to mix. But even when the 
antidote of language is shown as a failure, even when 
silence is viewed as the sole "out," what cannot be denied 
is the extraordinary awareness of language at this time. 
This perception was translated in the theater of the age. 
Hippolyte's inability to communicate, part of his Amazon 
heritage, shows to what degree language has been sexual­
ized in Racine's theater. The entire tragedy of Berenice 
is one of moral "aphasia." This strong consciousness of 
language should not be neglected, for it forms one of the 
most essential aspects of the classical literary experience. 
The moralist writers of the era were caught up in a per­
sistent attempt to define—perhaps to redefine after a cata­
clysmic period of history—the "self," and it was the power 
of language that could, it was hoped, not only explicate 
but create. There is great attention to what can only be 
called the factice in these authors' works. They communi­
cate an urgency to reform the raw material, to transform 
the private into the societal. The long introductory pages of 
Mme de Lafayette's La Princesse de Cleves form one power­
ful example of the opposition of these two structures, the 
glittering brilliance of court society serving to mask the 
personal, hidden tensions of warring egos. 
This study seeks wide diversity in the selection of writers. 
Nevertheless, it is, by necessity, limited. Although a series 
of related but independent essays best serves the stated 
purposes, a distinction should be made between what has 
been stressed and what has been omitted. Certain moralists 
are included, and others, often important, are left aside. 
For what reasons? This study seeks, first of all, to focus 
upon writers of different intellectual bents. At the same 
[6]
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time, I have attempted to represent various "genres"— 
essays, maxims, novels, letters—for the prose works of the 
seventeenth century are far from limited to one format. 
It is important, moreover, to add here that biographical 
information is left aside as not contributing to the subject 
and, in fact, possibly detracting from it; for the emphasis 
remains throughout not on any one writer but on his or 
her analysis of Vamour-passion. Furthermore, each chapter 
is an interpretation unto itself, related to those that pre­
cede and follow, but deliberately not through any system 
of comparisons. And finally, there is a recognition that each 
work studied can be viewed from other, different perspec­
tives. What is really proposed here is one person's reading 
and evaluation. This, I believe, is the primary task of any 
critic—a personal "struggle" with the text. 
However, the important question of who was left out and 
why needs further elucidation. It is, moreover, a problem 
considerably more difficult to justify than the corresponding 
one regarding the writers who were included. To a large 
extent, the selection of authors was based on the period 
of the 1660s and 1670s. The body of writings studied here 
do fit largely into that time span (with Saint-Evremond's 
and Mere's works traversing a slightly more comprehensive 
period). Hence, moralists such as the "mystical" Saint-
Francois de Sales, or the "libertine" La Mothe le Vayer 
are not studied, their works dating from earlier in the 
century. La Bruyere, however, has been included, despite 
the "generation gap," in a chapter specifically intended as 
a conclusion, because his work clearly shows the limits of 
the preceding literary generation's enterprise. The Carac­
teres, published first in 1688, offer the portrait of a society 
less concerned with self-control than with material ac­
quisition. Language in La Bruyere's book no longer tames; 
rather, it accumulates, in a moral and spiritual vacuum. 
There are factors other than time, however, that limited 
the selection of authors. Bossuet, for example, could easily 
be included in this "sounding," as could Nicole; and if 
they are not, it is only because of certain artificial limits 
[7]
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that any study places upon itself, as well, perhaps, be­
cause of a reluctance to probe writers who demand a thor­
ough knowledge of the subtle depths of Christian theology. 
In the end there was also the important recognition that 
certain writers could best exemplify not any specific, pre­
formed thesis (for there is no attempt here to "prove" any 
formulated-in-advance, tight theory; the study remains 
consistently a sondage) but at least general movements 
and directions along which any analysis must be oriented. 
There are, however, two writers who, although not in­
cluded in the body of this study, deserve attention, even 
if of a summary nature: one, Descartes, omnipresent 
throughout this series of essays, though concealed; and two, 
Pascal, central to his age, and not included here because 
of a reluctance to add still more verbiage to the ancient 
debate over the authenticity of the Discours sur les 
passions de I'amour, and also because of a realization that 
this work, questions of authorship aside, is not all that 
original, repeating to a large extent many ideas exposed 
in several of the chapters in far more striking fashion. 
But it is first Descartes who deserves, even demands, 
some explication, and in particular his work Les Passions 
de I'dme, published at the end of 1649, shortly before his 
death. Many of the ideas he espouses in this work had 
already been expressed in his correspondence, notably in 
that with "la princesse Elisabeth." As early as 1645, Des-
cartes seems to have been preoccupied with defining and 
explaining his view of man's involvement with strong emo­
tion, and in one letter to Elisabeth clearly posits his belief: 
"Je ne suis point d'opinion . . . qu'on doive s'exempter 
d'avoir des passions; il suffit qu'on les rende sujettes a la 
raison, et lorsqu'on les a ainsi apprivoisees, elles sont 
quelquefois d'autant plus utiles qu'elles penchent plus vers 
l'exces."1 This notion of taming through reason, through 
self-knowledge and control, is also at the base of Les 
Passions de I'ame, and the work relies heavily upon a 
constant synthesis between emotional emptiness and un­
tamed passions. Descartes seeks to maintain the perfect 
[8]
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measure, the right dosage of emotion, and though les 
passions frequently serve to fortify and maintain concepts 
and beliefs, they may also risk pushing too far: "Tout le 
mal qu'elles peuvent causer consiste en ce qu'elles fortifient 
et conservent ces pensees plus qu'il n'est besoin, ou bien 
qu'elles en fortifient et conservent d'autres auxquelles il 
n'est pas bon de s'arreter."2 
The "self that Descartes creates in his work, constantly 
on guard against emotion that is not understood or directed 
by the system of will, when touched by love is involved in 
a process of self-perfection that becomes a goal unto itself, 
love serving then as only a means. This view of love de­
mands a recognition of superiority in the chosen love ob­
ject and reflects Descartes' preoccupation with self-
discipline and control. What emerges is a picture of a 
well-disciplined, self-knowledgeable individual, bent on 
seeking to maintain a controlled form of emotion in his life. 
Any distance from this basic principle of perfection, such 
as an ill conceived love, may result in a serious moral 
downfall: "L'amour qui est injuste nous joint a des choses 
qui peuvent nuire, ou du moins qui ne meritent pas d'etre 
tant considerees par nous qu'elles sont, ce qui nous avilit 
et nous abaisse."3 The theme of potential self-degradation 
pervades the moralist literature, reminding repeatedly that 
love can throw into disruption the composed, tight system 
of self-regulation, that it can disorient, alienate the self. 
This awareness, which may, as for Madame de Lafayette, 
translate itself by a vocabulary of "falling," points per­
sistently back to Descartes. 
But Descartes himself admits to the possibility of failure 
in this attempt at "taming" passions: "J'avoue qu'il y a 
peu de personnes qui se soient assez preparees en cette 
facon contre toutes sortes de rencontres, et que ces mouve­
ments excites dans le sang par les objets des passions 
suivent d'abord si promptement des seules impressions qui 
se font dans le cerveau et de la disposition des organes, 
encore que Tame n'y contribue en aucune facon, qu'il n'y a 
point de sagesse humaine qui soit capable de leur resister 
[9]

LOVE AND LANGUAGE 
lorsqu'on n'y est pas assez prepare."4 Descartes proposes, 
then, as the definitive remedy in the battle, a constant 
state of self-preparation, maintained by means of the "re­
flective" process, by means of an interior dialogue. Thus 
the word is given the ultimate task of control. If moved to 
unreason, the sole final recourse must be to the domain of 
language, to la reflection and to la resolution, hence to a 
temporal structure that places its greatest value upon the 
slow, meditative, recuperative balm of reason, rather than 
upon the spontaneous immediacy of emotion. The principal 
component is the "word," always lucid. It is above all this 
emphasis upon structured language to counteract the dis­
order and disorientation caused by les passions that makes 
Descartes' work significant in terms of the study proposed 
here. 
The reasons for mentioning the Discours sur les passions 
de I'amour, for so long attributed to Pascal, are not unlike 
those for Les Passions de I'ame. Both works decidedly 
reflect important trends in the thinking of the age, many 
of which lend force to what will be studied in the body of 
this essay. If "Pascal's" short piece was not included there, 
it was for the reasons mentioned earlier: a wish to avoid 
adding yet more opinion to the long-standing debate over 
its authenticity, and secondly (and far more importantly), 
a developing feeling that the work does not offer the 
originality and richness one might anticipate. Many of the 
ideas expressed in the Discours, e.g., on the ties between 
love and ambition, are expressed with far greater force by a 
writer like the chevalier de Mere. However, because the 
work is considered a "highlight" of the age, it is necessary 
to indicate some of the ideas that bear most directly on 
this study; for whether or not the Discours properly belongs 
to Pascal, it is at least a part of the writings of the age, 
and hence deserves consideration as a reflection of general 
trends. 
As for the debate over authorship, it is a very old one 
by now, going back to 1842 and to Victor Cousin's dis­
covery of the manuscript. Cousin, like Lanson and Saulnier 
[10]
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after him, was ready to accept the attribution of the work to 
Pascal. However, Louis Lafuma, returning to a careful and 
precise study of the sources, adopted another opinion, 
maintaining that Pascal could not have written the work, 
for the author apparently made use of texts that did not 
appear until after Pascal's death in 1662.5 However, the 
dispute, obviously unending, although M. Lafuma's con­
clusions have been accepted by many, is not really of 
interest here. Rather, it is more important to focus upon 
those passages of the Discours sur les passions de Vamour 
that reflect dominant directions and currents of the era. 
As in Descartes' writings, as in so many of the classical 
moralists' works, there is in the Discours a decided fascina­
tion with the perfection sought from the love experience. 
The association of love with moral superiority, with self-
development, runs through the work: "II semble que Ton 
ait toute une autre ame quand Ton aime que quand on 
n'aime pas; on s'eleve par cette passion, et on devient 
tout grandeur."6 Loving, stripped here of an erotic base, 
becomes a means to self-recognition, to self-recomposition, 
through a constant mingling with "reason," an association 
that the author maintains throughout the work. Love re­
mains, within this context, a tamed force; is tamed, more 
precisely, within the context of the work. 
Moreover, the "rules" of loving are developed in the 
Discours much as in the other mondain literature of the 
age, properly reflecting the semi-literary milieu that pro­
duced it. There is a close attention to correct form, to the 
certitude that the "right" language can communicate love, 
can thereby assure its success, and the wooing attempts of 
the male are viewed here as an absolutely integral part 
of the love situation. 
But the most important part of the Discours sur les 
passions de Vamour, and that which forms its central 
premise, is the close relationship between love and bore­
dom. The work opens with a declaration of direct hier­
archy: "L'homme est ne pour penser." The passions serve 
primarily as a stimulus in what would otherwise become a 
[in 
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monotony of reason. "Cest une vie unie a laquelle il ne 
peut s'accommoder; il lui faut du remuement et de Faction, 
c'est-a-dire qu'il est necessaire qu'il soit quelquefois agite 
des passions, dont il sent dans son coeur des sources si 
vives et si profondes."7 Thus, from the beginning, the role 
of love has been relegated to second place, necessary only 
as a lift in an otherwise thinking universe. What stands out 
is the denial of spontaneity, the extreme sense of regula­
tion, the feeling that "love" is viewed as a rather benign 
force. "Discoursing" as he does, the author successfully 
limits, even bans, the spontaneous, disruptive side of erotic 
energy, and thus tames in advance a potentially chaotic 
situation. 
Although it is true that the authors of Les Passions de 
Fame and the Discours sur les passions de Vamour share 
with many other writers of their time a core of basic beliefs, 
what is particularly important in terms of the study pro­
posed here is that these works reflect a fundamental trend 
of classical moralist writing: the need to analyze love, to 
structure, to negate, to purge. This need, furthermore, 
clearly translates a desire to free themselves and their 
readers from the illusions of love, from the romantic, 
romanesque myth-making (prevalent earlier in the century, 
but also a long-standing trend of Western thought). One 
after another, each writer, emphasizing diverse means, 
seeks liberation from the demands of passion, and it is pre­
cisely these diverse ways "out" that this study will attempt 
to explore. 
To insure conformity throughout this work, 1 have modernized all French 
spelling, including the quotations from modern editions where editors have chosen 
to leave certain forms unchanged, as in the Lettres of Mme de Sevigne and 
the Oeuvres completes of the chevalier de Mere. 
1. Rene Descartes, Les Passions de I'ame (Paris: Gallimard, 1953; preface, 
1969), preface, p. 10. 
2. Ibid., p. 80. 
3. Ibid., p. 126. 
4. Ibid., pp. 175-76. 
5. A precise analysis is available in Louis Lafuma's 1950 edition of the Discours 
sur les passions de I'amour, published by Delmas. This scholar conjectures that 
[12] 
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the work is by Charles-Paul d'Escoubleau, marquis d'Alluye et de Sourdis. With 
greater certainty he concludes: "C'etait certainement quelqu'un qui frequentait 
assidument plusieurs des vingt ruelles qui animaient la vie litteraire et galante 
de l'epoque" (p. 108). 
6. Blaise Pascal, Discours sur les passions de I'amour (Paris: Hachette, 1966; 
original edition, 1897), p. 134. 
7. Ibid., p. 123. 
[13]


Chapter One 
THE CHEVALIER DE MERE

I HE CHEVALIER DE MERE IS KNOWN 
"anecdotally as the gentleman who one 
day in 1653 accompanied Pascal (and 
the due de Roannez, their mutual friend) 
on a coach ride, thereby exposing the 
great mathematician to a whole new way 
of thinking, which Pascal would call Vesprit de finesse, 
and which represented man's intuitive, perceptive side. 
Although Mere describes the ride and ensuing conversa­
tion in detail (and readily sheds much favorable light on 
his own role as philosopher-teacher), the incident tends to 
overshadow careful, thorough study of Mere's works: the 
Conversations, first published in 1668-69; the Discours, 
which appeared in 1676-77; the Maximes, sentences et 
reflexions morales et politiques, published in 1687, and 
the correspondence.1 
This is not to deny the mutual influence that Pascal and 
Mere may have exerted over each other. Or perhaps the 
ideas they shared are less a result of direct influence than 
of the force the age's diverse philosophical currents may 
have exerted on them simultaneously. In any case, Mere's 
ideas on the two kinds of study needed by man to advance 
successfully in the world do call to mind Pascal's famous 
passage on Vesprit de geometrie and Vesprit de finesse: 
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II y a deux sortes d'Etude, l'une qui ne cherche que l'Art 
et les Regies; l'autre qui n'y songe point du tout, et qui n'a 
pour but que de rencontrer par instinct et par reflexions, 
ce qui doit plaire en tous les sujets particuliers. S'il fallait 
se declarer pour l'une des deux, ce serait a mon sens pour 
la derniere, et surtout lorsqu'on sait par experience ou par 
sentiment, qu'on se connait a ce qui sied le mieux. Mais 
l'autre n'est pas a negliger, pourvu qu'on se souvienne 
toujours que ce qui reussit vaut mieux que les Regies. (2:109) 
Like Pascal, moreover, the chevalier was fascinated by 
mathematics. Gambling interested him for its rewards, per­
haps even more so for its elegant retirement into a closed 
circle, removed from less-refined preoccupations (that is, 
as the quintessential activity of I'honnete homme), but he 
was also drawn to the mathematical aspect of the stakes 
and worked with Pascal at solving various game problems.2 
The idea of order that permeates his writings is perhaps a 
result of this training; but whatever the reason, Mere, 
while relying on intuition in structuring his moral universe, 
also believed firmly in an aesthetics of symmetry and pro­
portion: "Tout ce qu'on fait et tout ce qu'on dit est une 
espece d'Architecture: il y faut de la Symmetric" (2:37). 
Thus affective reactions, inherently less organized in their 
original state, demand a constant ordering and structuring, 
consistent with the chevalier's emphasis on control. 
To achieve his ends, the chevalier de Mere relied on 
techniques culled both from finesse and geometrie. But 
once this intellectual kinship with Pascal has been estab­
lished, Mere tends to become a shadow figure, if not for 
scholars, at least for the body of students, who become only 
marginally acquainted with the moralist tradition. There 
may be an additional reason for passing him by. His works 
are dry, repetitious, rigid; everything is constrained and 
measured. Mere's attention to performance in society runs 
counter to current belief in movement and free expression. 
The reader is not likely to find much in his work that is 
relevant to life as we know it today. 
The question then arises whether Mere offered a "rele­
[16] 
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vant" experience to seventeenth-century Frenchmen. His 
writings clearly did not propose a code of living in reach 
of "everyman." Mere, building a moral structure whose 
goal was social perfection, designed for a superior individ­
ual constantly in control of himself, was writing for an elite. 
His ideas had meaning for that social class which earlier 
in the century had found in the ethics of glory and grandeur 
appropriate self-definition. The ideal proposed by the 
chevalier de Mere is directed toward a generation who had 
discovered the bankruptcy of the morals of heroism. The 
nobleman's glory and power were hardly significant con­
cepts at a time of weakening political power. Mere's works, 
published well into the second half of the century, propose 
the small-scale, reduced code necessary to such a time, the 
diminishing of stress on la vraie vertu reflecting the de­
creased political power. Henceforth, social perfection will 
be the new goal. 
Jean Starobinski, in an article on La Rochefoucauld but 
which applies with equal force to Mere, formulates the 
transition that has occurred: "C'est dans le champ social 
lui-meme, c'est dans le commerce quotidien que les valeurs 
esthetiques vont se substituer aux imperatifs moraux et 
prendre a leur tour valeur d'imperatifs. L'existence trouvera 
sa regie dans la loi qui gouverne le rapport harmonieux 
des formes et des fictions: il faudra apprendre a plaire, a 
cultiver les agrements, a trouver les airs et les manieres."3 
The acknowledgment that the old rules no longer com­
pose an operable force engenders an alternative moral 
structure: I'honnetete. Mere's writings are faithfully de­
voted to the formulation of this idea. His conversations 
with the marechal de Clerambault, in their structure alone, 
especially reflect the preoccupation with refinement and 
style as they fluctuate between two activities: conversing 
and gambling, recourse to the latter being the primary 
interrupting force in the flow of words. It is not only a 
leisured world that emerges but a facile one, alternating 
between gentlemanly conversation and le jeu. 
The emphasis on refined elegance, on manner and cor­
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rect form, demanded an ideal civilization to serve as an 
example to the seventeenth-century nobility. Mere chose 
one way beyond the time and space of classical France: 
ancient Greece. The portrait, not surprisingly, is of a 
fictitious Greece, heavily romanticized and obviously re­
moved from any historical accuracy. The chevalier offers 
a superb glorification of a refined, elegant civilization, 
superior in manners and conduct to any other. He fre­
quently alludes, it is true, to heroes and heroism, but he 
does not use these terms as Corneille did. Gone are the 
sublime pride, the heroic stances, the princely declama­
tions, for Heroism is now refinement, and the Hero is he 
who conquers not violently, but "d'une maniere qui plaise" 
(1:52). 
The core of Mere's work, I'honnetete, was not a new 
subject, having already been analyzed by writers as emi­
nent as Chapelain and Balzac. Mere's direct predecessor 
was Faret, who, in his UHonneste Homme, published in 
1630, sought to establish a code of behavior for aristo­
cratic man at court. But the chevalier's definition went 
further than his predecessors', and his own involvement 
with the ideal is more intense. He both enlarged and 
deepened the concept, separating it from more limited 
notions of courtly conduct and social gallantry. L'honnetete 
for Mere was an active force—"il faut qu'elle agisse et 
qu'elle gouverne" (1:55)—not a decoration. It was the es­
sence of the individual and "la quintessence de toutes les 
vertus" (3:71). All this is very vague, and deliberately so, 
for the assumption was that the elite circle for whom these 
words were intended could reach behind the imprecision. 
The ideal was not accessible to all—in fact, was never 
meant to be—but rather had meaning for a certain few seek­
ing to maintain, for themselves and the society that sur­
rounded and observed them, their superior status. Mere 
was intent upon establishing a moral code, one to be 
deciphered by the marechal de Clerambault and a few 
others, but clearly restricted in its accessibility. Nothing 
has really changed, the "essence" of nobility has remained 
[18]

THE CHEVALIER DE MERE 
intact; but with the shift from ethical to aesthetic criteria, 
success may be more attainable, failure less traumatic. 
L'honnetete for the chevalier de Mere takes precedence 
over any rival demands, which explains why love, spon­
taneous and uncontrollable, finds little place in his moral 
universe. He believed that l'honnetete was a complete moral 
system requiring total commitment: "La consideration de 
ce qui est honnete, et do ce qui ne Test pas, doit faire 
toute l'etude, et toute la conduite de notre vie" (Ref., 7). 
A sharply penetrating and discerning mind was also neces­
sary. Emphasis throughout Mere's works is on conscious, 
reasoned behavior; the passions must be kept in check: 
"Pour etre sage, il faut que l'esprit et la raison soumettent 
le coeur, et pour etre mechant, il faut que le coeur domine 
la raison et l'esprit" (Ref., 262). Although this dichotomy 
is expressed in rather unsophisticated terms (and surely 
deliberately so)—the mind is "good," and the heart is "bad" 
—it does convey the chevalier's fundamental view of life. 
The spontaneous irrationality of passion is alien to his 
ideal, which, though not excluding love, nonetheless makes 
room only for an ascetic, untroubling amour honnete. 
The preeminence of l'honnetete is never in doubt. Por­
trayed as solid, durable, and eminently worthy in every way, 
the ideal contrasts with the evanescent passions: 
L'honnetete se montre si agreable a toute sorte de jour, 
qu'elle merite bien qu'on la cherche; et quand on la trouve, 
et qu'on ne la perd point de vue, on ne manque jamais de 
l'acquerir. Ayons-la toujours devant les yeux, et si nos pas­
sions nous veulent detourner de ce qu'elle nous ordonne, 
rebuttons-les severement. . . . Nous y sentirons d'abord 
quelque contrainte, mais elle ne sera pas longue, et puis a 
considerer nos plus sensibles contentements, ils s'en vont 
bien vite, a peu pres comme un songe agreable. (3:88) 
The passions, and the pleasure they procure, are seen as a 
mere dream; l'honnetete appears as an enduring, even per­
manent, force. The ephemeral quality that Mere accords 
to love refers not only to time. He perceives love as an illu­
[19]

LOVE AND LANGUAGE 
sion when contrasted with the moral firmness of Vhon­
netete. 
The passions emerge in Mere's works as not only ephem­
eral but also debasing for man: "La raison distingue 
Thomme de l'animal, mais la passion le confond avec lui" 
(Ref, 136). This traditional Christian view is further de­
veloped in one important letter, which Mere constructs as 
a conversation between himself and La Rochefoucauld. 
The conversation is probably apocryphal, and the ideas 
those of the chevalier alone. In any case, the letter con­
firms his belief that physical love is crude and impure, for 
he is in ready agreement with "La Rochefoucauld": "Je 
trouve aussi que ces plaisirs sensuels sont grossiers, sujets 
au degout et pas trop a rechercher, a moins que ceux de 
Fesprit ne s'y melent. Le plus sensible est celui de l'amour, 
mais il passe bien vite si l'esprit n'est de la partie" (Let., 
90). Yet another letter explains that physical love alone is 
morally unsatisfactory, adding that "lorsque les graces de 
l'esprit et du bon air accompagnent la beaute du corps, 
l'amour n'a rien qui degoute" (Let., 682). 
For Mere the erotic impulse is also wild, uncontrolled, 
and unpredictable, offering distressing potential for indi­
vidual alienation. Love contradicts reason and moderation 
—"La sagesse et l'amour ne s'accordent jamais" (Ref., 143) 
—and is an inherently destructive force—"L'amour est sembla­
ble au feu, il brille et plait quand on en est eloigne: mais 
il brule et consume quand on s'en approche de trpp pres" 
(Ref., 144). These reflections, though rather banal, set the 
tone for Mere's analysis. What concerns him is the disrup­
tive nature of love, its capacity for estranging the "true" 
self. His fictional characters serve to illustrate this fear: 
"On aime Armide dans le camp des Chretiens, parce 
qu'elle s'y presente douce et composee dans une grande 
moderation, mais quand Renaud la quitte . . . et que dans 
l'exces de sa colere et de ses regrets elle ne garde plus de 
mesures, quelle difference d'elle a elle-meme" (2:15)? 
The "true" self as envisioned by the chevalier may be 
loosely described as the conscious, reasoning side of man. 
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Mere's efforts are directed toward dominating and control­
ling the unreasoning, subconscious layers of the self. His 
writings frequently reflect an analytical naivete so strong 
for one of Mere's general perceptiveness that deliberate, 
studied ignorance can be the only explanation: "Mais en­
core, comment se peut-il que l'amour et la haine se trou­
vent quelquefois a un si haut point dans un meme coeur, 
et qu'on puisse traiter si cruellement des personnes qu'on 
aime d'un amour extreme" (Let., 674)? This superficial 
psychology contradicts the perceptions of other classical 
writers, such as Racine, who explored fully the love-hate 
dichotomy. Mere, however, categorically rejects what he 
views as immoral behavior, and his rejection takes the form 
of suspended belief. 
He is blind also to other "anomalies" of love. In one 
letter to a female correspondent, the chevalier ponders 
how the superior traits associated with Vhonnetete can fail 
to engender deep love: "La beaute, Fagrement, l'honne­
tete, la bonne mine, les graces du corps et de l'esprit, ce 
sont des grands attraits pour se faire aimer; et nous voyons 
neanmoins que ces belles qualites produisent bien souvent 
un effet contraire, tant a l'egard des hommes que des 
femmes" (Let., 672). There follows a long list of "aberra­
tions," which appear to be both historical (Henri II and 
the duchesse de Valentinois) and fictional ("un grand Seig­
neur fort bien fait, fort galant," who loved only physically 
deformed men), and which illustrate the intensity of Mere's 
stance. 
It may be said also that the chevalier feared that love 
could weaken the male. The Reflexions morales focus on 
this question in some detail. To support the general state­
ment "L'amour excite le courage quand il est dans la 
moderation, mais sitot qu'il porte un homme jusque dans 
la volupte, il le ramolit, bien loin de le rendre vigoureux" 
(Ref., 170), Mere offers in the following reflection several 
classic examples of men rendered "soft" by women—Achilles 
and Polyxena, Antony and Cleopatra. Thus, against a 
morale of softness, irrationality, and alienation, Mere will 
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propose another vision, I'honnetete, an ideal that point by 
point surpasses erotic love. 
For not only is I'honnetete durable, whereas passion is 
perceived as ephemeral, what further distinguishes the 
chevalier's goal is its capacity for engendering happiness: 
L'honnetete me semble la chose du monde la plus aimable, 
et les personnes de bon sens ne mettent pas en doute, que 
nous ne la devons aimer, que parce qu'elle nous rend heu­
reux: Car la felicite, comme on sait, est la derniere fin des 
choses, que nous entreprenons. Ainsi tout ce qui n'y con­
tribue en rien, quoique Ton s'en imagine quelque appa­
rence honnete, c'est toujours une fausse honnetete. . . . 
Car a bien examiner toutes les vertus, elles ne sont pas a 
rechercher que de cela seulement, qu'elles peuvent servir 
a notre bonheur. (3:99) 
Mere also emphasizes the relationship between I'hon­
netete and happiness in his correspondence: "Tout ce qui 
ne peut contribuer a nous rendre la vie agreable, ce doit 
compter pour rien; I'honnetete meme qu'on estime tant, 
n'est a souhaiter que parce qu'elle rend heureux ceux qui 
l'ont et ceux qui l'approchent" (Let., 318). Mere stresses 
happiness because he seeks to dismantle another ideal, 
la vraie vertu, that prevailed earlier in the century. Happi­
ness was never the goal of la vraie vertu, which strove instead 
for loftiness and integrity even at the expense of life itself. 
Unlike I'honnetete, however, love is directly associated 
with suffering—"Qui commence a aimer, doit se preparer a 
souffrir" (Ref, 138)—and with despair—"L'affectiondegenere 
facilement en desespoir sitot qu'elle n'a plus d'esperance; 
elle veut tout perdre, quand elle ne peut rien gagner" 
(Ref., 137). Indeed, in those letters that appear free of the 
galanteries that color much of the correspondence, Mere 
is genuinely pained by love's disappointments: 
En effet je trouve que je m'engage extremement, et d'abord 
je ne croyais pas que cela dut aller si loin . . . j'avais bien 
quelque pressentiment que je courais plus de hasard aupres 
de vous que je n'avais fait partout ailleurs; mais parce que 
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j'avais vu beaucoup d'occasions ou je m'etais sauve des 
plus grands dangers sans blessure ou du moins sans bles­
sure mortelle, je me fiais trop a ma fortune, et pour dire le 
vrai, j'etais bien imprudent de ne pas craindre d'etre si 
souvent tete-a-tete avec vous dans les Tuileries. {Let., 
171-72) 
It is not the intention here to explore Mere's motivations, 
and the above passage may or may not express genuine 
emotional anguish. Whether the words are "sincere" is 
not germane, for, in any case, they correspond perfectly to 
the general tenor of Mere's writings: love is associated 
with emotional wounds, with suffering, and is rarely the 
beneficiary of the "positive thinking" reserved for I'hon­
netete. 
There is, however, yet one more important characteristic 
of I'honnetete: the quest for aesthetic perfection. This 
artistic element sharply distinguishes Mere's ideal from the 
naturalness of love. Critics have detected an artificial qual­
ity to Vhonnetete, as formulated by the chevalier; but sig­
nificantly, the artificial in his works is linked closely with 
art. Theater metaphors are prominent, frequently in rela­
tion to the chevalier's ideal man: "Le personnage d'un hon­
nete homme s'etend partout; il se doit transformer par 
la souplesse du genie, comme l'occasion le demande" 
(3:157). Mere thinks in terms of audiences, of society as a 
"watching" public. Thus his honnete homme must never 
fail to captivate and seduce. 
In what may seem initially paradoxical, and in contra­
diction to the artistic imagery, Mere portrays I'honnete 
homme as a completely natural figure. His person must be 
unaffected and unadorned. For I'honnete femme, makeup 
and fancy dress are rejected as masks of the natural self. 
Pedantry is attacked as a cover-up for true knowledge, as 
is brilliance that lacks depth: 
Mais les gens faits, et qui jugent bien, n'aiment pas les 
choses de montre, et qui parent beaucoup, quand elles ne 
sont que de peu de valeur. Celles qui n'ont guere d'eclat, 
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et qui sont de grand prix, leur plaisent. Cela se remarque 
en tout, et meme en ce qui concerne l'esprit et les pensees. 
Car si ces sortes de choses semblent fort belles, et qu'elles 
ne soient belles qu'en apparence, elles degoutent tout aus­
sitot, et celles qui le sont sans le paraitre, plus on les con­
sidere, plus on les trouve a son gre. C'est qu'elles sont belles 
sans etre parees, et qu'on y decouvre de temps en temps 
des graces secretes, qu'on n'avait pas apercues. (1:56) 
Mere had a penchant for all in life that is secret, undetected, 
below the surface. "Ces beautes secretes" form an integral 
part of his aesthetics, contrasting with the seduction of sur­
face attractions. 
The natural state of things, however, is not always 
sufficiently commanding. The superior individual—male or 
female—must strive for perfection, and it is in this effort 
that the artistic goal is realized: "Sans mentir," writes 
Mere to one correspondent, "vous avez eu jusqu'ici trop 
de confiance aux avantages que la nature vous a donnes: 
et puisque vous voulez que je vous eclaircisse de tout, 
sachez que le plus beau naturel est peu de chose a moins 
qu'on n'ait soin de le perfectionner" (Let., 502). Social 
man is viewed here as a living work of art, whence the 
appropriateness of aesthetic standards. 
The artistic ideal does not function in a vacuum. Aes­
thetic perfection is not only an aspect of courtly conduct. 
For Mere I'honnetete continually transcended limited no­
tions of aristocratic man at court. If he dwells extensively 
on aesthetic perfection, it is in large part because of as­
sociation with the theme of control. L'honnete homme thus 
becomes a highly complex figure, whose essential posture 
of sharp observation combined with a possessing style 
leads to complete domination over his audience: "Nous 
avons toujours quelque chose qui nous tient au coeur, et 
nous touche sensiblement: et c'est un grand avantage, que 
de penetrer ce faible pour gagner les personnes comme on 
veut" (3:152). 
The type of control he envisions, however, is of a special 
nature. Domination for Mere means seduction, in both 
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the broadest connotation and the most sexually limited 
one. It is, moreover, in the art of language that the cheva­
lier finds the most satisfactory means to successful "pene­
tration," hence, to control. His letters, as well as the con­
versations with the marechal de Clerambault, emphasize 
that perfection in eloquence is the way to success, where­
as the "right" language is also judged essential in the art 
of sexual seduction. In both cases aesthetic domination 
of an audience is the primary goal. 
As a strictly social concept, free of sexual orientation, 
Mere's art consists of winning over others through elegant 
discourse: "Quand on s'est acquis toutes les qualites qu'on 
peut souhaiter pour etre eloquent, on est assure de plaire 
et de persuader, et meme de se faire admirer dans tous les 
sujets agreables" {Let., 371-72). It is significant that the 
art of pleasing is coupled here with the art of persuasion. 
L'art de plaire is the basis of Mere's ideal, but the connota­
tions are complex. L'honnetete transcends the ideas of 
"pleasing" associated with gallant behavior and relies upon 
an aesthetically defined social presence in order to 
achieve total domination: "Mais je vous puis assurer que 
Ton ne saurait trop avoir une certaine justesse de langage, 
qui consiste a se servir des meilleures facons de parler, 
pour mettre sa pensee dans l'esprit des gens comme on 
veut qu'elle y soit, ni plus ni moins" (1:15). Elegance and 
refinement are not meant only to "please"; they are also, 
perhaps principally for Mere, a sure means to molding 
and controlling others' thinking. 
When domination is sexualized, skillful use of language 
is equally essential. In the Conversations Mere shows how 
indulging in verbal excesses and failing to control lan­
guage can ruin a suitor's attempt to please and seduce: 
"On leur [les femmes] jette son coeur a la tete, et d'abord 
on leur en dit plus que la vraisemblance ne leur permet 
d'en croire, et bien souvent plus qu'elles n'en veulent" 
(1:21). Although Mere explains that seduction of women 
involves diverse "agrements," he places particular stress 
on verbal art. Contrasting Caesar in battle to Caesar 
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seducing Cleopatra, the chevalier highlights two diverging 
means for success, but which are equally dependent upon 
appropriate expression and style. 
By far the richest example, however, of the adroit use 
of language in the art of seduction is detailed in a letter 
where Mere purports to relate a "friend's" adventures. In 
this situation a would-be lover, disguised as a family tutor, 
successfully gains the complete attention of the woman 
he desires. His method is unusual—mastery of the art of 
reading aloud—but destined to succeed: 
II faut done que je tache de lui plaire en tirant la quintes­
sence de tous les agrements qui la peuvent toucher par la 
meilleure maniere de lire; elle consiste a bien prononcer 
les mots, et d'un ton conforme au sujet du discours, que 
ma parole la flatte sans l'endormir, qu'elle l'eveille sans la 
choquer, que j'use d'inflexions pour ne la pas lasser, que 
je prononce tendrement et d'une voix mourante les choses 
tendres; mais d'une facon si temperee qu'elle n'y sente 
rien d'affecte. Je fis en peu de jours tant de progres en 
cette etude qu'elle ne se plaisait plus qu'a me faire lire et 
qu'a s'entretenir avec moi. (Let., 60) 
Here Mere portrays the erotic domination of an audience 
through close attention to subtleties of style and form. 
Perfected, artificial expression replaces natural conversa­
tion as a first important step in seducing the woman. It 
is surely not coincidental that the language Mere's 
"friend" adopts to recount his little tale is charged with a 
latent sensuality ("je prononce tendrement et d'une voix 
mourante les choses tendres"), which communicates the 
desired goal of seduction. Thus if verbal excess may lead 
to failure in seducing a woman, careful attention to lan­
guage may, on the other hand, engender considerable suc­
cess. The veracity of the above story is of little conse­
quence. Hyperbole may well have come into play. But 
even if Mere has exaggerated the role of polished lan­
guage arts, the story still conveys an idea essential to his 
thinking: the erotic domination of an audience through 
an aesthetic medium. 
What Mere develops is a desexualized portrait of love, 
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for diverse reasons. There is surely an Epicurean element 
to his works. In their descriptions of the ideal woman, the 
Epicureans emphasized both physical charm and a high 
degree of intelligence. Many passages in the chevalier's 
works allude to the importance of intellectual ability in 
women, and the stress that he places on this talent re­
sults, in part, from an attitude that values intelligent dis­
course. "Ce qui fait principalement que vous plaisez 
toujours," writes Mere to a female correspondent, "c'est 
que vous avez l'esprit fin, avec une extreme justesse a 
parler, a vous taire, a etre douce ou fiere, enjouee ou 
serieuse, et a prendre dans les moindres choses que vous 
dites le meilleur ton et le meilleur tour" (2:10). 
But if Mere's philosophical ties to Epicureanism are 
always apparent, they do not sufficiently explain the formu­
lation of his ideal. Maurice Magendie believes that the 
mondain code, which banished spontaneity and relied 
heavily upon convention, may have been a reaction against 
"la sensualite sans esprit mise a la mode par le Vert 
Galant."4 Mere's strong sense of refinement, his quest for 
the correct airs, and his close attention to style, and par­
ticularly to style in language, do indeed offer an alternative 
to overemphasis on sensuality. As such, I'honnetete be­
comes a form of sublimation. 
Perhaps there is another reason, related to the above 
but sufficiently distinct to warrant mentioning. "La ga­
lanterie," one critic has written, "est un alibi commode. 
Elle introduit dans la conversation entre hommes et 
femmes un langage qui, malgre ses conventions, reste un 
langage amoureux . . . c'est le chemin naturel de la 
seduction."5 Many of Mere's letters to female friends testi­
fy to a highly cultivated form of galanterie. (This impres­
sion, impossible to prove, results from the cumulative ef­
fect of reading a large number of very similar letters to 
women correspondents.) What the letters, essays, and 
dialogues convey is that attention to style and language 
has become a means to achieving emotional independence 
while still ensuring the success of the game of love. 
Both Magendie and Duchene offer meaningful explana­
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tions of Mere's goal—the de-sensualizing of love in favor 
of an aesthetically defined art de plaire. Mere does in­
corporate an ethical standard into his writings. By stating 
that "il est certain que quand on aime une personne d'un 
merite exquis, cet amour remplit d'honnetete le coeur et 
l'esprit et donne toujours de plus nobles pensees, que 
Faffection qu'on a pour une personne ordinaire" (2:81), 
the chevalier suggests that his ideal is morally superior. 
But despite the introduction of this ethical standard, Mere 
still conveyes a socialized view of love. As the above pas­
sage suggests, love is a means for arriving at the perfec­
tion of the self that Mere calls Vhonnetete. "C'est de 
l'amour, que naissent la plupart des vrais agrements" 
(3:75). This cause-and-effect relation communicates the 
diminished stress on individual feeling and the heightened 
stature of pleasability that are the mark of the chevalier 
de Mere's works. Within his moral universe, there is little 
room for the solipsistic spontaneity and intensity of pas­
sion. At best, reciprocal honnetete has become the ideal 
in a world where social perfection is the highest standard. 
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LA ROCHEFOUCAULD

i HE MAXIMES TOTALLY DEFY 
critical discourse as we know it; their 
fragmented structure is at variance with 
a continuous, organized flow of words. 
And yet the temptation to order, to struc­
ture, to systematize, remains strong, al­
most as if the fragmentary form provoked some special chal­
lenge. Hypotheses explaining why La Rochefoucauld favored 
the maxim have been amply formulated, perhaps most sat­
isfactorily by Jean Starobinski,1 for whom the maxim cor­
responds to the demands of a subject matter imbued with a 
sense of man's physical and psychic "fragmentation." But 
even—or perhaps especially—the most perceptive analysis is 
in radical contradiction with the work as La Rochefoucauld 
presented it, for a continuous, structured chapter or essay 
brings to the Maximes the very sense of order that the author 
clearly sought to avoid. 
It is perhaps our ambiguous, uncomfortable relation­
ship to the discontinu in literature that lies at the base of 
any effort to link what was so deliberately left unjoined. 
(This discomfort was not experienced, of course, in the 
classical age, heir to a long tradition in the aesthetics of 
the discontinu, from the Odyssey up through Montaigne. 
Rather, our own reactions emanate from the university 
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criticism of the nineteenth century and its efforts to impose 
rigor and structure.) As Roland Barthes has shown in his 
essay "Litterature et discontinu," modern Western thought 
will accept, at best, only certain specific forms of the dis­
continuous: "Le livre discontinu n'est tolere que dans ses 
emplois bien reserves: soit comme recueil de fragments 
(Heraclite, Pascal), le caractere inacheve de Toeuvre (mais 
s'agit-il au fond d'oeuvres inachevees?) corroborant en 
somme a contrario Fexcellence du continu, hors duquel il 
y a quelquefois ebauche, mais jamais perfection; soit comme 
recueil d'aphorismes, car Taphorisme est un petit continu 
tout plein, l'afrirmation theatrale que le vide est horrible."2 
La Rochefoucauld's Maximes, although not exactly pro­
verbial, belong certainly both in forme and fond to a tradi­
tion of pithy, moral reflection. Nevertheless, a certain 
malaise remains; there is a desire, a need, to connect. 
Because the adage or maxim is its own entity, inevitably 
any attempt to agglomerate falsifies its basic premise of 
structural independence. The whole becomes equal to the 
sum of its parts; but it may well be that any "adding up" 
process is irreconcilable with intention. Nonetheless, once 
the critic decides to comment upon the text, he has no 
other choice than to structure into an intelligible whole the 
sum total of the Maximes (selecting certain ones as repre­
sentative of other similar maxims), or, on a more-reduced 
plane, to study one aspect (theme) of the work, again or­
ganizing the individual parts into a new, larger entity— 
virtue, amour-propre, and so on. The sole alternative pos­
sibility is to comment on each individual maxim, with no 
attempt made to relate it to any others. But this seems to 
be an unnecessary task, the success of the Maximes being 
due precisely to their polished form, which gives the "truth" 
in a more formally perfect fashion than any equivalent ex­
pression. 
The outcome of this enterprise is necessarily a certain 
gap between text and critical text. Ultimately, the Maximes 
taken as a whole are impenetrable. Their fragmentation, 
their sense of indivisible totality, escape any notion of 
system. Nevertheless, this section is an attempt at "pene­
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trating" the maxims that revolve about the theme of love, 
although an overly rigid systematization will be carefully 
shunned. 
But once the project is stated and accepted, other prob­
lems immediately arise within the bounds of the topic it­
self. La Rochefoucauld's pronouncements on love resist al­
most any categorizing, however fluid. In the Maximes 
alone, he moves from one "mode" of love to another, runs 
the gamut between la coquetterie and a nebulous nostalgia 
for a "pure" love, remote, abstract, unattainable. And only 
recently an additional important manuscript has been 
added to the works of La Rochefoucauld, La Justification 
de I'amour, whose heavy emphasis on la courtoisie seems 
to be in contradiction with the basic tenets of the Max­
imes? Synthesis becomes a near impossibility. But one 
basic underlying concept does seem to blend the diverse, 
even sometimes diverging, ideas together—the notion of a 
passive man, a receptacle for an ever present flow of 
impulsions, an individual whose very autonomy seems 
little more than illusory. 
Traditionally, Vamour-propre has been seized upon as 
the fundamental current of the Maximes, the irreducible 
unit to which all of human thought and deed eventually 
succumb. The familiar paradigm unfolds as a dialectic 
between diverse outer manifestations and one basic inner 
motivation, Vamour-propre. However, in a series of arti­
cles begun in 1962 and concluded in 1966, Jean Staro­
binski reverses this premise, which has long held sway. 
Relying upon certain maxims that center upon inner divi­
sion, split, rather than on motivating unity, Starobinski 
concludes that the so-called external chaos is infinitely 
more simple than that which reigns "underneath."4 Maxim 
16 (of the 1678 edition) offers, for example, a multiplicity 
of motivations to explain clemency: "Cette clemence dont 
on fait une vertu se pratique tantot par vanite, quelquefois 
par paresse, souvent par crainte, et presque toujours par 
tous les trois ensemble."5 Causation reveals itself as both 
complex and flexible. 
Delving further, Starobinski dissociates the "self from 
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lfamour-propre, showing that the two are not equivalent for 
La Rochefoucauld, and that Vamour-propre is only one 
impulsion that appropriates the self. The latter emerges as 
an empty, hollow space, a vacuum, subject to invasion not 
only by self-love but by all forces. Vice, virtue, passion, 
all are conceived as "outside" of man, exterior to him, 
almost as floating energies.6 Starobinski's theory is sub­
stantiated by a careful reading of the Maximes. What strikes 
immediately is La Rochefoucauld's frequent use of per­
sonification, this literary device being not only a colorful 
stylistic variation but rather the means by which the maxim-
writer expresses the very tension integral to his work. When 
La Rochefoucauld writes that 'Tamour-propre est le plus 
grand de tous les flatteurs" (Max. 2) or that 'Tamour­
propre est plus habile que le plus habile homme du monde" 
(Max. 4), he is endowing self-love with qualities of func­
tioning independence and virtual autonomy, rivaling 
man's own and therefore a threat to the philosophical 
beliefs of voluntarism and freedom that he cherishes. 
Various maxims establish structures parallel to, and com­
peting with, man's own "systems": "Les passions ont une 
injustice et un propre interet qui fait qu'il est dangereux de les 
suivre . . . " (Max. 9). Not only is mankind endowed with 
an unmitigating self-interest, but so also are the intruding 
passions, their foundation a twin of the individual's. Those 
scholars who seek to determine the precise philosophical 
bent of the Maximes have justifiably concentrated on their 
antistoical posture, and the constant use of personification 
to depict man's loss of autonomy, his fall from the grace 
of voluntarism, is the perfect image of the new thinking. 
As tempting, then, as it is to view I'amour as an inter­
rupting force into the privileged domain of I'amour-propre, 
this perspective simply does not hold up. In fact, if a 
schematization is necessary at all, it would have to be one 
that depicts love and self-love as two parallel forces, each 
making its independent set of demands upon the vacuum 
of the self. That La Rochefoucauld conceived of these 
forces as operating in similar fashion, is reflected in his 
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choice of imagery. Both the long digression on I'amour­
propre and one of the Reflexions diverses, "De l'amour 
et de la mer," use the metaphor of the sea to translate the 
sense of movement and flow with which he endows both 
energies. 
There is considerably more to be said on the question 
of movement and energy, central to La Rochefoucauld's 
thinking and most prevalent throughout the Maximes and 
his other works. But this thinking is seemingly at variance, 
or at least does not obviously correlate, with his views on 
love as he expressed them in 1660, when La Justification 
de l'amour first appeared, a date that corresponds to the 
writing of the earliest maxims. The subtleties, nuances, 
and paradoxes of the Maximes and of a few of the Reflex-
ions diverses are absent from the Justification, which at 
preliminary reading fails to convince the reader that the 
work is indeed one of La Rochefoucauld's. Or at best the 
text seems to be a plaidoyer, urging a woman to quit her 
modesty and to bestow her favors upon the author.7 But 
although this last possibility may not be totally false, ul­
timately the Justification does seem to offer several parallels 
with the Maximes and with a few of the longer pieces. 
Since the publication of La Justification de l'amour is 
quite recent (1971), some preliminary background informa­
tion is necessary: 
La Justification de l'amour parut au debut de 1660—l'acheve 
d'imprimer date du 13 decembre 1659—dans le troisieme 
volume du Recueil des pieces en prose les plus agreables 
de ce temps chez Charles de Sercy. Ce traite, qui se divise 
en trois parties, occupe les pages 289 a 334, precedant 
ainsi un texte bien connu de La Rochefoucauld, L'Amour­
propre a Mademoiselle, qui va jusqu'a la page 344. Bien sur, 
une telle juxtaposition dans un recueil collectif ne prouve 
rien en lui-meme. Mais cet indice prend une certaine im­
portance du fait que Sercy cherchait a grouper les pieces 
par auteurs. (P. 10) 
My analysis, though not able to ascertain positively that 
the Justification is by La Rochefoucauld, does try to involve 
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it in the larger group of his known works. In any case (as 
with the "Pascalian" Discours sur les passions de Vamour), 
even if the work is not by the author of the Maximes, it 
nevertheless belongs to an analogous group of writings and 
therefore reflects their concerns and expression. For my 
purposes, I will here consider the work as one of La Roche­
foucauld's, although I am aware of, and accept as poten­
tially valid, the questions concerning the authenticity. 
What is significant is that the date of publication of the 
treatise on love corresponds approximately to the composi­
tion of the earliest maxims. Therefore, it would be false to 
attempt a study of the evolution of La Rochefoucauld's 
ideas on love when, in fact, many of his most important 
views seem to have evolved during the same period. In 
some ways this makes the task more difficult. There is no 
means to establish any transition in his thought, and the 
concordance of dates would seem to suggest that very 
possibly two different forces were in operation at the same 
moment: "une rehabilitation de l'amour et une contesta­
tion de tous les grands sentiments de l'homme" (pp. 16-17). 
Basically, both the Maximes and La Justification de 
l'amour originate in the same metaphysical source: man is 
subject to "invasion" by exterior forces and energies. The 
personification so prevalent throughout the Maximes—the 
stylistic device by which La Rochefoucauld was best able 
to translate his view of man's place in the world—appears 
also in the treatise on love, although in a somewhat dif­
ferent vein. In both works man is struggling, at war with 
(martial metaphors appear throughout the apology of love), 
outside elements, his autonomy is called into question, and 
he is drawn as a passive agent in a world of forces over 
which he has little control. But whereas there is no resolu­
tion to this confrontation in the Maximes, only a full 
acknowledgment of the chaos inherent in love, as well as 
recognition of its inevitable, sad end, in the Justification 
the weakness of the male lover becomes the means to es­
tablishing a stable situation where love can exist, as a secret. 
The deterministic view of man and the passions is as fully 
expressed in the Justification as in the Maximes? but the 
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images coincide perfectly with the general courtois, pre­
cieux tone: "L'Amour, ce dit Platon, est un puissant 
Magicien, qui attire soudainement les coeurs, et transforme 
etrangement les volontes. La beaute que ce Sexe adorable 
possede par eminence, et avec exclusion du notre, est le 
premier philtre duquel l'Amour se sert pour cet effet" 
(pp. 38-39). The reference to the philter, to the magic po­
tion with all its ties to legend, is more than simple courtois 
vocabulary. If love is a magic potion, man is the passive 
agent who drinks from it, and immediately, all notions of 
responsibility disappear. Drinking the love philter has long 
been an ideal way to communicate abnegation of human 
freedom dependent upon choice, and to enhance a sense of 
mutual, although involuntary, obligation. The entire con­
cept of a floating love-energy, a "potion" distinct from the 
self, that the individual absorbs into his system does not 
at all betray La Rochefoucauld's views on the invasion by 
annihilating impulsions, but rather reflects the determinis­
tic bent of his thinking. 
The personification so evident in the Maximes is given an 
enhanced status in the treatise on love, where it borders 
on allegory. The use of capital letters for "Amour" and 
"Beaute" provides them with a sense of independence, as 
they seduce and ensnare man. "Beauty" is furnished with 
supreme power (although in a traditional Epicurean vein, 
the mind also participates in the all-encompassing attrac­
tion), at war with man's so-called indomitable nature: 
La Beaute, cette chose admirable dont Ton sent la puissance 
bien plus facilement que Ton n'en explique la nature; ce 
rayon de la Divinite; cette Reine victorieuse des Sages les 
plus moderes, et des Conquerants les plus invincibles; 
cette qualite dont la domination est si bien etablie, qu'encore 
que toutes les Creatures semblent etre armees pour la 
combattre. . . . Enfin cette Beaute peut-elle trouver un 
coeur qui lui fasse une opiniatre resistance? (Pp. 40-41) 
The passage is written in the over-refined, over-elegant 
style of the Precieuses, and adheres to the courtois code. 
Nevertheless, the personification, the quasi-allegorical note, 
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follow perfectly La Rochefoucauld's fundamental beliefs. 
The warlike metaphors additionally support the view of man 
as being intruded upon, invaded by potent energies, "de­
termined" by them. Everything has become an "actor" 
on the world's stage, rivaling for possession of the self. 
"Le 'conflit des passions'—dramaturgic figuree, psycho­
machie allegorique—se fait passer pour la realite derniere 
et pour le sens veridique de la vie interieure."9 However, 
the belief that man is not responsible for his desire is 
mediated in the Justification, where emotional bondage is 
viewed as pleasurable. In the essay on love, man is por­
trayed as the adoring slave to woman; in the Maximes, on 
the other hand, he is depicted as bound by love, an im­
perfect, debilitating, and autocratic force. 
Personification is not the sole link between the two works. 
The concept of le vrai amour appears throughout both the 
treatise and the aphorisms. Although the latter focus on 
love as an imperfect force, quick to dissipate into coquetry, 
gallantry, or total stagnation, there is nevertheless room in 
the Maximes for an ideal love: "S'il y a un amour pur et 
exempt du melange de nos autres passions, c'est celui qui 
est cache au fond du coeur, et que nous ignorons nous­
memes" {Max. 69). Similarly, in the opening section of the 
Justification, La Rochefoucauld quickly establishes what 
love is not: "L'Amour est le nom du monde le plus commun, 
et la chose la plus rare: tout le monde en parle; beaucoup 
de personnes croient le ressentir; peu le connaissent; et 
cette ignorance produit . . . tant de fausses galanteries 
qui sont si ordinaires, et lesquelles sont plutot contraires a 
l'Amour, qu'elles n'en sont les effets" (pp. 27-28). In both 
works La Rochefoucauld carefully distinguishes between 
the commonplace reality and the exceptional ideal. "II 
semble done," concludes Hubert, "qu'il ait vu dans chaque 
vertu et dans chaque passion avouable de l'homme un cas 
limite, un etat exceptionnel, qu'il faudrait a tout prix at­
teindre sous peine de s'enliser dans ce monde equivoque ou 
les vertus sont des vices deguises et ou l'amour se confond 
avec la vanite" (p. 19). 
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The presentation of le vrai amour, however, is not paral­
lel in the two works. In the Maximes it is maintained as a 
remote ideal, a goal that man will never attain. Perfect love 
in the Justification, on the other hand, though still ideal­
istically portrayed, is a real possibility for mankind, if not 
for all men, then at least for an elite circle of honnetes gens. 
L'honnetete is not a predominant theme of the Maximes, 
although it does figure in the Reflexions diverses. How­
ever, in La Justification de I'amour, La Rochefoucauld fo­
cuses on l'honnetete, establishing a strong tie between that 
superior moral ideal and love. 
In the opening part of the essay, the moralist openly 
justifies love to its critics—"le vrai Amour est la chose du 
monde la plus raisonnable" (p. 30)—and in the best Epicu­
rean tradition paints a harmonious picture of attraction 
based equally on feminine beauty and merit. (The work, it 
should be made clear, is written exclusively from a male 
point of view, although La Rochefoucauld does distinguish 
between male and female reactions in matters of love.) It 
is, however, at the end of the first section and throughout 
the second that La Rochefoucauld develops his most origi­
nal and, for this study, most significant ideas, particularly 
in his analysis of the secret. 
In the introduction to La Justification de I'amour, Hubert 
maintains that the close attention La Rochefoucauld ac­
cords secret love is the strongest reason for attributing 
the essay to the author of the Maximes. The latter work 
does emphasize hidden, secret elements in man's moral 
life. But if the two works utilize a common principle, they 
do not pursue the idea along parallel lines. The term cacher 
assumes two very different connotations. 
"Qui aime, et ne temoigne pas la Passion a l'objet de son 
Amour si adroitement, et par des moyens si respectueux, 
qu'elle ne s'en puisse abstenir, est timide, et manque a 
l'Amour meme. Qui n'a pas assez de conduite pour cacher 
sa Passion a toutes les autres personnes, en la faisant con­
naltre a la seule qu'il aime, est peu judicieux, et n'aime 
pas bien" (p. 62). Love, then, is to remain a complete secret 
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from the world. For transmitting the passion to the "love 
object," such communication may utilize only the most re­
spectful means. These methods, as the second section will 
inform, are rarely verbal, or verbal only in the final stages. 
La Rochefoucauld has developed a theory that first iso­
lates love, removing it from the eyes of the world, then 
tames it to such a degree that to "talk love" is itself a "sin," 
violating the rather ascetic criteria of merit and esteem 
(key principles of I'honnetete) that tolerate only a discreet 
sign language. 
This is not to say that language is not important in the 
art of wooing. In La Justification de I'amour, it is essential, 
but in a limited context: 
II nous ordonne de commencer la conduite de notre Pas­
sion par une connaissance la plus parfaite que nous puis­
sions tirer de la personne que nous aimons, et particuliere­
ment les sentiments qu'elle a en general touchant l'Amour; 
d'essayer de lui temoigner en toutes rencontres une extreme 
curiosite de savoir les pensees qu'elle peut avoir sur ce 
sujet; de renouveler autant que la licence le permet les 
discours qui touchent cette matiere. (P. 64) 
In a note to the above passage, J. D. Hubert remarks 
that the art of loving expressed here resembles closely the 
art of conversation as developed in the Reflexions di­
verses: "On ne saurait avoir trop d'application a con­
naitre la pente et la portee de ceux a qui on parle . . ." 
(p. 192). The point is significant and deserves further analy­
sis. As in the writings of the chevalier de Mere, the 
Justification socializes love. This is not to say that the es­
say involves the lover in a large context: he is, to the con­
trary, isolated, refused the pleasure of divulging his feelings. 
However, in describing love in terms that bear a close re­
semblance to the art of conversation, La Rochefoucauld 
stresses not spontaneously experienced emotion but rather 
the controlled refinement of genteel society. 
The second section, however, is less concerned with the 
couple than with the lover and the world, and the ban 
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against communication is severe. No third party may share 
in the knowledge of the passion, which must remain an 
eternal secret: "Peut-etre s'etonnera-t-on que la Loi de 
l'Amour, que Ton peut appeler la premiere, puisque c'est 
elle qui regie ses commandements, soit un commandement 
de le tenir couvert" (p. 68). The precieux tone of such 
"commandments" does not detract from an awareness 
that the interdiction against discussing or sharing the pas­
sion is absolute. 
The final section of La Justification ("Suite de la se­
conde partie du traite de l'amour") develops and amplifies 
the themes of the earlier parts, with the taboo against lan­
guage assuming greater force. It is no longer a question of 
maintaining a secret, but of how to communicate with 
the female. Forthright avowal of love may occur, but only 
if explicitly permitted by the woman, and only after the 
acceptance by her of other signs, judged less demeaning 
to the morale of I'honnetete. The spoken word itself is seen 
as a transgression, no less threatening than a physical act. 
In this context, where gesture and action are never even 
brought into question, to speak of love is the ultimate vio­
lation. Speech must therefore be repressed by I'honnete 
homme—"Quelquefois il se considere soi-meme dans un si 
grand, et si veritable exces de Passion, que sa grandeur lui 
donne de l'audace. En ce moment l'impatience de faire 
connaitre ouvertement son Amour, lui porte la parole sur 
les levres; en celui-ci le respect la rejette dessus la langue" 
(p. 73)—as a means to tempering the passion and to main­
taining the standards of esteem and respect. 
The final pages of La Justification de l'amour focus al­
most exclusively on the question of language, as the author 
searches for more discreet methods of communication. 
There is an oblique element to these efforts, a desire to re­
main within the prescribed boundaries of Vhonnetete, even 
if only partial understanding results: 
Je confesse que comme la sujetion entiere de notre en­
tendement a la personne que nous aimons est la marque la 
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plus particuliere de la Passion que nous aurons pour elle, 
puisque nous la refusons meme tres souvent a nos Rois les 
plus legitimes, et que c'est l'unique service auquel les plus 
puissants Monarques de la Terre ne nous peuvent obliger, 
il est raisonnable que nous soyons extremement exacts a 
ne rendre point nos paroles criminelles, lesquelles sont les 
plus vives images de cet entendement. Je crois meme que 
nous ne devons laisser jamais sortir de notre bouche ce 
mot, lequel etant permis nous donne tant de joie, et defendu 
nous charge de peines et de tourments, je vous aime, que 
nous n'ayons lu dans les yeux de celle a qui nous parlons, 
qu'elle a quelque pitie de notre mal; ou bien si nous ne 
sommes pas assez heureux pour tirer ce sentiment de son 
coeur, que la violence de nos souffrances ne rompe ce si­
lence parlant. (Pp. 75-76) 
Within the confines of I'honnetete, "ultimate sin" has be­
come the violation of specific language codes—"a ne rendre 
point nos paroles criminelles"—whose basis is decidedly 
non-erotic. 
La Rochefoucauld does indicate that the woman may see 
fit to allow the potentially "criminal" words to be pro­
nounced. The precieux tone of this earnestly expressed 
hope contrasts with the severity directed toward unen­
couraged love talk, conveying an emotional freedom on the 
part of the author. Unquestionably, the entire work is 
colored by elements of la courtoisie and la preciosite; and, 
in fact, the interdiction against direct avowal of love may 
be viewed as a conscious attempt by La Rochefoucauld to 
adhere to those traditions, particularly as regards the ques­
tion of esteem. Through suppressing direct violations to the 
precieux tenets, the author may better persuade a woman, 
if that is his intention. 
Nonetheless, the moralist's close, intense attention to 
language may also be viewed as an effort toward moderat­
ing potential disruption to the morale of Vhonnetete, it­
self antithetical to unbridled, spontaneous emotion. Direct 
avowal of passion is permissable only when other, less-
threatening signs (particularly eye "language") have been 
received positively. Reliance on such non-verbal signs mod­
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erates what is otherwise perceived as a certain violation 
of social and moral dicta. In this context Vamour honnete 
coincides with la preciosite, with both attempting to circum­
vent the realities of passion through non-verbal means. The 
expression of love becomes then metaphoric. 
The Justification is, in the end, an ambiguous work, 
professing to explain and justify love, yet fixed into an 
ascetic mold, where love is a secret from the world and, 
as regards the couple, a discreet, non-assertive sentiment 
controlled by the woman. There is surely a source of 
pleasure in the submissive, secretive stance of the lover, 
but such pleasure, consistently passive, is never the true 
focus of the essay. The thrust of the work is Epicurean, 
even Platonic at times, but beyond the philosophical base 
is the careful attention to regulating language in love mat­
ters. To control language is to control the passion itself, 
first separating it from the outside world into the domain 
of the secret, then moderating its expression to conform 
to the ascetic limits of Vamour honnete. 
The Justification succeeds in harmonizing Vamour-passion 
with the behavior of Vhonnete homme; le vrai amour re­
mains an ideal throughout the work, but one that is por­
trayed as viable for an elite group of lovers, if only for them. 
The mood of the work is subdued, and love never finds 
expression in the Justification—either in the author's descrip­
tion or recommendations—beyond the levels dictated by so­
cial demands. Nevertheless, the effort, however dimin­
ished, is a positive one when contrasted with the Maximes, 
where no such resolution is offered. Love is seized upon, 
examined from every side, squeezed out, and left limply 
hanging. The harmonizing activities of the Justification 
and of certain of the Reflexions diverses are absent, and 
the sense of total determinism, no longer couched in the 
elegant phrases of the courtois-precieux mold, appears as 
a far more bitter pill. Moreover, the vrai amour is placed 
so far away from us that we are tantalized without receiv­
ing any hope of realization. As for the love we are allowed 
in our life, when it manages to exceed the boundaries of 
[41]

LOVE AND LANGUAGE 
coquetry and gallantry (a rare enough occurrence), it still, 
inevitably, ends and dies, and we are left with a sense of 
shame and an exhausted heart. 
The deterministic view of life that ruled over La Justi­
fication de Vamour is, as I showed earlier, present through­
out the maxims. But the aphorisms present a more complex 
view. "Reading through the Maximes consecutively, one 
may be struck by two evidently divergent prinqiples of 
causal explanation. On the one hand, persistent attention 
to egotism and passion points to a far-reaching psychologi­
cal determinism; on the other hand, emphasis upon for­
tune and the bodily humors as indomitable influences sug­
gests an equally powerful physical determinism."10 This 
dialectic is not really ever resolved in the Maximes, al­
though, as Philip Lewis has shown, the maxim on l'amour­
propre, which was number one in the first edition of the 
work but which La Rochefoucald later rejected, is able to 
link the ego's demands with forces from the outside: "II 
[l'amour-propre] est inconstant, et outre les changements 
qui viennent des causes etrangeres, il y en a une infinite 
qui naissent de lui, et de son propre fonds."11 Nevertheless, 
the problem remains when individual maxims confront 
others of a different persuasion. 
Maxim 262 of the 1678 edition, for example, states, "II 
n'y a point de passion ou l'amour de soi-meme regne si 
puissamment que dans l'amour"; and Maxim 374 concludes, 
"Si on croit aimer sa maitresse pour l'amour d'elle, on est 
bien trompe," the implication being, of course, that it is 
"pour l'amour de soi." Maxims such as these do indeed 
indicate a psychological base where l'amour-propre is seen 
as the major determining force behind man's love. In these 
cases, actually, "love" as we traditionally formulate it— 
as a reaching out to another—is stripped of that very impli­
cation. The "other" is present, but it is self-love that is 
ultimately at stake. This view is most nearly consistent 
with certain modern psychoanalytical ideas that center up­
on the theory of narcissism, holding that "love of self is 
of the same nature as love of another person, or of ex­
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terior objects. Both are classified as sexual instincts and 
considered to originate in the libido."12 
But in establishing priority, primary consideration should 
be given to external physical causes,13 although La Roche­
foucauld, fearing perhaps the consequence of stressing this 
attack on man's autonomy and will, omitted several 
maxims to that effect from the 1678 edition. (Most, in fact, 
were taken out after the publication of the first edition.) 
Frequently they are also the strongest thrusts against the 
prerogatives of the self, although a few significant maxims 
do remain in the established edition: "La duree de nos 
passions ne depend pas plus de nous que la duree de 
notre vie" (Max. 5); "La fortune et l'humeur gouvernent 
le monde" (Max. 435). 
It is, however, in the maximes supprimees that La Roche­
foucauld develops the greatest indictment against freedom 
and will; and although the basic belief of causation is not 
very different from that expressed in the Justification, 
the language is far more acerbic. It is no longer a question 
of magicians and potions; the entire precieux tone has 
vanished, replaced by the metaphor of illness: "La plus 
juste comparaison qu'on puisse faire de l'amour, c'est celle 
de la fievre; nous n'avons non plus de pouvoir sur l'un que 
sur l'autre, soit pour sa violence ou pour sa duree" (Max. 
supp. 59).14 The conclusion is inevitable: "Comme on n'est 
jamais en liberte d'aimer, ou de cesser d'aimer, l'amant ne 
peut se plaindre avec justice de l'inconstance de sa 
maitresse, ni elle de la legerete de son amant" (Max. supp. 
62). Love is not willed, nor will. And as Starobinski con­
cludes: "L'homme est ainsi depossede. II ne desire pas en 
personne, il n'est plus responsable de son desir. C'est le 
desir qui, venu on ne sait d'ou, s'installe en l'homme et 
reclame satisfaction."15 
Beyond the level of determinism, of erosion of autonomy, 
the Maximes take a quite different bent from the Justifica­
tion. The greatest concentration of thought on the theme of 
love in the maxims is directed toward the dynamics of 
Eros, both the internal movement necessary to maintain 
[43]

LOVE AND LANGUAGE 
its force as well as the cyclical flow of passion. Prone to a 
certain amount of concrete imagery, La Rochefoucauld al­
ludes to the sea and to the life force as metaphors of his 
outlook. Both images occur in the Reflexions diverses, 
and although that work is not at the center of this study, it 
does highlight the maxim-writer's views. "De Famour et de 
la mer" is short and may therefore be quoted in its entirety: 
Ceux qui ont voulu nous representer l'amour et ses caprices 
l'ont compare en tant de sortes a la mer qu'il est malaise de 
rien aj outer a ce qu'ils en ont dit. II nous ont fait voir que 
l'un et l'autre ont une inconstance et une infidelite egales, 
que leurs biens et leurs maux sont sans nombre, que les 
navigations les plus heureuses sont exposees a mille dan­
gers, que les tempetes et les ecueils sont toujours a crain­
dre, et que souvent meme on fait naufrage dans le port. 
Mais en nous exprimant tant d'esperances et tant de 
craintes, ils ne nous ont pas assez montre, ce me semble, le 
rapport qu'il y a d'un amour use, languissant et sur sa fin, 
a ces longues bonaces, a ces calmes ennuyeux, que Ton 
rencontre sous la ligne: on est fatigue d'un grand voyage, 
on souhaite de l'achever; on voit la terre, mais on manque 
de vent pour y arriver; on se voit expose aux injures des 
saisons; les maladies et les langueurs empechent d'agir; 
l'eau et les vivres manquent ou changent de gout; on a re­
cours inutilement aux secours etrangers; on essaye de 
pecher, et on prend quelques poissons, sans en tirer de 
soulagement ni de nourriture; on est las de tout ce qu'on 
voit, on est toujours avec ses memes pensees, et on est 
toujours ennuye; on vit encore, et on a regret a vivre; on 
attend des desirs pour sortir d'un etat penible et languis­
sant, mais on n'en forme que de faibles et d'inutiles. 
(Pp. 197-97) 
This reflection contains many of La Rochefoucauld's ideas 
on love. In the first part he describes the internal chaos of 
love, its storms and reefs, and the second half is more con­
cerned with the cycle of love, particularly with its end. 
Comparing love to the life rhythm in another of the Re-
flexions diverses, "De l'amour et de la vie," he picks up 
again the theme of cycle, of rhythm: 
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L'amour est une image de notre vie: l'un et l'autre sont 
sujets aux memes revolutions et aux memes changements. 
Leur jeunesse est pleine de joie et d'esperance: on se trouve 
heureux d'etre jeune, comme on se trouve heureux d'aimer. 
Cette felicite neanmoins est rarement de longue duree, 
et elle ne peut conserver longtemps la grace de la nou­
veaute. . . . Nous nous accoutumons a tout ce qui est a nous; 
les memes biens ne conservent pas leur meme prix, . . . 
Cette inconstance involontaire est un effet du temps, qui 
prend malgre nous sur l'amour comme sur notre vie; il en 
efface insensiblement chaque jour un certain air de jeunesse 
et de gaiete, et en detruit les plus veritables charmes. (Pp. 
200-201) 
In these passages La Rochefoucauld demonstrates a de­
cided proclivity for all that is associated with movement, 
time, and change. The Maximes also are filled with allu­
sions to passage and to transformation. Love is conceived 
as a force totally dependent upon constant energy. Vary­
ing his elements, La Rochefoucauld adopts the metaphor of 
fire: "L'amour aussi bien que le feu ne peut subsister sans 
un mouvement continuel; et il cesse de vivre des qu'il 
cesse d'esperer ou de craindre" (Max. 75). Not only, then, 
is love in a state of constant change and movement, rush­
ing to an unfulfilling end, but it is conceived also as a 
projection, a forward-seeking shove, dependent upon either 
fear or hope, both future-directed emotions. La Roche­
foucauld is thereby calling into question the very nature 
of love, perhaps its existence even; for if the dynamic ele­
ment, the projection, is removed, there remains nothing. 
Love emerges as a non-force, dependent for sustenance 
upon our desires and anxieties, and it is these forces that 
sweep over us, demanding satisfaction.16 
La Rochefoucauld, as seen in the Reflexions diverses, 
is equally aware of love as a cycle, hence the comparison 
to the life flow; and although there are a few images of 
the early stages of love—"La grace de la nouveaute est a 
l'amour ce que la fleur est sur les fruits; elle y donne un 
lustre qui s'efface aisement, et qui ne revient jamais" 
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(Max. 274)—most of the adages are concerned with the end 
of love, with its eventual erosion and subsequent staleness. 
In the terminal stages, no pleasure remains, and the fre­
quent reference to illness suggests a feeling of corporal 
decrepitude, of a worn-out, worn-down mass of tissue. 
Stagnation sets in, and all that is left is a hopeless feeling 
of shame: "II n'y a guere de gens qui ne soient honteux 
de s'etre aimes quand ils ne s'aiment plus" (Max. 71). But 
worse than anything else is the inability to remove oneself 
from the labyrinth, from the web: "On a bien de la peine 
a rompre, quand on ne s'aime plus" (Max. 351), and the 
individual stagnates in the morass of his own dilemma. 
The image of stagnated, dying love pervades both the 
Maximes and the Reflexions diverses, and once in a while, 
La Rochefoucauld makes allusion to the graceful, happy 
stages of a developing passion. There are, however, almost 
no references to love as a potent, positive force. That love 
may be a powerfully upsetting feeling, with negative effects, 
La Rochefoucauld does acknowledge: "Si on juge de l'amour 
par la plupart de ses effets, il ressemble plus a la haine 
qu'a l'amitie" (Max. 72). But most frequently, it is associ­
ated with weakness, debilitation, sickness, and death; once 
in a while with delicate, promising hopes; almost never 
with vitality and vigor. There is one important exception, 
however, indicating that La Rochefoucauld at the very least 
did glimpse the possibilities of something more powerful, 
more forceful: "La meme fermete qui sert a resister a 
l'amour sert aussi a le rendre violent et durable, et les 
personnes faibles qui sont toujours agitees des passions 
n'en sont presque jamais veritablement remplies" (Max. 
All). Here love is linked to notions of energy and force; 
it is stationary ("durable") but not stagnant. Nevertheless, 
it seems fair to conclude that such possibilities are limited 
in La Rochefoucauld's moral universe—the note of disinte­
gration prevails. 
The final question revolves around le vrai amour, a con­
cept that La Rochefoucauld developed at length in La 
Justification de l'amour, and that also occupies an im­
[46]

LA ROCHEFOUCAULD 
portant place in the Maximes. Nevertheless, the latter 
work fails to establish a working plan for this superior 
ethic, whereas the Justification, in an elaborate display of 
mondanite, offers the honnete homme a code for achieving 
harmonious interaction between his personal and social 
needs. The concept of true love in the Maximes is no longer 
a perfectioning of the Epicurean mode, combined with the ex­
cellence of mondain principles; it is instead an intangible, 
even quixotic, vision, an ideal value, that La Rochefoucauld 
periodically injects into his writing as a tantalizing stan­
dard. Moreover, it is truly indefinable, and the sole method 
of explanation is through defining what it is not. 
Several maxims allude to the difficulty of defining this 
ideal, and almost all of these center upon the basic theme 
of concealment: 
S'il y a un amour pur et exempt du melange de nos 
autres passions, c'est celui qui est cache au fond du coeur, 
et que nous ignorons nous-memes. {Max. 69) 
II n'y a que d'une sorte d'amour, mais il y en a mille 
differentes copies. {Max. 74) 
II est du veritable amour comme de l'apparition des 
esprits: tout le monde en parle, mais peu de gens en ont 
vu. {Max. 76) 
The allusions to the hidden depths of the heart, if inter­
preted within the context of all of La Rochefoucauld's 
writings, would point to his doubt regarding the possibility 
of ever reaching such a pure form of love, for le fond du 
coeur is really a never ending abyss, and man can never 
hope to come to grips with its depths. Similarly, maxim 
76, by comparing "real love" to apparitions, thereby con­
tests its reality for mankind and places the whole question 
in the realm of the superstitious. In the aphorisms that 
which is secret and hidden is no longer the conscious effort 
of I'honnete homme to maintain the restraints of his moral 
system. Rather, if le vrai amour is hidden, it is because the 
ideal is far removed from any hope of realization. 
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And yet the ideal remains strong, appears almost viable 
sometimes, but ultimately remains elusive. Of course, were 
one to achieve such purity, all coquetry, gallantry, envy, 
and jealousy would disappear. But the final reality is an 
imperfect state of love, an inauthentic copy. 
Evidently, as Jean Starobinski has concluded, La 
Rochefoucauld never succumbed to the Nietzschean type 
of nihilism he flirted with; for he maintained at least a 
facade of belief in absolute moral values, unattainable 
perhaps, but existing as images in man's mind.17 Certain 
religious, ethical, and moral standards—in this case, love— 
retain their sense of purity, if only in the abstract. There 
is still a metaphysical and psychological "out," and funda­
mental, humanistic notions—freedom, will, self-perfection— 
are given a new lift, after having been negated. 
It is, however, difficult to return to the Justification 
after the Maximes; for even if the latter fail to take the 
ultimate step into a form of nihilism, they offer nonetheless 
some rather conclusive statements on the "way things are," 
statements that seem to destroy the hope that was put forth 
in the apology on love. There is an element of finality 
to the maxims, whereas the apology of love proposes an 
"open end," an aperture onto the world. 
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Chapter Three

MADAME DE LAFAYETTE

,ENDANT QUE LA GUERRE CIVILE 
[dechirait la France sous le regne de Charles 
IX, l'Amour ne laissait pas de trouver sa 
place parmi tant de desordres et d'en causer 
beaucoup plus dans son Empire."1 The 
abrupt beginning of La Princesse de Montpensier and its 
direct thrust upon the reader succeed in translating perfect­
ly the view of passion as a violent, interrupting force in a 
world dependent upon monotonous repetition, upon un­
questioned habit, for smooth functioning. In Mme de La­
fayette's works, true passion results from a sudden shock, 
from the arrival on the scene of a new presence, unknown 
before, and capable of radically altering the existence of 
the participants. It is not by chance that the opening lines 
of La Princesse de Montpensier establish a link between 
love and war. The martial metaphor for Mme de Lafayette, 
as for La Rochefoucauld, was the most potent means of ex­
pressing the state of man subject to invasion by violent 
passions that call into question his yearnings toward re­
pose as well as his belief in free will. 
It is the explosive, destructive, anarchical force of Eros 
that Mme de Lafayette sought to depict. Under the de­
cency of style (or the style of decency), the mind and the 
body are warring, the former manifestly unable to exert 
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control over the spontaneous, free impulses of the latter. 
In the tradition of the Rambouillet group and of the pre­
cieux code in general, passionate love could be traced to 
an origin of mutual understanding and admiration.2 In 
other words, it has a past. But for Mme de Lafayette, 
passion originates explosively, combustively, and is not 
related at all to the mental concepts of esteem and respect, 
based upon prior knowledge. 
Originating spontaneously within the body, erotic pas­
sion is translated by the body, totally unreceptive to the 
dicta of virtue and common sense. This coup de foudre ef­
fect occurs on successive occasions in La Princesse de 
Cleves:'M. de Cleves, upon seeing Mile de Chartres for the 
first time, "demeura si touche de sa beaute et de l'air 
modeste qu'il avait remarque dans ses actions qu'on peut 
dire qu'il concut pour elle des ce moment une passion et 
une estime extraordinaires."3 When Mme de Cleves and the 
due de Nemours first meet at a court ball, the effect is ab­
solutely electric and does not fail to astonish all who sur­
round them: "Quand ils commencerent a danser, il s'eleva 
dans la salle un murmure de louanges. Le roi et les reines 
se souvinrent qu'ils ne s'etaient jamais vus, et trouverent 
quelque chose de singulier de les voir danser ensemble sans 
se connaitre" (p. 262). The moment a new passion is born, 
it is sufficient unto itself, and, originating in the demands 
of the body, is totally free from dependency upon the past. 
That the body's impulses offer the most direct truth con­
cerning the individual is perceived, although unconscious­
ly, by the king and queens. Vaguely troubled, they react 
to this scene of perfect physical harmony by seeking to 
reinstall through a rapid introduction the reign of reason 
and virtue signaled by the term "se connaitre." The in­
stant, spontaneous accord between Mme de Cleves and the 
due de Nemours is in violation of traditional codes—occi­
dental, humanist, precieux—seeking to spiritualize love. 
The entire story of Zaide (in the tale of that name) and 
Consalve also belies the precieux, devout humanist concep­
tion of love based upon prior knowledge, admiration, and 
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respect. Early in the tale, Consalve expresses the belief 
that he could never love a woman without first knowing 
her well; the prince, his friend, takes the opposite stance 
(the whole discussion recalling a long tradition in courtois 
literature, the debate on love, from the medieval jeux partis 
to the precieux novel): "Je serais incapable de devenir 
amoureux d'une personne avec qui je serais accoutume 
et, si je ne suis surpris d'abord, je ne puis etre touche. 
Je crois que les inclinations naturelles se font sentir dans 
les premiers moments; et les passions, qui ne viennent que 
par le temps, ne se peuvent appeler de veritables pas­
sions."4 Consalve falls passionately in love with Zaide 
from the first moment he lays eyes on her and thus con­
tradicts his own theory of prior acquaintance.5 The obvious 
conclusion from Consalve's experience is that the nature of 
passion is sudden, violent, interruptive, independent of 
control by reason or by will. 
Because Mme de Lafayette clothed her tales and novels 
in a habit of cold concision, where the voice of passion 
central to her writing adopts only the most lucid, struc­
tured, carefully modulated tones, the very obvious erotic 
center of the works is frequently shunned in criticism, as 
if to penetrate the style would be a transgression. Although 
criticism has not failed to point out that one of the major 
themes of the novels and nouvelles is the difficult transition 
between appearance and reality—hence the lengthy portrayal 
of courtly splendor in the early pages of La Princesse de 
Cleves, contrasting with the moral imperfection that soon 
follows—it has, nonetheless, not carried such analysis one 
step further by showing that Mme de Lafayette's careful 
masking (through the channels of monotonous repetition, 
barren vocabulary, rigid structure) was only that, a mask, 
an appearance that barely veiled the erotic center and the 
diverse inner tensions.6 
It is true that allusions to the violent demands of the 
body, to the preeminence of the erotic over the mind and 
its illusions of will, may be stylistically reduced in Mme de 
Lafayette's works. The sole exception to this general pat­
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tern of minimal portrayal of that which is directly, explic­
itly sexual is the short, posthumous La Comtesse de Tende 
where the "language" of the body belies the code of de­
cency, social and literary. Sensual fulfillment is ushered in, 
expressed obviously through recourse to adultery, preg­
nancy, and illegitimate birth. The guilty participants are 
punished severely, but for a short time, the duration only 
of the tale itself (the illusion of fiction translating the 
illusory situation of a reigning, satisfied desire), the code 
of erotic gratification presides. The language of the text is 
virtually "violated" by the intrusion of vocabulary such 
as grossesse, but with the death of the heroine, the tempo­
rary social and literary deviation is expunged. 
Contemporary writers have the option of adopting the 
most primitive discourse in attempting to translate the out­
cry of passion. Neither grammar nor stylistic euphemism 
is required. Language can be not only direct but obscene 
in its effort to capture spontaneity, intensity, and violence. 
These same emotions were hardly absent from the litera­
ture of the classical age, but they were reduced or modu­
lated by an extraordinary superstructure. The chaos of pas­
sion was thematically present, but linguistically ordered. 
Phedre's lamentations, for example, over the tremendous 
burden and pain of her body, are cloaked in the rigid, 
highly structured Alexandrine verse: 
Que ces vains ornements, que ces voiles me pesent! 
Quelle importune main, en formant tous ces noeuds, 
A pris soin sur mon front d'assembler mes cheveux? 
Tout m'afflige, et me nuit, et conspire a me nuire.7 
The body's disorder and pain are couched in poetry's con­
tained refinement, the structure of the verse lending struc­
ture to, and thereby instantly diminishing, the effect of 
emotional chaos. In a similar fashion, mythological sym­
bolism replaces more direct allusions while offering un­
ambiguous explanation. That Hippolyte is painted as "ce 
fils de FAmazone" serves notice that there will be a strug­
gle with the opposite sex. 
[54] 
MADAME DE LAFAYETTE 
For Mme de Lafayette the relaxation of the socio-liter­
ary code occurs directly only in La Comtesse de Tende. 
Her other works are free of obvious violations. Hence, the 
recourse is to sexual symbolism as in the second scene at 
Coulommiers in La Princesse de Cleves, a scene that 
Michel Butor has analyzed thoroughly. Butor suggests that 
such symbolism, in this case, la canne des Indes, perceived 
by us in the post-Freudian age, was also discernible to the 
seventeenth-century reader accustomed to its frequent 
use in the fairy tales of the age.8 (I will discuss later Mme 
de Lafayette's recourse to various elements derived from 
the romanesque and the atmosphere of the contes de fee.) 
Although the truth of their extraordinary mutual attrac­
tion is already sensed by Mme de Cleves and M. de Ne­
mours, it remains at first an unconscious, hidden percep­
tion. Within the boundaries of a socially acceptable act— 
dancing—an act that is moreover ordered by social authority 
(it is the king who commands them to dance), the power 
of the body's extremely forceful presence and vitality is 
at once lessened and harmonized. The experience is still 
perceived as basically aesthetically satisfying; the beauty of 
the couple provokes "un murmure de louanges," although, 
imperceptibly, there is already the beginning of a trans­
gression, for the couple has never met before. But the 
physical harmony takes precedence over any sense of im­
minent danger, and the sexual nature of the pleasure the 
two partners experience is hidden by the veil of social ac­
ceptability and by the structured, measured elegance of the 
dance. 
At Coulommiers, however, a different mood prevails; 
and although Mme de Cleves lives the entire scene in a 
blur of conscious and subconscious, of dream and reality, 
the moment posits the entirety of her conflict. What was 
before socially authorized becomes now a transgression, an 
intrusion, a penetration that threatens to destroy not only 
Mme de Cleves but the entire social network based upon 
a norm of control and restraint. 
There is, in particular, at Coulommiers, a sense of under­
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lying violence that menaces directly the person of Mme de 
Cleves. Her utter exposure to Nemours, the penetration 
of his look upon her, testify to strong male aggression. 
The game of love, as Bernard Pingaud has shown, is not 
played without some extreme consequences for the wom­
an: "Un homme peut bien conquerir et abandonner suc­
cessivement plusieurs maitresses. Une femme, surtout si 
elle est mariee, perd a ce jeu non seulement la considera­
tion, mais le repos. Cette aventure qui n'est pour les autres 
qu'un sujet de curiosite, auquel on s'attache un jour et 
qu'on oublie le lendemain, est pour elle une decheance 
progressive, contre laquelle, par tous les moyens en son 
pouvoir, elle essaie en vain de lutter."9 Throughout all of 
Mme de Lafayette's works—in her fiction as well as in the 
short biography of Henriette d'Angleterre—there is a pervad­
ing atmosphere of male prowess that exerts itself either in 
the game of war or in the game of love. No less than four 
men attempt to control the princesse de Montpensier, each 
regarding her as his own exclusive conquest. The comte de 
Tende freely neglects his wife, subjects her to pain and 
humiliation, until his passion is eventually ignited through 
jealousy. And the due de Nemours persistently views the 
relationship with Mme de Cleves in terms of an aggressive 
seduction. 
Women are the prey of virile, violent instincts, and mar­
tial activity is seen by Mme de Lafayette as the sole satis­
factory means to repressing aggressive, erotic impulses. 
Thus when the chevalier de Guise fully comprehends Mme 
de Cleves' feelings for Nemours, he is so grieved that 
"des ce jour, il prit la resolution de ne penser jamais a 
etre aime de Mme de Cleves. Mais pour quitter cette 
entreprise, qui lui avait paru si difficile et si glorieuse, il 
en fallait quelque autre dont la grandeur put l'occuper. 
II se mit dans l'esprit de prendre Rhodes, dont il avait deja 
eu quelque pensee" (p. 307). Aggressive energies must be 
released in some fashion, and war is perhaps the sole satis­
factory outlet in a world where passion is rarely capable of 
being gratified and, when it is, of enduring. Women are 
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perceived as the object of the male impulse to vanquish, 
and the acts of transgression that their lovers commit leave 
them in a highly weakened position. 
In La Comtesse de Tende, the most direct attack is of 
course the adultery that triumphs over female virtue, ex­
posing the countess to guilt and dishonor. But although 
the reader is never witness to any adulterous scene (we 
are told only that she has become pregnant), a strong pre­
liminary violation occurs when the chevalier de Navarre 
successfully enters her chambers, surreptitiously, thus 
penetrating beyond the limits of socially acceptable meet­
ing grounds. This violation is, moreover, keenly felt as such 
by the countess; she perceives a direct threat to her per­
son and reputation. The entering of a room is in itself, 
for Mme de Lafayette, an act of seduction over a weakened 
adversary, who quickly succumbs to irresolution and con­
fusion: "La comtesse se laissa tomber sur un lit de repos, 
dont elle s'etait relevee a demi et, regardant le chevalier 
avec des yeux pleins d'amour et de larmes: Vous voulez 
done que je meure? lui dit-elle. Croyez-vous qu'un coeur 
puisse contenir tout ce que vous me faites sentir?"10 The 
chevalier's triumph, his successful attempt at drawing out 
the confession of love, is flawless. 
It is, however, in La Princesse de Cleves that Mme de 
Lafayette constructs her most masterful scene of symbolic 
rape. Early in the chain of events, Nemours freely steals a 
portrait of Mme de Cleves, and the symbolic possession is 
reinforced by his knowledge that the portrait belongs to M. 
de Cleves. The princess observes the entire scene, not at 
first without considerable pleasure. However, the ravish­
ment is soon perceived as an aggressive attack on her per­
son: "Elle fit reflexion a la violence de l'inclination qui 
l'entralnait vers M. de Nemours; elle trouva qu'elle 
n'etait plus maitresse de ses paroles et de son visage" (p. 
303). For the moment Mme de Cleves has been successfully 
undermined. 
The desired goal is physical possession, and this triumph 
of Eros is shared completely by the woman, although she 
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is never the aggressor. She may flee, as does the princesse 
de Cleves, succumb as the comtesse de Tende, but she is 
not the initiator of the struggle to possess. If she does choose 
to withstand the attack, her conscious behavior may well 
conform to her prescribed rules; but her subconscious, 
through her body, her gestures, her almost imperceptible 
movements and reactions, succeeds in communicating her 
yearnings. The body announces exactly what the mind 
seeks to obliterate. The mark of erotic passion is the com­
plete inability to disguise it, and the spontaneous expres­
sion of this passion—unnatural silences, blushes, self-
conscious gestures11—is the surest sign of the mind's loss of 
control. Originating in the body, erotic love is translated 
totally by it; and the upsetting, disquieting effect of passion 
upon the individual cannot be successfully masked. The 
dancing scene in La Princesse de Cleves reveals itself as 
the moment of optimum candor; here the basic truth of 
spontaneous drives is neither blocked outwardly nor re­
pressed inwardly. 
The nature of passion, as portrayed in Mme de Lafayette's 
universe, is to ravage, to destroy the smooth continuum of 
existence, to alienate the self from its most intimate concep­
tion. Surging suddenly, seemingly from nowhere, endowed 
with no past, no socially sanctioned signs (knowledge, 
respect), passionate love is experienced as a radical break, 
both temporal and psychological. In La Princesse de Cleves, 
which is the most complete of all Mme de Lafayette's works 
(the other tales offer more or less diverse fragments of the 
whole cycle), the goal is to reestablish the integrity of the 
heroine. Mme de Chartres' recourse to a vocabulary of 
imminent danger, of fall—"vous etes sur le bord du precipice 
(pp. 277)—suggests that at stake is the concept of "breaking 
apart," of falling from one world into another, engendering 
dispersion of the self and its alienation from a preliminary 
set of values. 
The problem then becomes, once the disquieting force of 
passion sets in, how to recompose the self, how to re­
establish continuity, how to regain the lost sense of "one­
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ness." The battle was hardly a new one in the century, and 
Mme de Lafayette's writings seem to bear directly upon 
the solutions of her predecessors, if only to deny their 
ideas. The whole of La Princesse de Cleves, from one point 
of view, is designed to combat a perspective of life based 
upon the strength of the mind. With the example of Con-
salve, M. de Cleves, and the princesse de Cleves herself, 
Mme de Lafayette quickly and forcefully undermines Mile 
de Scudery's and the precieuses* belief in mutual under­
standing and admiration as a prerequisite to a satisfactory 
love relationship. The body, and not the mind, is the seat of 
passion, and therefore any struggle to resist it based upon 
reason and lucid discourse is doomed to failure. 
Descartes, whose Les Passions de I'dme is perhaps at the 
base of Mme de Lafayette's thought, wrote that it was 
possible to acquire "un empire tres absolu sur toutes les 
passions, si on employait assez d'industrie a les dresser et 
a les conduire,"12 through the practice of la vertu (a pre­
dominating word, moreover, of La Princesse de Cleves and 
certainly not by chance the final one). La vertu was con­
sidered as the exercise of those standards that an honnete 
homme would judge to be superior. The necessary factor 
ensuring the continuity of this standard was "une ferme 
et constante resolution d'en bien user, c'est-a-dire de ne 
manquer jamais de volonte pour entreprendre et executer 
toutes les choses qu'il jugera etre les meilleures."13 The 
concept of a resolution relies heavily upon the firm use 
of mental faculties to moderate the force of the passions 
and endows the "word" with ultimate powers of tran­
scendence. 
This path is foredoomed a failure by Mme de Lafayette, 
however, for, as Serge Doubrovsky has expressed, "la 
reflexion, comme son nom l'indique, ne fait que refleter 
les pensees que nous avons formees spontanement et sur 
lesquelles elle n'a aucune prise."14 Mme de Cleves' multi-
fold attempts at extricating herself from her prison mis­
carry because they are based upon language that is mani­
festly unable to reply to the body's spontaneous drives. 
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Mme de Chartres, in an effort to regulate her daughter's 
behavior on the side of virtue, depended upon a system of 
self-control, obtained in turn by a constantly on-going 
dialogue with the self in favor of certain moral values, the 
antipode of which is the disorganizing life of passion. This 
"extreme defiance de soi-meme" (p. 248) is reached only 
via an unremitting inner soliloquy; the "right" words will 
achieve the desired goal of virtue. Thus the resolutions 
that Mme de Cleves makes after each emotional jolt are 
her chosen method of breaking the cycle. 
After her portrait is stolen, after she reads the letter 
supposedly addressed to Nemours (the one that in reality 
was directed to the vidame de Chartres), after she spends 
time alone with Nemours in an effort to copy that letter 
from memory, Mme de Cleves, aware of her violently 
intense feelings for him, resolves to control herself, to re­
establish reason in her life, to combat her passion. But 
this task will prove impossible, although she fully believes 
that her resolutions in themselves are sufficient to do battle 
with her desires. 
In the moments following her reading of the letter, Mme 
de Cleves, totally absorbed in her remorse and guilt, is 
consoled by the recognition that, "apres cette connaissance, 
elle n'avait plus rien a craindre d'elle-meme, et qu'elle 
serait entierement guerie de l'inclination qu'elle avait pour 
ce prince" (p. 311). Later, however, after the moments of 
solitude with Nemours in an effort to reconstruct the let­
ter, moments that bring her considerable pleasure, she 
concludes: "Je suis vaincue et surmontee par une inclina­
tion qui m'entraine malgre moi. Toutes mes resolutions 
sont inutiles; je pensai hier tout ce que je pense aujourd'hui 
et je fais aujourd'hui tout le contraire de ce que je resolus 
hier" (p. 330). With the full recognition of the impotence 
of the private, inner word, of reflections, in controlling 
her emotional state, Mme de Cleves opts for the sole re­
maining solution, flight: "II faut m'arracher de la presence 
de M. de Nemours; il faut m'en aller a la campagne, 
quelque bizarre que puisse paraitre mon voyage" (p. 
[60]

MADAME DE LAFAYETTE 
330). But flight in this universe is tightly constricted, and 
M. de Nemours has only to visit his sister, whose country 
home is a neighbor to Coulommiers, in order to be present 
at the scene of the aveu. 
Flight is not an answer to the dilemma, for the locus is 
at once too restrained, and the heroine is constantly being 
called back to the even more intimate circle of the court. 
Feeling these parallel pressures upon her, Mme de Cleves 
returns to reliance upon the lucid, unequivocal word as a 
solution to her problem, only this time she chooses dis­
course not with herself but with her husband. The question 
of a sincere confession is not a new one in the history of 
La Princesse de Cleves. Mme de Chartres had maintained 
a strict relationship with her daughter, whereby the latter 
was to keep her mother informed of all the amorous in­
trigues developing about this newcomer to the court, a 
counsel the heroine follows until the encounter with Ne­
mours. After the episode at the ball, Mme de Cleves enters 
into a whole new world, that of the secret. And when she 
finally resolves to speak openly to her mother, it is too late; 
Mme de Chartres is on her deathbed, unable to communi­
cate at length. In the early pages of the work, the power of 
the word is still at its highest peak. Mme de Chartres relies 
upon it as the sole method of maintaining her daughter in 
a virtuous state. Nonetheless, when Mme de Cleves per­
ceives the nature of her feelings, she abruptly falls silent, 
and communication is cut off or disguised. 
The aveu, the confession to her husband is doomed, for 
it opposes two codes, two universes, that are radically 
unharmonious: the mind and the body, Logos and Eros. It 
has been questioned whether the aveu is truly an act of 
courage on the part of Mme de Cleves or, rather, its 
opposite, a wish to place the responsibility for her conduct 
on someone else. Possibly it is both. What is more signifi­
cant, however, is whether, as an act relying upon the power 
of reasoned discourse, it can successfully combat passion 
and jealousy. It seems fair to judge it a failure, for the 
prince de Cleves, although intellectually esteeming his 
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wife's sincerity, is manifestly unable to control his rage for 
possession. Her "Fiez-vous a mes paroles" becomes an 
impossibility; M. de Cleves' suspicions will arise not out of 
logic, not out of dispassionate reason, but out of his frus­
trated effort to appropriate Mme de Cleves for himself. 
Belief, trust, and confidence are of perilously little weight 
in a world where the humanistic code has been stripped 
bare. What is sought is complete possession over Vautre— 
Eros being the symbol for that possession as well as for its 
eventual failure—and words are impotent as agents against 
this rage. 
In the end it appears that there are really only two 
alternatives: to succumb, as do Mme de Tende and the 
princesse de Montpensier, or to fight, in accordance with 
the honnete code: resolutions, sincerity, and flight. The 
second choice, which may loosely be referred to as an at­
tempt to repress, is unsatisfactory, for the spontaneous 
drives of the body will not be controlled by the dicta of 
the conscience grounded into the format of la parole. The 
transcendence of the passions that occurs in Corneille's 
plays reveals itself as totally bankrupt in Mme de Lafa­
yette's moral structure, and the desire for possession, 
translated through the concept of sexual desire and ener­
gies, emerges as the superior force. Descartes' code of 
generosite, his heavy use of la reflexion is shown to be 
equally lacking, since the inner dialogue, the reasoning with 
the self, comes too late. The spontaneous drives of the body 
have preempted the reign of the mind. 
If attempts at repressing fail, as they inevitably do, then 
the obvious alternative would be that of the two other 
heroines: to give in. La comtesse de Tende experiences the 
totality of her decision; la princesse de Montpensier suc­
cumbs in intentions only. Both women are severely "pun­
ished," through great suffering and eventual death; and 
within the context of these two tales, it would appear that 
a strict Christian moral alone prevents a happy conclu­
sion. There is a strong sense of transgression, of having 
given in to the body, which a rigid Christian ethic cannot 
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tolerate. This ethic unquestionably permeates the writings 
of Mme de Lafayette. The erotic is seen as threatening 
and demeaning; women are prey to the seductive efforts 
of the male; transgressions occur that violate the most 
traditional, religious views. But the full cycle of Mme de 
Lafayette's thinking is really not complete in either La 
Princesse de Montpensier or La Comtesse de Tende, for 
in these two tales physical desire is merely punished. It 
is not shown as an empty path to possession as in the far 
more complex La Princesse de Cleves. The drive to ap­
propriate I'autre, interpreted through erotic longing, 
emerges as a radical impossibility, and it is to this end that 
Mme de Lafayette's works are directed. Physical posses­
sion is recognized as vastly unable to satisfy the far more 
intense longing for control. 
The theme runs strongly through La Princesse de Cleves, 
interwoven among others, almost lost at times, but looming 
up at the end, thereby giving new force to what was earlier 
not quite conclusive. The failure of Eros to satisfy on any 
level beyond immediate gratification is evident early in the 
marriage between M. de Cleves and Mile de Chartres, 
prior even to her first encounter with Nemours: 
M. de Cleves ne trouva pas que Mile de Chartres eut 
change de sentiment en changeant de nom. La qualite de 
mari lui donna de plus grands privileges; mais elle ne lui 
donna pas une autre place dans le coeur de sa femme. Cela 
fit aussi que, pour etre son mari, il ne laissa pas d'etre son 
amant, parce qu'il avait toujours quelque chose a souhaiter 
au dela de sa possession; et, quoiqu'elle vecut parfaitement 
bien avec lui, il n'etait pas entierement heureux. II con­
servait pour elle une passion violente et inquiete qui 
troublait sa joie. (P. 260) 
The vague, nebulous quality that surrounds this passage, 
the imprecision of the "quelque chose," is not by accident. 
Rather, Mme de Lafayette's efforts here seem directed to 
portraying a still subconscious perception, experienced fully 
by M. de Cleves but not in a lucid, comprehensive fashion, 
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only within the realm of dim impressions. Having attained 
full rights and "privileges" over his wife, whom he adored 
and desired from their first encounter, having "possessed" 
her physically, he remains unsatisfied. Although aware 
from the start that Mile de Chartres never shared his 
passion, he undoubtedly anticipated that physical intimacy, 
achieved in marriage, would establish the intensity he had 
sought. 
The queen, in her pursuit of the vidame de Chartres, 
expresses directly, almost violently, what was lolling about 
in M. de Cleves' mind. She offers the most brutal recog­
nition of man's desires, seeking to appropriate the vidame 
de Chartres exclusively for herself, forever, and she will 
entertain no other attachments for him: 
Je le souhaite, parce que je desire que vous soyez entiere­
ment attache a moi, et qu'il serait impossible que je fusse 
contente de votre amitie si vous etiez amoureux. . . . 
Souvenez-vous que je veux la votre [confiance] tout entiere; 
que je veux que vous n'ayez ni ami, ni amie, que ceux qui 
me seront agreables, et que vous abandonniez tout autre 
soin que celui de me plaire. (P. 317) 
This absolute attachment, this fidelity with no end, is 
impossible to achieve, for it is truly a confiscation of 
I'autre, a denial of his autonomy. 
But conscious desire to possess is rare in Mme de La­
fayette's tales; more frequently, the wish plays itself out 
at the subconscious level. The ultimate failure to appropri­
ate the partner is subconsciously perceived by certain char­
acters long before emotional involvement has become a 
reality. It has been noted that Mme de Lafayette's works 
most frequently center upon a trio,15 the third person 
serving as the obstacle to the satisfaction of the two others. 
The trio structure is quite naturally a symbol in itself of 
the inability of the couple to re-create the "edenic isola­
tion,"16 and a symbol also of the jealousy inherent in all 
passion. But the banal character of the trio structure is 
invested with an additional force when the metaphor of 
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"threeness" becomes a subliminal response and an obstacle 
to the mere project of the couple. 
M. de Cleves falls victim to these strange, unconscious 
machinations, for his illness and his subsequent death re­
sult, not from any real situation, but from his fantasy of 
Mme de Cleves spending the night with Nemours. With­
out waiting to hear any precise details from his aide, who 
had observed Nemours at Coulommiers (for indeed, those 
precise details were lacking, since nothing occurred), he 
succumbs to a violent illness immediately, almost as if he 
could no longer endure the pain of not having achieved 
with his wife the relationship he had so ardently desired. 
His imagination, evoking fantasies based on the structure 
of a trio, becomes his sole defense against any further hopes 
for attaching Mme de Cleves exclusively to his own person. 
Illness and death are thus his only way out of the unsatis­
factory "coupling" with his wife. Imagination becomes 
the means to freedom, to M. de Cleves' liberation from il­
lusions of "quelque chose . . . au-dela de sa possession," 
of an existence devoted exclusively to himself. 
The novel Za"de is too reminiscent of the earlier trends 
of the romanesque, too different from the nouveau roman 
of Mme de Lafayette, to enter easily into an analysis. The 
structure of the work hardly conforms with the new trend 
toward brevity and concision. But certain themes in the set 
of tales do reappear in all of Mme de Lafayette's writings. 
The hero, Consalve, involved in a passionate effort to woo 
Zaide, very early in the novel constructs for himself an 
elaborate rationalization of her emotional distance. Not able 
to understand her language, he still perceives through vari­
ous gestures and reactions that she is in love with another, 
and the intensity with which he endows this fiction points, 
to a fundamental sense of frustration inherent in many of 
Mme de Lafayette's principal characters. His imaginary 
construct serves as a solid barrier to all his hopes, as if 
in advance, on the subliminal level alone, the perception 
of the ultimate failure of all coupling is already present. 
With Consalve the story takes another turn and ends with 
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references to a happy marriage. But his addiction to anx­
ieties over the threat of a rival, a nonexistent one, pre­
figures entirely the situation of Alphonse and Belasire, 
whose short tale seems to serve no further end than to 
demonstrate in precise terms the subconscious blocking 
of fulfillment. Alphonse is presented as a man with a pri­
mary obsession, a fear of jealousy, that guides his life and 
allows him no serious attachment until he meets Belasire. 
In the early part of his relationship with her, he remains 
tortured with doubts about marriage, preferring "le malheur 
de vivre sans Belasire a celui de vivre avec elle sans etre 
aime" (p. 110). On a conscious level, he manages to sur­
mount these fears; but the subconscious refuses to follow 
such a facile accommodation, and in a sudden, seemingly 
inexplicable transition, Alphonse passes from confidence to 
doubt, the lack of intervention on the part of the author 
testifying to the movement away from the conscious and 
toward the subliminal. Alphonse enmeshes himself in a 
paroxysm of jealousy for a rival, but he is a dead rival 
and can pose no threat to the harmony of the couple. As 
with Consalve, there is an extraordinary intensity to Al­
phonse's struggle that belies an almost deliberate attempt 
at destroying the relationship with Belasire, as if his psyche, 
conditioned by a long tradition of suspicion toward mar­
riage, fully anticipated the impossibility of having her ex­
clusively for himself. Although his conscious mind at this 
time has gone beyond his fears and all his efforts are di­
rected toward marriage, in reality his longstanding revolt 
emerges triumphant over his voluntary decisions. The 
transition from conscious confidence to subliminal rebel­
lion is almost imperceptible; it is not analyzed or inter­
preted by Mme de Lafayette, for it is not a movement of 
reason but rather a complex, subconscious impulse. Thus 
the construct of the false trio serves Alphonse as a potent 
means to a radical rupture of the relationship. 
It is not always through the device of a hypothetical trio 
that the perception of the ultimate inability to "possess" 
is manifested. Mme de Cleves eventually foresees how 
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fragile is the due de Nemours' attachment for her, how time 
alone will destroy it, how she can never, in fact, retain him. 
Hers is the recognition that passion can subsist only when 
barred from total satisfaction. Within the context of La 
Princesse de Cleves, the fading is seen occurring on the 
part of M. de Nemours, on the part of the male, and that 
may well have been Mme de Lafayette's bias; but it is pre­
cisely the same course that Alphonse long feared on the 
part of the woman. It is a pattern perceived as operating 
within the "other," but that is its psychological base. Meta­
physically it is the recognition of the impossibility of pos­
session. 
The princesse de Cleves' problem, and Alphonse's prob­
lem as well, remain without obvious solution, for the para­
dox of the life situation will not allow for a compromise. 
"En face d'une double impossibility metaphysique,—l'amour 
ne pouvant etre satisfait, en raison des relations qui exist­
ent necessairement entre deux libertes, ni refoule, du 
fait qu'il represente une irresistible expression de nous­
memes,—il ne reste plus de solution, ou plutot il n'en reste 
qu'une: le suicide. Si la spontaneite ne peut etre reprimee, 
elle peut etre supprimee, et la destruction de soi est la 
seule issue."17 A self-mutilation occurs; for the princesse 
de Cleves it is a solitary sacrifice; for Alphonse and Be­
lasire, the couple unite in an effort to annihilate their po­
tentiality as two. Alphonse's intense subconscious drive to 
destroy any hopes of marriage is in the end consented to, 
and surpassed by, Belasire herself. Establishing the pre­
eminence of le repos, Belasire renounces all further com­
merce with Alphonse and, going one step further, commits 
herself to a life without love by entering a convent. The 
renunciation is virtually a mutual one, with the couple 
united in a stand against marriage, against love, against 
the foredoomed attempt at possession. In the interest of 
repose, of avoiding the tumultuous jealousy that is insepa­
rable from passion (for it announces the failure to possess), 
the couple will be sacrificed, sacrifices itself, destroys it­
self voluntarily. Belasire's retreat is thus a spiritual suicide, 
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a denial of what is most fundamental, spontaneous, and 
free, a mutilation of her person and equally of Alphonse, 
for the couple-structure is ruptured. 
Mme de Cleves, in an even more extreme stance, chooses 
not only a spiritual suicide but a physical one as well, as 
if recognizing that the only way out of the dilemma of un­
satisfied passion is the death of the instrument that is the 
seat of the longing: the body. The illness that debilitates 
her and leads to her death becomes the means by which 
she successfully purges her passion. Death installs itself in 
the place of Eros, in a revival of the Tristan myth. 
There is, as Gabriel Bounoure has remarked, a strong 
element of auto-punition% implied in the renunciation of 
Mme de Cleves and of Alphonse-Belasire, a self-chastise­
ment for having played the game poorly and lost, of hav­
ing succumbed to a pattern of living totally opposed to 
earlier, stricter standards of vertu and defiance. The retreat 
to the convent may be viewed as an aspiration to purity, 
to a life beyond the disorder engendered by love, as a 
means to moral healing, or as the perfect cloture trans­
lating the suppression of Eros. All these motives inter­
twine, quite naturally, and all come back to a more general 
theme of refusal dictated by aspirations toward repose. 
If le repos here is essentially the absence of passion 
and suffering, then Mme de Cleves and Belasire are basi­
cally opting for a minimal existence, a life characterized 
by absence rather than plenitude. The theme of repose tra­
verses the moralist writings of the century, originating per­
haps in the religious literature (Pascal, Bossuet), but 
finding room also in the ataraxia of the Epicureans. The 
tranquillity to which Mme de Lafayette's characters aspire 
is a strange paradox, at once an emptiness and a fulfill­
ment—ultimately, a fulfillment in an emotional vacuum. 
But if suppression is indeed the accurate word for the 
path that Mme de Lafayette sees as the sole "out" in a 
world where passion, desired eternal, rests finite, it is also 
the right one for her efforts to deny the most traditional 
forms of romanesque expression. The attack is thus against 
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the double illusion of the myth of passion and of its expres­
sion, the precieux novel. Reading through Mme de La­
fayette's works, one perceives two distinct movements that 
compose the structure of the recit. There is the flat, monot­
onous, monochromatic repetition of certain basic passages: 
Mme de Cleves' continued efforts to reestablish the con­
tinuity of her emotional life; Consalve's slow, steady 
progression toward Zai'de. Varied only slightly each time, 
these passages form the foundation of each tale. Less fre­
quently there are flashes of something else, scenes that 
are throwbacks to the traditional romanesque, sometimes 
even conte de fee, atmosphere. It is as if these latter scenes 
are there as traps, for no sooner do they surge upon the 
page than they are destroyed for the illusion that they cre­
ate. 
The early, descriptive pages of La Princesse de Cleves 
are among the snares; the superlative kings and queens, 
princes and princesses, dukes and duchesses, are portrayed 
in all their courtly splendor, only to "fall" rapidly into the 
most untenable situations far removed from aristocratic 
appearances. The dancing scene, also, stands out as an 
"interrupter" of the monotony, a moment when the illu­
sion of harmony is at its peak, the atmosphere of the ball 
lending a highly romanesque flavor to the moment. The 
chateau of Mme de Cleves at Coulommiers is in itself a 
fantastic lure, the ideal and familiar place for the satisfac­
tion of passion, the fairy-tale response to the problem. 
But the scenes at Coulommiers emerge as the antithesis 
of the romanesque experience. What is woven there is not 
satisfaction but rather the powerful destruction of any 
such possibility, for it is these scenes that are the cause of 
M. de Cleves' jealousy, illness, and death. Rather than 
opening onto a field of unlimited charms, of romantic play, 
they definitively shut out the possibility, the illusion, of 
a marriage between the princesse de Cleves and M. de 
Nemours. The chateau becomes the locus of death, belying 
its traditional wonderland symbolism. 
This opposition of structures—the monotonous, flat scenes 
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pitted against the momentarily dramatic ones—is little more 
than the myth confronting the reality. The illusion of pas­
sion will be destroyed as will its medium, the long, ad­
venture-laden precieux novel. Henceforth the tale will be 
short; romanesque-type episodes will be included in order 
for the illusion to be more systematically destroyed. Con­
siderably more polished in her artistic skills by the time 
she wrote La Princesse de Cleves and thus able to avoid di­
rect references to her method, Mme de Lafayette offered 
in her earlier works almost a commentary of her aims. In 
La Princesse de Montpensier, the first of her tales, she 
signals her intentions exactly and explicitly: 
Un jour qu'il revenait a Loches par un chemin peu connu 
de ceux de sa suite, le due de Guise, qui se vantait de le 
savoir, se mit a la tete de la troupe pour servir de guide; 
mais, apres avoir marche quelque temps, il s'egara et se 
trouva sur le bord d'une petite riviere qu'il ne reconnut pas 
lui-meme. Le due d'Anjou lui fit la guerre de les avoir si 
mal conduits et, etant arretes en ce lieu, aussi disposes a 
la joie qu'ont accoutume de l'etre de jeunes princes, ils 
apercurent un petit bateau qui etait arrete au milieu de la 
riviere; et, comme elle n'etait pas large, ils distinguerent 
aisement dans ce bateau trois ou quatre femmes, et une 
entre autres qui leur sembla fort belle, qui etait habillee 
magnifiquement, et qui regardait avec attention deux 
hommes qui pechaient aupres d'elle. Cette aventure donna 
une nouvelle joie a ces jeunes princes et a tous ceux de 
leur suite. Elle leur parut une chose de roman. (P. 10) 
In the pursuit of the romanesque, the hero and heroine 
are caught up in a web of intrigue and adventure, the cul­
mination of which is the scene of the rapt manque leading 
to a disheartening end, to the death of Mme de Montpen­
sier. The irresistible trap of the myth of passion, the pur­
suit of "une chose de roman," the construction of their 
own roman, are swiftly and brutally destroyed by an au­
thor intent on abolishing an entire code, both moral and 
aesthetic. And with the exception of Zaide, which con­
forms in structure and even theme far more to earlier tra­
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ditions than to the "new novel" of Mme de Lafayette, all 
the tales point in the same direction. Illusions must be 
dismantled, and to do so, the transmitters of the illusions, 
the precieux novels, must be revealed as sham, for they 
are perhaps after all not the transmitters but rather the 
very creators of the myth. Their so-called verity must fall, 
and Mme de Lafayette, re-creating romanesque scenes in 
the middle of vast monotony and pain, successfully re­
veals the extent of their bankruptcy. And that is undoubt­
edly why her final work, La Comtesse de Tende, is charged 
with a strange intensity, with allusions to illegitimate preg­
nancy and birth, to great suffering, to a pathetic death. It 
stands as a most definitive slap at the "old way." The 
chimera is thus laid to rest. 
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Chapter Four

SAINT-EVREMOND

AINT-EVREMOND'S WRITING ex­
'perience is surely one of the most curious 
among those of the moralists. His entire ap­
proach defies the classical rules of order, 
structure, and impersonality. There is a strong 
sense of the haphazard, an impression that comic and 
serious can readily mingle, and, especially, a feeling that the 
direct portrayal and analysis of the self are integrally a 
part of writing. Moreover, Saint-Evremond attempts to 
convey that he could just as soon not write as write, that 
the act of writing is not always "serious"; sometimes, it is 
only a game, an amusing pastime. How successfully he was 
able to convince that he did indeed have the option of 
silence is open to question. Ultimately it can be said that 
his seeming nonchalance is little more than a pose, a means 
to an ironic distance necessary to counteract any "over­
involvement," a means to emotional freedom. 
There is also in Saint-Evremond a sense of disorder 
that seems to be the outcome of a radically paradoxical 
situation, set in motion by the confrontation between praise 
of pleasure and fear of love. Both aspects of his stance 
merit study, although the second part, his fear, has only 
recently been fully understood.1 Saint-Evremond's reticence 
is complex, and the two diverging poles—involvement and 
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self-containment—not infrequently in the course of his writ­
ings pull together, then coincide, only to split apart once 
more. 
There is, first, his heavy preoccupation with the concept 
of pleasure. As Victor Du Bled has shown, there were de­
grees of libertine thought in the seventeenth century, with 
Saint-Evremond situated definitely along a more moderate 
line,2 always reluctant to relinquish a vocabulary of discern­
ment, discretion, and moderation; nevertheless, his ideas 
follow a well-defined, carefully structured conception of 
pleasure, with the self and its well-being always at the 
center. 
The underlying question that pervaded seventeenth-
century French thought—"What shall man do to be saved?" 
—was the problem with which Saint-Evremond also was 
struggling. His answer was at antipodes from that of Pascal 
and the Jansenist writers. Christian faith, with its re­
nouncement of worldly pleasure and its emphasis on the 
gift of grace, never seduced Saint-Evremond, except 
perhaps as an emotional strength that he occasionally en­
vied, but always from a distance. Even more vehement 
than his questioning of abstinence to gain salvation, how­
ever, is his denigration of a life of metaphysical specula­
tion, as embodied in the ideas of Descartes: "Je ne vis 
plus que par reflexion sur la vie, ce qui n'est pas propre­
ment vivre; et sans la philosophic de M. Descartes qui 
dit: je pense done je suis, je ne croirais pas proprement 
etre."3 But it was not only to experience more fully his own 
vitality that Saint-Evremond rejected the meditative, con­
templative way of life. Interspersed throughout his works 
are frequent allusions to man's inability to understand the 
human condition, to his ultimate blindness in all matters 
of life and death, of body and soul. Thus to the escha­
tological debate of the time, already so deeply ingrained 
into the century's traditions, Saint-Evremond proposed a 
response radically different from that of either Descartes 
or the Jansenists: pleasure, here and now. Le plaisir is 
one of the primary words and themes of Saint-Evremond's 
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writings, and he tried over the years to create from it a 
true ideal, with an art de vivre to match. 
The concept of pleasure in seventeenth-century thought 
was dominated by the Dutch philosopher Spinoza. Saint-
Evremond sojourned twice in Holland, the first time in 
1661 and 1662, only briefly, and again for a lengthy period 
of time, from 1665 to 1669, interrupting his exile in England. 
It is known that he met with Spinoza. But the question of 
influence is always a touchy one, and in this case, to create 
too close a kinship between men whose writing experiences 
differed so sharply—the Frenchman bordering on the mon­
dain trend of the era, the Dutchman steeped in the greatest 
depths of philosophical examination—would be misleading. 
Spinoza is one of the sternest, most demanding, least 
permissive of moralists, and he and Saint-Evremond are 
widely different. The Dutch philosopher, moreover, differs 
markedly from writers like Gassendi, who had a direct 
bearing upon Saint-Evremond's thought. Nevertheless, 
Spinoza's elaborate formulation of a "pleasure principle" 
seems to have guided Saint-Evremond, if not in a very 
substantial way, at least then as a preliminary direction. 
Of particular significance is the Dutch philosopher's recog­
nition of the essential unity of things, his refusal to split 
the world into distinct substances, a belief, moreover, that 
the post-Freudian writers have seized upon: 
On the problem of human happiness, what distinguishes 
Spinoza from the Western philosophic tradition . .  . is 
his allegiance to the pleasure-principle and his rejection of 
mind-body dualism. His allegiance to the pleasure-principle 
brings him to recognize the narcissistic, self-enjoying char­
acter of human desire, and hence to recognize that human 
perfection consists in an expansion of the self until it enjoys 
the world as it enjoys itself. 
Saint-Evremond, though shunning the "hard" consequences 
of much of Spinoza's thought, nevertheless makes use of 
these concepts of pleasure and fundamental unity. 
There are several important ideas in the above selection, 
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not the least of which is the problem of mind-body dualism. 
The Jansenist writers faced the same dilemma, and their 
answer was most nearly consistent with centuries of West­
ern tradition, both Christian and Platonic: the persistent 
denigration of the body. Saint-Evremond offered another 
solution. Although he was always careful to distinguish 
his particular brand of "volupte"—a general well-being and 
sense of fulfillment deriving from the honnete code—from 
any connotation of debauchery, nevertheless, true, bodily 
pleasure was an integral part of his world. His deep-riding 
sensuality is most directly and beautifully conveyed in his 
frequent praise of la bonne chere. Sensual pleasure was 
most intensely experienced through eating, and he relished 
descriptions of succulent fruits and full-bodied wines. 
To eat is to feel alive; to detail one's intense enjoyment 
is to grant a high position to physical gratification. This 
is not to say that Saint-Evremond relied exclusively upon 
sensual gratification for achieving happiness. He was al­
ways quick to praise the mind's pleasures, too, and it was 
precisely in this drawing together of two traditionally 
contrary forces into a composite whole that Saint-Evremond 
achieved the ideal of both Epicurus and Spinoza. The physi­
cal and the spiritual need not exclude each other, as the 
devout Christian writers would have it. Rather, in the true 
style of Vhonnetete, they may be viewed as complementary 
forces in a harmonious, balanced life. 
Saint-Evremond was fully cognizant of the potent human 
capacity for loving, a belief he expressed, nevertheless, 
with utmost discretion: "II est certain que la nature a mis 
en nos coeurs quelque chose d'aimant (si on le peut dire), 
quelque principe secret d'affection, quelque fond cache de 
tendresse, qui s'explique et se rend communicable avec le 
temps."5 The deliberately vague words, the almost precieux 
tone of the aphorism, cannot hide what Saint-Evremond is 
alluding to, precisely a "quantum" of affectionate energy, 
a "love force" that will reveal itself with time but also 
from underneath a vocabulary of reticence. In order best to 
develop this concept, Saint-Evremond leans heavily upon a 
basic life energy, essential to every human being and which 
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will be augmented by love. His ideas on this subject are, 
however, expressed in a language charged with extraordi­
nary egocentrism, and "love" in Saint-Evremond's moral 
universe reflects the growing awareness of "selfness" that 
permeates the age. 
This is why Brown's passage on Spinoza is significant, 
in that it calls attention to extreme intensification of the 
self. In a more limited and more mundane fashion, for 
Saint-Evremond, too, the self and its pleasure are primary. 
To dwell as completely as he did on the pleasure motive 
within each individual was to say that the self and its 
gratification are the ultimate morality as well as the ulti­
mate salvation. What he demanded, therefore, was a con­
stant awareness that the individual conscience is sacrosanct, 
and that exterior, imposed standards should not stand in the 
way of man's pleasure. It is a highly egotistical stance (in a 
non-pejorative sense), fully in keeping with what Saint-
Evremond sought to gain in the way toward an eventual 
self-liberation for all. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Saint-Evremond cate­
gorically shunned the family's authoritative moral norms 
that tended to go counter to individual needs. This was 
particularly so as these standards manifested themselves 
in the lives of the young women of the age, to whom he 
was a frequent "counselor." In a letter to one young female 
acquaintance, he resolutely advises against parental sub­
jugation: 
Je ne doute point que l'entrevue de votre sainte Mere, et 
de toute votre pieuse Famille n'ait ete accompagnee de 
beaucoup de pleurs. Vous aurez donne aux larmes de cette 
Mere des larmes civiles et respectueuses, comme une Fille 
bien nee. . . . Cest assez d'avoir obei une fois, et sacrifie 
votre repos a une complaisance, que peut-etre vous ne lui 
deviez pas. . . . Elle est injuste, apres avoir exige de vous 
une si dure obeissance, de vouloir regler vos inclinations. 
. . . On aime ce qui plait, et non point ce qui est permis.6 
What Saint-Evremond envisioned was a free and indepen­
dent spirit, capable of placing its pleasure above the de­
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mand& of the family, which ran counter to self-fulfillment. 
The erotic force or energy that Saint-Evremond had per­
ceived (although he always couched it in "discreet" lan­
guage) demanded a freedom that the family, as the essential 
social unit, could not condone. 
But the moral authority that the parent seeks to impose 
upon his children may be embodied within the spoken or 
unspoken tenets of the society, where it is perhaps even 
more potent than within the confines of the home. In the 
well-known letter Saint-Evremond addressed to Mile de 
Queroualle, who was being wooed by the English monarch 
Charles II, and who was supposedly torn by her wish to 
submit and her desire to maintain a chaste reputation, he 
urges her to become the king's mistress (for political rea­
sons, too, perhaps, although these are unmentioned in the 
letter). Having weighed virtue against pleasure, he comes 
out strongly for the latter: "Heureuse qui peut se conduire 
discretement sans gener ses inclinations! car s'il y a de la 
honte a aimer sans retenue, il y a bien de la peine a passer 
la vie sans Amour. . . . Ne rebutez pas trop severement 
les tentations en ce Pays-ci" (3:90). In his "decent" lan­
guage, Saint-Evremond here clearly pits the moral dicta 
of society against the inner demands of the self, and the 
inclinations to which he most discreetly refers are precisely 
those of the body. Social authority, when in opposition to 
the individual's happiness, must be worn down. (It must 
also be said that there is a strong element of voyeur or 
"outsider" in the letters to female friends. When he freely 
offers them his advice, it seems almost as if his pleasure is 
in "confessing" them, in sharing their anguish in a some­
what paternalistic but distant fashion.) 
What is needed, then, is a constant attention to all forces 
that act upon the individual, a weighing of their relative 
importance to his emotional state, and an eventual selection 
of those that will contribute the most to one's enjoyment, 
without passing the limits of a self-imposed code of decency 
and restraint, the mark of I'honnete homme. The love 
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"quantum," that which Saint-Evremond called the "prin­
cipe secret d'affection," is, viewed within this framework, 
nothing less than an intensification of life, potent in the 
ability to counteract obsession with death, to glorify the 
life force itself. Beyond that, however, it is that which is 
most intimately and integrally part of the "self," that which 
will most readily resist control by "outside" standards, 
and thus, for Saint-Evremond, the ultimate symbol of 
human freedom. 
The act of selection requisite to this "sorting out" pro­
cess demands not only an awareness and an understanding 
of the self but also a total immersion in an egocentric 
universe, whereas the "other" counts only as a force to be 
analyzed, reckoned with, selected or rejected. Erotic 
energy, the power of love, is thus easily convertible into a 
force of control, I'honnete homme or Vhonnete femme 
stepping back from diverse emotional pulls if they threaten 
psychic disintegration. Thus, while counseling his women 
friends to reject imposed social standards, while urging 
them to seek the greatest freedom possible, he nevertheless 
remains fixed on the theme of control, which is central to 
the performance of man in society. Saint-Evremond's atti­
tude is summed up in a letter to madame la duchesse de 
Mazarin, his longtime friend, written at a moment of par­
ticular difficulty in her life: "Faites revenir ce temps heureux, 
ou toujours Maitresse de vous-meme, vous ne laissiez de 
liberte a personne qui valut la peine d'etre assujettie" 
(4:210-11). This ready intermingling of love and power is 
perhaps more than anything else the mark of "la litterature 
de l'honnetete," the sign also of the new priorities, Eros 
becoming a predominantly social force, in a world where 
the societal predominates. 
In particular, however, it was obvious to Saint-Evremond 
that a philosophy, however non-structured in appearance, 
of pleasure, however modest, necessitated an absolute 
attention to the present. A belief in the full expression of 
the self demanded a total commitment to "now." Evaluat­
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ing the moral weight to be attributed to past society versus 
present, Saint-Evremond was quick to establish the pre­
eminence of the latter: 
Je sais que la Raison nous a ete donnee pour regler nos 
Moeurs: mais la Raison, autrefois rude et austere, s'est 
civilisee avec le temps; elle ne conserve aujourd'hui presque 
rien de son ancienne rigidite. II lui a fallu de l'austerite 
pour etablir des Lois, qui pussent empecher les Outrages et 
les Violences: elle s'est adoucie pour introduire l'Honnetete 
dans le commerce des hommes, elle est devenue delicate et 
curieuse dans la recherche des Plaisirs, pour rendre la vie 
aussi agreable qu'on avait tache de la rendre sure et hon­
nete. Ainsi, Monsieur, il faut oublier un temps, ou c'etait 
assez d'etre severe, pour etre cru vertueux, puisque la 
Politesse, la Galanterie, la Science des voluptes, font une 
partie du Merite presentement. (2:333) 
There is no dream of another social structure more satis­
fying than the present one, and moral standards of the 
past cannot be made to apply to the present. 
Within an individual life also, the past fails to offer sub­
stance. A past love, for Saint-Evremond, is a dead love; 
and conversely, a dead lover belongs only to the past. 
Exhorting Mme de Mazarin to quit her mourning for a 
lover who was killed—"les Amoureux sont mortels comme 
les autres" (4:193)—Saint-Evremond sought to achieve a 
realistic appraisal of time, placing all his value firmly in 
the present. Death should bring to those who live on, not 
obligation, but freedom; and the intense dedication to the 
self that Saint-Evremond preached did require an extraor­
dinary facility of emotional disengagement, necessary to 
maintain the standards of control dictated by Vhonnetete. 
He makes a parallel stand for the future. There is no 
question of an afterlife in his moral outlook, no balancing 
of present happiness against future salvation. Salvation is 
here, on earth. There is no Pascalian wager. The future is 
simply demystified. Nor is there any room for future regret, 
for guilt. Veiled or unveiled threats of hell are weak com­
pared with the need for love, and should not be used as 
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deterrents to the individual's needs: "La peur de la Dam­
nation, l'image de l'Enfer avec tous ses feux, ne lui oteront 
jamais l'idee d'un Amant" (4:277). For Saint-Evremond 
there is no mystical force to be reckoned with; there is 
only the strong feeling of strong passion, and thoughts of 
an afterlife, of possible damnation or salvation, are pushed 
aside and rejected. 
The self-oriented, pleasure-seeking individual must, in 
addition, maintain an attitude of flexible "availability" and 
disengagement in his social contacts. Pleasure must never 
become tyranny or obsession. Again, it is a matter of the 
self controlling and manipulating outside forces to the end 
of its own happiness; hence, increasing the number of 
loves, the amount of loving, violates no code but only 
enhances the possibilities of fulfillment. The "quelque 
chose d'aimant" sets no limits upon its capacity for satis­
faction, and thus Saint-Evremond rejects an over-attach­
ment to any one person: "Se reduire a n'aimer qu'une 
personne, c'est se disposer a hair toutes les autres: et ce 
qu'on croit une Vertu admirable a Fegard d'un Particulier, 
est un grand crime envers tout le Monde" (4:122). There 
is something monstrously antisocial in exclusivity, a crime 
against mankind. But it is more than that. He clearly saw 
the enormous danger to the individual's liberty in an over-
attachment to the "other." This tyranny had to be avoided, 
and the self remain free to enter and leave relationships as 
necessary, the vital energy force protected against any en­
croachment. The emotional vigor must never be violated, 
the precarious equilibrium between pleasure and restraint 
remaining intact. 
But it is particularly the question of infidelity that oc­
cupies Saint-Evremond when he speaks of pleasure and 
tyranny, and it is at this point that his morale goes most 
clearly and forcefully against traditional, established social 
standards. As "spiritual adviser" to a seemingly large group 
of women, Saint-Evremond did not hesitate to counsel free­
dom from attachments based on standardized norms or 
simply on time: 
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II n'y a rien de si honnete qu'une ancienne Amitie, et 
rien de si honteux qu'une vieille Passion. Detrompez-vous 
du faux merite d'etre fidele. . . . 
Mais que d'ennuis accompagnent toujours cette mise­
rable Vertu! Quelle difference des degouts de votre at­
tachement a la delicatesse d'une Passion naissante! Dans 
une Passion nouvelle, vous trouverez toutes les heures 
delicieuses: les jours se passent a sentir de moment en 
moment qu'on aime mieux. Dans une vieille Habitude, le 
temps se consume ennuieusement a aimer moins. On peut 
vivre avec des Indifferents, ou par bienseance, ou par la 
necessite du commerce: mais comment passer sa vie avec 
ceux qu'on a aimes, et qu'on n'aime plus? (1:96) 
In the face of the established "virtues" of fidelity and 
commitment of a permanent nature, Saint-Evremond opted 
for the individual's chance to move freely within his social 
universe. In Holland particularly he found the women 
bound to rigid, fixed standards that kept them faithful to 
a first lover: "moitie par habitude, moitie par un sot hon­
neur qu'on se fait d'etre constant, on entretient languissam­
ment les miserables restes d'une Passion usee" (2:232). 
Long tormented by the passage of time (which may well 
explain the peculiar game of "being old" he so expertly 
played, even in early middle age), Saint-Evremond rejected 
and shunned allegiances based upon accumulated days. A 
relationship whose sole foundation was one of habit was 
the very antithesis of his ideal rapport, where both partners 
enjoyed a sense of renewed vitality. 
Up until now, it seems clear that Saint-Evremond was 
engaged, to a greater or lesser degree, in the moral dilem­
ma of his age, of all ages. Where was man to find happi­
ness? And how was he to build a life accordingly? Saint-
Evremond's answer fits into a general schema of thought 
that traversed his century, heir to the skepticism and doubt 
engendered during the Renaissance. Most specifically, he 
questioned the Christian reliance upon future salvation, 
rejected it, and came forth with his answer of modified 
terrestrial pleasure. But his ideas are not bound into well-
structured philosophical treatises, and it is more and more 
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difficult to separate the man's own particular sensitivites 
from the "moral" he espoused, especially when he readily 
makes his person so available to us. Thus what on the one 
hand appears as an intellectual celebration of freedom from 
constraint is on the other only one man's special battle 
against pain, against obsession with death. And although 
the emphasis on the life forces was an integral part of 
the "libertine" philosophy of the time—indeed, almost a 
convention—bit by bit Saint-Evremond's words on the sub­
ject take on a surprisingly personal tone. 
Unquestionably, a philosophy of terrestrial pleasure 
could not fail to be distressed by a certain end to that hap­
piness. Or it may be that the obsession with death is the 
emotional fear that gives rise to the intellectual construct 
of earthly gratification. In any case, Saint-Evremond 
sought to allay the death fear by a very deliberate stress on 
life; and the belief in disponibilite, in the present time 
rather than in the past or future, in total self-determina­
tion, reflects an attempt at firmly rooting the individual 
in his immediate "selfdom." Actually, it is not the obses­
sion with ultimate death alone that Saint-Evremond 
sought to diminish, but all the pain in life, all the little 
deaths that strip man of an essential feeling of well-being. 
Among the critics, H. T. Barnwell in particular has 
done a thorough job of analyzing the question of le 
divertissement in the writings of Saint-Evremond, show­
ing that the pleasure theory served as a potent counter-
force to the fear of death and pain.7 Pleasure, then, is 
seen as a way of attaining an emotional equilibrium that 
neither Christian grace nor rational meditation could offer. 
That is why the principle of self-fulfillment and self-
enjoyment must be maintained at all cost, rising above 
obligations to one's family and society, why moral authori­
ty with its emphasis on what is "due" must be withered 
away, as a threat to the supremacy of individual determina­
tion. 
The result of this attitude is much less an extolling of 
spectacular happiness than the calm acceptance of a modus 
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vivendi, where freedom from pain and fear is equated with 
genuine bliss. There was always within Saint-Evremond 
the realization that to achieve a complete, total joy, an 
omnipresent happiness, was a radical impossibility. At 
best one could hope for a compromise situation, where 
the absence of pain and unhappiness, the absence es­
pecially of the dominating fear of death, would allow for 
a satisfactory life situation. His parody of the cogito— 
"J'aime done je suis"—is simply an affirmation of the desire 
for life weighted against all forms of pain, against medita­
tion that leads to thoughts of ultimate nothingness. In 
this equivocal, ambiguous call to pleasure, Saint-Evre­
mond's works begin to separate from the general, free­
thinking current of his age and to assume their own unique 
quality. 
The capacity to accept a compromise situation some­
where between joy and pain is why Saint-Evremond 
seems so willing, so eager, to replace love with friend­
ship, to engage in a game where one is easily converted 
into the other, where the intense, vibrant feelings of pas­
sion can be readily interchanged with the calm felicity of 
friendship: "Et si je passe de l'Amitie a TAmour sans 
emportement, je puis revenir de 1'Amour a l'Amitie avec 
aussi peu de violence" (1:59). His pleasure was never 
frenzied but quiet, and the persistent image of the ugly, 
tired, old man, which he so frequently employed in self-
description, served to support his need; for such an indi­
vidual is beyond the love domain, exempt from Eros. 
But of greatest significance for this study is the question 
of emotional risk. Clearly, the danger for potential psychic 
and social disintegration involved in friendship is far 
weaker than that associated with love. No great emo­
tional turbulence is associated with friendship, tradi­
tionally, for the sexual component is absent, whereas 
/'amour-passion, perhaps more readily than any other force, 
can undo the stable network of the individual psyche and 
the collective society. 
Thus the writer who counseled his many correspondents 
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(mostly female) to indulge in sensual enjoyment of the 
freest nature, who spoke with such feeling on the value of 
passion in one's life, ultimately bows to the conceptions 
of love that dominated his age. Friendship is the furthest 
point to which Saint-Evremond could comfortably adhere, 
and even at those times when he gives way to "amorous" 
sentiments (with Mme de Mazarin), his posture is patheti­
cally submissive and placating—"Baisez le vieillard, Reine!" 
(4:112)—thus violating all the concepts of emotional inde­
pendence and detachment he had so readily espoused. But 
even these supplications seem strangely devoid of emotion 
and serve only to disparage ironically his own self. 
Love enticed him as a philosophical ideal, as the symbol 
of the pinnacle of pleasure, but he gladly yielded in favor 
of a less-demanding relationship. His emphasis on friend­
ship did not violate his strong belief in pleasure, of course; 
the Epicurean ideal included all forms of physical and 
mental pleasures. But it did reduce the degree of desired 
emotional intensity. Even during the rare times that he 
analyzed the quality of love, Saint-Evremond was moved 
by that aspect which offered the smallest amount of emo­
tional turbulence, by that which most successfully elimi­
nated confusion of an erotic base: 
Quoique l'Amour agisse diversement selon la diversite 
des complexions, on peut rapporter a trois mouvements 
principaux tout ce que nous fait sentir une passion si ge­
nerale: aimer, bruler, languir. 
Aimer simplement, est le premier etat de notre Ame, 
lorsqu'elle s'emeut par l'impression de quelque objet 
agreable. . . . Bruler, est un etat violent sujet aux inquie­
tudes, aux peines, aux tourments. . . . Languir, est le plus 
beau des mouvements de l'Amour; c'est l'effet delicat d'une 
flamme pure, qui nous confuse doucement. (3:123) 
His praise goes for languishing, because Saint-Evremond 
shunned the tumultuous aspect of love as too upsetting to 
a precarious emotional well-being. He enjoyed best a feel­
ing of calm and repose, that same feeling he obtained from 
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a steady but undemanding friendship, free from the in­
tense, anxious side of passionate love. He often admitted 
that he would have enjoyed a friendship with a woman if 
the relationship could have remained unhampered by agi­
tated, sexual feelings. 
But it is perhaps in his attitude toward women that 
Saint-Evremond shifts most obviously between two differ­
ent standards: the philosophical glorification of love and 
the personal fear. Women troubled him. He liked to point 
out that some of the most famous men in history lived 
independently of female company, and he even offered a 
short praise of homosexuality, unusual for his time, as a 
viable alternative to heterosexual love (4:115). But the 
female character persistently disturbed him, at least as he 
reveals those anxieties in his writings, and he seems to 
have been most relaxed toward women when they were 
not a part of his own life. 
Resolutely pro-Nature when advising female friends, 
although somewhat distant and removed, Saint-Evremond 
lashed out against prudery in all forms. In the letter to 
Mile de Queroualle, he wrote: "Mais vous savez trop le 
Monde, pour donner de veritables tendresses aux chagrins 
des Prudes, dont la Vertu n'est qu'un artifice pour vous 
priver des plaisirs qu'elles regrettent" (1:90). Prudery for 
Saint-Evremond, as for Moliere, was little else than a 
mask, a poor travesty for women unlucky enough to be de­
prived of lovers, camouflaging their bitterness under a 
blanket of virtue. 
For the same reason, he was quick to condemn con­
vent life, where love blooms rather than fades away, where 
erotic love, or at least the desire for it, surfaces quickly: 
"Au lieu de porter au Couvent le degout de l'Amour, le 
Couvent vous en fera naitre l'envie. . . . Ainsi vous 
serez consumee de regrets, ou devoree de desirs, selon 
que votre Ame se tournera au souvenir de ce que vous 
avez pu faire, ou a l'imagination de ce que vous ne pour­
rez executer" (3:92). The inevitable result, according to 
Saint-Evremond, is that passion is converted into religious 
devotion, and God becomes a new lover (1:137). 
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He attacked equally vigorously les precieuses, whom he 
saw as violating the laws of Nature as severely as the 
prudes. What he recognized in their overly intellectual 
approach to love is what modern critics have referred to 
as their sublimation of passion. "Les Jansenistes de 
l'Amour," as he chose to call them, adopting the expres­
sion from Ninon de Lenclos, violated the very foundation 
of passion by denying its affective power: "Elles ont tire 
une Passion toute sensible du Coeur a l'Esprit, et converti 
des mouvements en Idees" (1:111). This intellectualiza­
tion and deification of love go contrary to Saint-Evre­
mond's belief in sensual gratification and its "here and 
now" quality. Any cult of love was repugnant to him, 
which is undoubtedly why, along with his attack on the 
precieuses, he also criticized the vestiges of la courtoisie 
in seventeenth-century Spanish mores. Love considered as 
a game, with set rules to follow, was for Saint-Evremond 
a basic denial of natural instinct. This attitude, however, 
did not prevent him from writing what must surely be 
some of the tritest love poetry of the precieux genre, but 
he saw that as strictly an exercise in style and not as a 
code of living. 
Nevertheless, though vociferously defending Nature's 
way, though attacking multifold inhibitions and obstacles, 
Saint-Evremond's own portrayal of the ideal woman and 
the ideal love is a masterpiece of the very bias he so 
angrily denounced. In fact, this "portrait" reveals itself 
as the summation of Saint-Evremond's double stance— 
the fascination with love and the equally strong fear of 
it. The title of the passage alone serves to suggest a most 
fanciful, ephemeral situation: "Idee de la femme qui ne se 
trouve point, et qui ne se trouvera jamais." The non­
existence of such a woman is thereby established before 
Saint-Evremond has even begun the body of the text, and 
the entire essay is built upon a series of antitheses whose 
member elements cancel out one another: 
Sa Taille est d'une juste grandeur, bien prise, aisee, d'un 
degagement aussi eloigne de la contrainte, que de cette ex­
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cessive liberte. . . . Son Esprit a de l'etendue, sans etre 
vaste, n'allant jamais si loin dans les pensees generates, 
qu'il ne puisse revenir aux considerations particulieres. . . . 
[Elle est] egalement ennemie d'un mouvement inutile, et 
de la mollesse d'un repos, qui se fait honneur du nom de 
Tranquillite, pour couvrir une veritable Nonchalance. 
(2:243-45) 
Saint-Evremond's ideal female is an equilibrium of con­
trasting components, whose parts he manipulates back and 
forth until the whole self disappears in a display of verbi­
age that negates rather than creates. 
But the most striking sets of contrasts are those that de­
scribe Emilie's prowess as a woman: 
Elle vous attire, elle vous retient, et vous approchez tou­
jours d'elle avec des desirs que vous n'oseriez faire pa­
raitre. . . . On connait par une infinite d'experiences, 
que l'Esprit s'aveugle en aimant; et l'Amour n'a presque 
jamais bien etabli son pouvoir qu'apres avoir mine celui 
de notre Raison. Sur le sujet d'Emilie, nos Sentiments de­
viennent plus passionnes, a mesure que nos Lumieres sont 
plus epurees; et la Passion, qui a toujours paru une mar­
que de Folie, est ici le plus veritable effet de notre bon 
sens. (2:245-46) 
To counteract the fear of loss of reasoning powers, Saint-
Evremond proposes a "new" passion, one where sensuality 
is increased through some vague, spiritual enlightenment, 
and vice versa. Unable or unwilling to consider ideal love 
as preeminently or even partially sexual, Saint-Evremond 
does not offer only the standard coupling of Love and Rea­
son, but rather the intermingling of the two, their inter­
penetration. And ultimately it is the erotic that emerges 
as "purified," whereas the gains for Reason are far less 
clear, for it was the former, always, that had been the dis­
turbing element. 
Emilie attracts at the same time that she repels. There 
is a hint of sexuality, but it is quickly dispelled as the 
"purifying light" of reason takes over. Ultimately, Saint-
Evremond's ideal emotional experience involved a suspen­
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sion of the faculties of deep feeling, and the most he can 
propose is a vocabulary of sensual expression, nullified by 
a contingent one of reason, sense, and purity. In light of 
this, it seems fair to suggest that the experience of Saint-
Evremond was grounded in failure, that the "libertine" 
atmosphere of which he was decidedly a part, with its em­
phasis on physical pleasure, never succeeded in totally de­
stroying the strong inhibitory forces that were part of the 
entire generation. 
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Chapter Five 
MADAME DE SEVIGNE

,LLE N'A PAS DE PASSION AU COEUR en 
ecrivant: mettons a part toujours l'amour mater­
nel."1 Gustave Lanson's earnest desire to rele­
gate Mme de Sevigne's passion for her daughter 
to a substrate level reflects his basic preoccupa­
tion with the nonessential side of the voluminous corre­
spondence. Lanson was most fascinated by the anecdotal 
Mme de Sevigne, the part of the letters given over to de­
scribing the multifold events of the time—"Toutes ces 
anecdotes, ces narrations charmantes ou poignantes, sont 
un des documents les plus since res que l'histoire puisse 
consulter"2—and the ambiguous, strange relationship with 
Mme de Grignan is seen basically as an ecart from the 
epistolary norm. 
Certainly, Lanson's taste seems to have fixed Mme de 
Sevigne and her letters into a mold that only recently has 
been deemed questionable. Most of the morceaux choisis 
collections refer constantly to the letters depicting the 
death of Turenne, the representation of Racine's Esther, 
and, suspecting perhaps that it was at least necessary to 
allude once to the feelings of Mme de Sevigne for Mme de 
Grignan, the editors frequently include the famous episode 
of the crossing of the Avignon bridge. Seemingly, one 
reason for easily including the latter piece would be that 
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stylistically, through its reenactment of the little drama, it 
conforms to the general notion we have of Mme de Sevigne 
as a tableau painter, gifted in depicting a certain sense 
of color and movement through the written word. 
But in the past few years, critical interpretations have 
centered on the primary, essential point of the correspon­
dence: the mother-daughter relationship. Reading through 
the three volumes of the letters in the Pleiade edition, 
it is evident immediately that the anecdotal approach is 
more than merely limiting. Such analysis actually dis­
figures the work, for the anecdote serves only as a support, 
or even sometimes as a foil, for the one element that over­
whelmingly dominates the letters to Mme de Grignan— 
the expression of the great love. 
In terms of the general study I have proposed, it is fair 
to question whether the letters occupy the same position 
toward society as the works of the other writers. Do they 
offer a general view of man in his universe—both immediate 
and cosmic? Do they propose a code or style of living? 
Does the introduction of "je" alter the basic intention of 
the seventeenth-century moralists: an impersonal negat­
ing and subsequent reconstruction of social patterns most 
necessary to the fundamental well-being of the individual 
and his society? In reply it must be said that a very power­
ful view of life, of living, does emerge from the letters 
of Mme de Sevigne; and in fact, it is one that goes counter 
to the philosophical and religious thinking of the day. Mme 
de Sevigne identified living with loving. 
The Jansenist, Epicurean, and mondain codes are all 
violated by this other life-view: Jansenism by Mme de 
Sevigne's heavy emphasis on human love; Epicureanism 
by her willingness to plunge into a total, highly intense 
involvement with another, thereby sacrificing repose and 
emotional liberty; and finally la mondanite by her refusal 
to establish an idiom allowing for the superficial transfer 
of sentiment without loss of inner control. Unlike the great 
majority of classical moralists, Mme de Sevigne opted, 
through her letters, for a radical approach to life, radical 
in that it embraced the passions without fear. 
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Nevertheless, her stance is not without ambiguity. Life 
as love is not exactly what Mme de Sevigne chose, or it 
is precisely what she chose if living can be completely 
synonymous with writing. There is a distinction between 
stressing her passion or stressing the writing that inter­
preted it, between Mme de Sevigne primarily as active 
"lover" or passive poet. Recent criticism has tended to 
emphasize one side at the expense of the other, sometimes 
forgetting that the feelings and their expression can be 
separated only with great difficulty. Roger Duchene in his 
Madame de Sevigne et la lettre d'amour accentuates her 
passion as a living force, so strong that she had to express 
it constantly. Left without any other means to do so, she 
opted for the letter. His study traces the history of Mme de 
Sevigne's passionate love for Mme de Grignan. Letter-
writing is seen as a means to filling in the terrible gap 
that Mme de Grignan's departure for Provence had cre­
ated. Beginning with the fateful day, Duchene skillfully 
follows the life of Mme de Sevigne's unusually intense 
love: "Les lettres a Mme de Grignan permettent de suivre 
les etapes de 1'evolution des sentiments de Mme de Sevigne. 
Apres les lents progres vers une meilleure entente de 1671 
a 1676, vient la brusque rupture de 1677 avec, jusqu'en 
1680, des sursauts et des paroxysmes. Et c'est enfin, dans 
une serenite un peu grave, l'accord que seule attriste la 
pensee de la mort. La preuve de la verite de l'amour dans 
les lettres, c'est cette courbe, dessinee au jour le jour, d'une 
affection s'etalant sur vingt-cinq annees."3 
Whereas Duchene is interested primarily in the curve of 
Mme de Sevigne's love for her daughter and in examining 
the reasons for such fluctuation, Gerard-Gailly, in his in­
troduction to the Pleiade edition of the letters, offers a 
Freudian analysis of the passion itself. Duchene describes 
from the outside; Gerard-Gailly from the inside. His read­
ing centers primarily upon certain semi-erotic passages of 
the letters and he concludes: "Passion maternelle! Mater­
nelle, sans doute, mais amoureuse aussi, et passion d'amant 
pour un autre etre humain."4 His views are reinforced by 
the fact that the more obvious "love" passages were re­
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moved by Mme de Sevigne's earliest editors, who prob­
ably recognized their ambiguous value. 
For other critics, notably Jean Cordelier, the love rela­
tionship between Mme de Sevigne and Mme de Grignan 
is viewed as the means through which the former was best 
able to fulfill a calling as a writer. Cordelier seeks to prove 
that the passion she experienced was only indirectly tied 
to Mme de Grignan, via the necessity of writing. Thus she 
loved the person who allowed her to realize her vocation.5 
Interpreting the question of language in a different vein, 
Bernard Bray explains that the erotic language Mme de 
Sevigne frequently used in the letters to her daughter was 
the result of a linguistic impasse. She was forced into the 
lyric note because "la marquise ne disposait d'aucun 
autre langage pour exprimer la douleur de l'absence."6 
This interpretation is diametrically opposed to the Freudian 
analysis of Gerard-Gailly, and the center of focus shifts 
from the psychological to the socio-linguistic. 
All the methods used to analyze the correspondence 
both succeed and fail in their attempts to understand the 
strange letters. Roger Duchene's exhaustive study maintains 
too strict a parallel between living and writing. He is so 
interested in the gaps between letters, in what mother and 
daughter were feeling at all times, that he forgets that Mme 
de Sevigne's primary identity is through letter-writing, 
and hence through the domain of the summary, the delib­
erate exclusion, not through any consecutive, all-inclusive 
pattern. 
As for Gerard-Gailly's Freudian study, it too fails at a 
certain point. Without a doubt his perceptions do open 
doors, for very frequently Mme de Sevigne's "maternal" 
love appears ambiguous. The rivalry with M. de Grignan 
for control over her daughter, the fascination with Mme de 
Grignan's physical beauty, the references to kisses and 
embraces far beyond polite convention, point to a situation 
that seemingly reflects desires of incest and sapphism. 
Mme de Sevigne herself, on occasion, found it useful to 
clarify that her love was maternel, as if other thoughts had 
[94]

MADAME DE SEVIGNE 
indeed crossed her mind at some point. But the Freudian 
bent ultimately fails to tell the whole story, for the letters 
show that writing was a clear alternative—in fact, even some­
times a clear preference—to physical presence, and their 
love seemed to express itself most satisfactorily for both 
parties when the written word could interpret it. Thus a 
study of psyches and motives cannot reflect the entire 
problem, for it neglects the very crucial question of the 
necessity to remain in the domain of written communica­
tion, and, going one step further, in the domain of the 
imagination. 
On the other hand, the theories stressing the writing 
experience are belied by Mme de Sevigne herself. Al­
though in reality her great passion may have fared far bet­
ter when on paper than at any other time, she nevertheless 
did believe that writing was a substitute for Mme de Gri­
gnan's presence, that it was only second best: "Quand je 
ne suis pas avec vous, mon unique divertissement est de 
vous ecrire" (1:611). On the conscious plane, the mar­
quise perceived that seeing was highly desirable, and writ­
ing, a palliative. Thus Jean Cordelier's neat little system 
transforming "je vivrai pour vous aimer" into "je vivrai 
pour vous ecrire"7 stretches the truth. That writing emerges 
eventually as a superior alternative to being together is clear 
through the letters, but only at rare moments was it viewed 
as such by Mme de Sevigne. Most of the time, she yearned 
for her daughter's presence. Finally, Bernard Bray, in 
emphasizing that linguistic patterns alone dictated Mme de 
Sevigne's expression, cannot sufficiently take into account 
either the nature of the relationship or the view of living 
that Mme de Sevigne sought to communicate. Ultimately, 
all aspects involved in Mme de Sevigne's relationship with 
her daughter must be studied, not only the fundamental 
ties but also how and why this alliance expressed itself 
as it did. 
It is difficult to ascertain the precise nature of Mme de 
Sevigne's feeling for her daughter prior to the latter's de­
parture for Provence, shortly after her marriage. In the 
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face of scholarship suggesting that Mme de Sevigne's 
love for her daughter was an outgrowth only of Mme de 
Grignan's marriage and subsequent departure, and thus 
of a loss of a person who for so many years had been 
dominated and dependent, other critics have attempted to 
show that the separation of the two women marked only a 
heightening of an already forceful passion.8 
There is really no strong evidence either way. But does 
an understanding of the years that preceded the 1671 de­
parture to Provence shed much light on the correspondence 
itself? The only important question—that of Mme de Se­
vigne's possible desire to dominate her child—can be gleaned 
readily through the letters themselves, and references to 
past patterns of behavior do little to clarify that problem. 
However, by no means was the dependence-independence 
syndrome the sole, or even primary, reason for Mme de 
Sevigne's faithful correspondence, a view that might be 
suggested by an overly detailed account of the years pre­
vious to Mme de Grignan's departure. 
What is significant is that the departure of Mme de Gri­
gnan for Provence on 5 February 1671 (where she was to 
follow her husband, who had just been named lieutenant-
general by the court) was an abrupt move and a shock that 
was to release an expression of intense passion that, dur­
ing the grand siecle, was paralleled perhaps only by the 
Lettres portugaises. The opening words of the first letter, 
written on 6 February 1671, one day after saying farewell 
to Mme de Grignan, set the note and tone of the twenty-
five years of correspondence: 
Ma douleur serait bien mediocre si je pouvais vous la de­
peindre; je ne l'entreprendrai pas aussi. J'ai beau chercher 
ma chere fille, je ne la trouve plus, et tous les pas qu'elle 
fait l'eloignent de moi. Je m'en allai done a Sainte-Marie, 
toujours pleurant et toujours mourant: il me semblait 
qu'on m'arrachait le coeur et Tame; et en effet, quelle rude 
separation! (1:189) 
Each subsequent separation following a period of re­
union evokes a similar outcry; and although as she becomes 
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accustomed to the absence of her daughter Mme de Se­
vigne consciously attempts to modify her acute misery and 
to modulate her tone, the letters are nevertheless, with 
varying degrees of intensity, primarily the vivid expres­
sion of the anguish engendered by the "eternal" separation. 
Through a process of defiguration that a collection of let­
ters such as these cannot help but create, the reader is 
left with the impression that the periods of separation far 
surpassed in length the number of days when the two wom­
en were reunited. It is, however, the reverse that is true; 
sixteen years, nine months together, eight years, four 
months apart.9 But it is not time together or apart, more 
of one than of the other, that is really at stake here. The 
nature of the feeling was such that each period of separa­
tion seemed "forever" to Mme de Sevigne. 
The motives governing Mme de Sevigne's correspondence 
with her daughter are no clearer than the precise nature of 
their relationship prior to 1671. At times it appears that 
the marquise was "engaged in a battle for a resisting 
heart,"10 that she sought to maintain her daughter in a 
state of dependency inconsistent with the newly acquired 
freedom that marriage and distance had bestowed upon Mme 
de Grignan. Her frequently haughty, commanding tones 
suggest that this was at least partially responsible for the 
highly intense exchange of letters. At certain times—for 
example, when she unsuccessfully exhorts Mme de Grignan 
to join her at Vichy and then to return to Paris together 
for the remainder of the year—it is obvious that a battle of 
wills was a definite part of their relationship. 
In a variation of the above theme, it could be postulated 
that Mme de Sevigne's obsessive passion for Mme de 
Grignan illustrates perfectly the fascination with an 
"absent" person, the fascination that Proust described at 
such length. Thus Mme de Grignan represents the creature 
who ultimately escapes total possession, what Albertine 
was for the narrateur of the Recherche. "Passion prou­
stienne, non pas que la mere de Mme de Grignan ait rien 
d'une femme damnee . . . mais parce que son aventure 
apparalt comme l'illustration parfaite de l'analyse que 
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Proust fera de la passion amoureuse, analyse qu'une 
breve citation de la Recherche suffit a rappeler: 'On n'aime 
que ce qu'on ne possede pas tout entier.'  " n In this case, 
Francoise-Marguerite's portrait, which Mme de Sevigne 
keeps close to her throughout the years and to which she 
makes frequent reference in her letters, would be the per­
fect symbol of Vetre de fuite, she who is both present and 
absent, the ideal metaphor for possession and lack of it. 
But if precise motivation cannot be determined (for 
doubtless Mme de Sevigne was moved to write by several 
reasons), other questions can be more readily resolved. 
Reading through the letters consecutively, one perceives 
two important points: (1) the letters to Mme de Grignan 
do not fit in at all with the ongoing trends of la mondanite 
and la galanterie; and (2) on the writing level at least, 
Mme de Sevigne's involvement with her daughter was 
strikingly absolute and total. 
That the marquise's relationship with Mme de Grignan, 
as she expressed it in her letters, far transcends any no­
tions of simple gallantry or artificial social structures has 
been most thoroughly documented by Roger Duchene in 
his recent comprehensive study of the letters. La lettre 
galante enjoyed much favor in seventeenth-century French 
society, where the salon life cultivated various socially ac­
ceptable "masks." Thus it emerges as an extremely well-
perfected means to avoid the more fundamental sentiments 
of a primarily erotic base. "Parler d'amour s'avere en con­
sequence a la fois necessaire et impossible, sauf precise­
ment par le biais de la galanterie, masque commode et 
qui permet d'oser beaucoup puisqu'elle est reputee jeu 
d'esprit innocent, admis et meme recommande par les con­
ventions de la vie mondaine."12 
Such a code is evident in the letters of the marquise, 
although not in those to her daughter. Rather, it is in her 
correspondence with her male admirers that she readily 
introduces la galanterie, particularly in that addressed to 
Menage and to Bussy-Rabutin, her cousin. Those letters 
are filled with wit and teasing grace, with joking ambig­
[98]

MADAME DE SEVIGNE 
uities and puns. Especially in the letters to her cousin, 
Mme de Sevigne demonstrates a proclivity for a certain 
equivocal note, where frequent references of a sexual na­
ture contrast with her very restrained, indignant manner 
when her cousin, provoked by her banter, steps beyond 
social rules. In the correspondence with her cousin, up un­
til 1658 (in later years this tone is wholly absent from their 
commerce), the young marquise employs an art of adept 
word manipulation with great flair, referring to Bussy-
Rabutin once, for example, he who had produced no sons, 
as "le beau faiseur des filles" (1:99). 
The letters addressed to her daughter never joke about 
love or passion. Of course, Mme de Sevigne was writing 
then to someone of her own sex, and even if latent in­
cestuous desires were present, the male-female element was 
absent. Hence there is an immediate reduction in any form 
of la coquetterie. But whereas quarrels or misunderstand­
ings with Bussy-Rabutin or Menage gave rise to a semi-
serious, semi-teasing lilt, any disagreement between Mme 
de Grignan and her mother was a constant source of pain 
and bitterness. "Les rapports de la mere et de la fille," 
writes Jean Cordelier, 
ont tout d'une veritable liaison amoureuse: craintes sans 
fondement, jalousie sans cause, ergotages tendres, accusa­
tions aussi maladroites que sinceres, protestations indi­
gnees, qui font de la Correspondance un chef-d'oeuvre de 
correspondance amoureuse, digne de figurer en bonne 
place dans toutes les anthologies de lettres d'amour.13 
Mutual jealousy did indeed exert a strong influence 
throughout the letters—Mme de Sevigne's envy of Grignan; 
Francoise-Marguerite's antipathy toward Retz and Cor­
binelli, close friends and confidants of the marquise. Mme 
de Sevigne persistently lashed out at M. de Grignan, feel­
ing that it was indeed her right to regulate even when he 
slept with his wife, to say nothing of the visits to Paris. 
The letters suggest, on the other hand, that Mme de Grig­
nan was tormented by worry over her mother's "fidelity": 
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Avez-vous bien peur que j'aime mieux Mme de Brissac 
que vous? Craignez-vous, de la maniere dont vous me con­
naissez, que ses manieres me plaisent plus que les votres? 
que son esprit ait trouve le chemin de me plaire? Avez-vous 
opinion que sa beaute efface vos charmes? Enfin pensez­
vous qu'il y ait quelqu'un au monde qui puisse, a mon gout, 
surpasser Madame de Grignan, etant meme depouillee de 
tout Finteret que j'y prends? (1:265-66) 
In the opposite vein, there were moments of great ten­
derness—Mme de Sevigne's pleas to her daughter to take 
better care of her health; the frequent self-denigration 
("j'ai trouve mille fois que je ne valais pas Fextreme peine 
que vous preniez pour moi" [2:259]) that alternated with 
periods of frenzied worry when letters failed to arrive on 
time or when the marquise believed that Mme de Grignan 
was somehow in danger, anguish that was frequently with­
out cause. Mme de Sevigne's imagination, her almost 
masochistic pleasure in torturing herself by creating 
dreaded adventures, demonstrate that the mood of the let­
ters cannot compare with the cajoling, teasing tone of the 
correspondence with Menage and Bussy. Mme de Se­
vigne's letters to her daughter testify to an overwhelming 
absorption, which had nothing in common with the orches­
trations of la galanterie. 
Time after time, the marquise writes that her love, her 
obsession, for her daughter, is in a realm separate from any 
other domain of her life. To permit the development of 
such emotion, to allow the feelings to attain a purer state, 
she frequently sought out absolute solitude: 
Quoique ma lettre soit datee du dimanche, je Tecris au­
jourd'hui, samedi au soir; il n'est que dix heures, tout est 
retire; c'est une heure ou je suis a vous d'une maniere plus 
particuliere qu'au milieu de ce qui est ordinairement dans 
ma chambre: ce n'est pas que je sois contrainte, je sais me 
debarrasser; je me promene seule, et quoi que vous disiez, 
ma tres chere, je serais bien oppressee si je n'avais pas cette 
liberte. J'ai besoin de penser a vous avec attention, comme 
j'avais besoin de vous voir. (3:18-19) 
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Solitude, however, necessarily depended upon the absence 
not only of all who were irrelevant to the passion but also 
of I'objet aime. Doubtless, a certain amount of fictionali­
zation occurred. What the solitude and the free reign of 
the imagination offered was the preferred formulation of her 
sentiments. Being alone allowed for the satisfaction of both 
the emotional need (constant attention focused on Mme de 
Grignan) and of the artistic one (perfection of the means 
of expression). Either way, what is important is the desire 
to isolate in order to concentrate best on the obsession to 
the exclusion of all else. 
Countless times throughout the long period from 1671 
to 1696, Mme de Sevigne explicitly states the degree to 
which the passion possesses her: 
Enfin tout tourne ou sur vous, ou de vous, ou pour vous, 
ou par vous. (1:235) 
Je vivrai pour vous aimer, et j'abandonne ma vie a cette 
occupation. (1:283) 
Cest une chose etrange que d'aimer autant que je vous 
aime: on a une attention et une application naturelle et 
continuelle, qui fait qu'en nulle heure du jour on ne peut 
etre surprise sans cette pensee. (1:685-86) 
Quelle possession vous avez prise de mon coeur, et quelles 
traces vous avez fakes dans ma tete! (2:454) 
Je pense continuellement et habituellement a vous. (2:460) 
Mon coeur est a vous . . . tout vous y cede et vous y laisse 
regner souverainement. (3:10) 
Even the infrequent recourse to precieux expression—as 
in the last example—cannot detract from the totality of 
involvement that left little room for other emotional de­
mands. The preoccupation with Mme de Grignan, or per­
haps more precisely with the image of Mme de Grignan, 
the almost deification of that image, is one of the most 
remarkable aspects of the entire correspondence. One 
perceives that the extreme concentration upon her daugh­
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ter, the quasi-religious fervor with which she endows the 
other woman's very being, was fundamentally vital to 
Mme de Sevigne, that this extraordinary effort and im­
mersion was linked to the life flow. 
Consciousness of her own body was very much a part 
of the marquise's passion. The love for her daughter is 
repeatedly tied to her own respiration—"Je souhaite, ma 
petite, que vous m'aimiez toujours: c'est ma vie, c'est 
Fair que je respire" (1:264)—and she "experienced it as 
consubstantial with her being, with her own identity."14 
What the mail brings and takes away is life itself. As 
Harriet Ray Allentuch has shown in her study, separa­
tion was seen as a period of mourning, of physical pain: 
"Cette separation me fait une douleur au coeur et a 
Tame, que je sens comme un mal du corps" (1:201).15 
Reunion, on the other hand, was viewed as spiritual and 
physical rebirth: "Quel voyage, bon Dieu! et quelle sai­
son! vous arriverez precisement le plus court jour de 
l'annee, et par consequent vous nous ramenez le soleil" 
(2:259).16 
In this identification of her love with the life process 
itself, Mme de Sevigne violates the precepts offered by 
the Jansenists, the Epicureans, and the mondain writers, 
all of whom placed another ideal—love of God, ataraxia, 
social perfection—above the intense emotional involvement 
absolutely vital to the marquise's sense of well-being. 
Even if, in part, the recourse to letter-writing reveals a 
decided preference for an attachment to what is absent, 
rather than a predilection for a permanent, "present" 
relationship, (a second marriage, perhaps), the commit­
ment is nonetheless, of a different nature from those 
proposed by the other writers of the age. 
The totality of the involvement, however, created certain 
problems, the most significant of which is the degree to 
which Mme de Sevigne altered reality—consciously or 
subconsciously—to conform to her emotional demands. 
Time, space, people, all undergo a radical transformation 
within the context of the letter. 
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The present is a nonexistent moment in the marquise's 
writings to her daughter. The passage of time is viewed 
within her own special confines, dependent upon her own 
private relativity: 
Pour cette negligence et cette joie de voir passer les jours 
les uns apres les autres, je la sens en moi et j'y fais reflexion 
a toute heure. Quand vous etes ici, il n'y en a pas un que 
je ne regrette; je trouve qu'ils m'echappent avec une 
vitesse qui m'attriste. Une heure, un jour, une semaine, 
un mois, un an, tout cela court et s'enfuit avec une rapidite 
qui m'afflige toujours. . . . Presentement, ma bonne, que 
je ne respire que de vous revoir et vous pouvoir garder et 
conserver moi-meme, je voudrais que tout cet intervalle 
fut passe; je jette les jours a la tete de qui les veut, je les 
remercie d'etre passes. Le printemps et l'ete encore me 
paraissent des siecles; il me semble que je n'en verrai 
jamais la fin. Je dors vite; et j'ai de l'impatience d'etre 
toujours a demain, et puis de recevoir vos lettres, et puis 
d'en recevoir encore, et encore d'autres. (2:572-73) 
But more is involved than simply an art of eloquent ex­
pression; for Mme de Sevigne the present assumes form 
and meaning only in relation to the past or the future, and 
is colored completely by either remorse or anticipation. 
Particularly in the earlier letters to Mme de Grignan, the 
ones written between 1671 and 1676, she alludes fre­
quently to such states of mind. Thoughts that revolve 
upon the past are inevitably filled with great sadness of 
time lost: "Helas! c'est ma folie que de vous voir, de 
vous parler, de vous entendre; je me devore de cette envie, 
et du deplaisir de ne vous avoir pas assez ecoutee, pas 
assez regardee" (1:230-31). She turns next to the future, 
since the past has not fulfilled and the present is sus­
pended, a non-moment: "II faut pourtant que je vous dise 
encore que je regarde le temps ou je vous verrai comme 
le seul que je desire a present et qui peut m'etre agreable 
dans la vie" (1:282). And in one remarkable passage, 
written four years later, she shows with what ease she 
could make the transition from past to future, completely 
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negating the present: "II est vrai que, depuis trois ans, 
nous n'avons ete que quatre mois separees, et ce qui 
s'est passe depuis votre depart. J'ai senti toute la joie de 
passer les etes et les hivers avec vous; et je sens encore 
plus le deplaisir de voir ce temps passe, et passe pour 
jamais, cela fait mourir. II faut mettre a la place de cette 
pensee l'esperance de se revoir" (1:768-69). 
The future reveals itself also as the undisputed answer 
to all problems, and, in fact, as a strong counterforce to 
a reality that is not only unsatisfying but frequently bitter. 
Even after a period of reunion that was particularly 
acrimonious, the future assumes a rosy glow, as Mme de 
Sevigne almost desperately invests time with qualities of 
transfiguration. The most recent reunion may have been 
a disaster, but time alone will change that, installing a 
reign of "truth" that the past has failed to achieve: "Eh, 
mon Dieu, ne nous reverrons-nous jamais en nous faisant 
sentir toutes les douceurs de l'amitie que nous avons? 
. . . Faisons done mieux, ma bonne, une autre fois . . . 
faisons-nous honneur de nos sentiments, qui sont si beaux 
et si bons: pourquoi les defigurer" (2:280)? The problem, 
of course, lies in determining whether the reunion (in this 
case, unsuccessful) or the promise of another encounter 
(judged successful in advance) is the disfiguration of the 
truth. Living versus writing. The essential truth of the re­
lationship, as Mme de Sevigne saw it, was revealed 
through the letters. That which did not adhere to the 
image was somehow inaccurate, false, defigure. 
Space, too, acquires new perspectives. That which is 
"dead" is really most alive. Through the resuscitative 
powers of memory, places that have a particularly strong 
association with Mme de Grignan and the past are those 
sites that most powerfully live within the marquise: "II 
n'y a point d'endroit, point de lieu, ni dans la maison, 
ni dans l'eglise, ni dans le pays, ni dans le jardin, ou je 
ne vous aie vue; il n'y en a point qui ne me fasse souvenir 
de quelque chose de quelque maniere que ce soit; et de 
quelque facon que ce soit aussi, cela me perce le coeur. 
Je vous vois; vous m'etes presente" (1:236). 
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But letter-writing achieves an even stronger transforma­
tion of reality. It was necessary, of course, in the cor­
respondence with Mme de Grignan, to have recourse to 
the outside world, that is, to the world beyond Mme de 
Sevigne and her daughter. But did the marquise's ref­
erences truly reflect ongoing reality? On a double level, 
it appears that by her particular selection of those to be 
mentioned in her letters, she conferred identity, existence 
even, to a choice few alone, and that her choice was ul­
timately guided by her passion for her daughter. As Ber­
nard Bray has shown, the correspondence is a closed work, 
a perfect reflection of the closed society at its root; and 
the letters refer constantly to the same basic group of 
friends, acquaintances, and family, common to both Mme 
de Sevigne and Mme de Grignan.17 
And yet the distinction of who enjoys favor—naming— 
does not stop there. Particularly those friends who are 
most deeply involved with Mme de Grignan—or who at 
least give that appearance to her mother—are included in 
the letters. Mme de Sevigne attempted to render her 
passion a collective one, to give it a sense of social primacy 
that it did not, could not, have. She sought to extricate 
her obsession from the strictly individual by endowing 
it with qualities of communal preoccupation: "Si je vous 
disais tous ceux qui vous font des compliments, il fau­
drait un volume: M. et Mme de Chaulnes, M. de Lavardin, 
M. le comte des Chapelles, Tonquedec, l'abbe de Monti­
gny, eveque de Leon, M. d'Harouys cinq cent mille fois, 
Jean Fourche, Chesieres, etc." (1:373). Those who re­
frained from such compliments were far less often alluded 
to, for Mme de Sevigne transformed the world according 
to her own highly limited standards. 
This is the problem central to the correspondence, and 
one that at times did not escape Mme de Sevigne her­
self. Which is "more real"? Living or writing? Further­
more, is it through writing or being together that a more 
satisfactory version (vision) of life emerges? Although 
constantly seeking her daughter's presence, on a conscious 
level at least, as that which would achieve the greatest 
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fulfillment for herself, Mme de Sevigne, on perhaps a 
deeper plane, was aware that letter-writing offered a vi­
able and perhaps more sustaining alternative to living to­
gether. In fact, that perception was shared by Mme de 
Grignan, according to her mother: "Vous me dites que 
vous etes fort aise que je sois persuadee de votre amitie, 
et que c'est un bonheur que vous n'avez pas eu quand 
nous avons ete ensemble" (1:226). The preceding was 
written in 1671, and eight years later, a similar tone still 
prevails: "Je ne me souviens plus de tout ce qui m'avait 
paru des marques d'eloignement et d'indifference; il me 
semble que cela ne vient point de vous, et je prends 
toutes vos tendresses, et dites et ecrites, pour le veritable 
fond de votre coeur pour moi" (2:451). It is evident that 
those expressions of tenderness may have been more 
often written than said, and that Mme de Sevigne was 
more than willing to replace any signs of indifference or 
hostility—not uncommon during their periods together— 
with what was the preferred mark, although expressed in 
writing. 
In a paradoxical way, then, absence allowed for a more 
satisfactory expression of love than did presence; and it 
can be said that writing did emerge as superior to being 
together, although on the conscious level the latter was 
the expressed, desired goal. But writing was heavily re­
lied upon to communicate "true" feelings, those superior 
emotions free of any bitterness, which Mme de Sevigne 
judged to be the real mark of the relationship with her 
daughter. That she saw the possibility of achieving the 
perfection she had mentally established as inherent in her 
involvement with Mme de Grignan is evident in the un­
usual recourse to writing even when her daughter was in 
or nearby Paris. Expressing herself via the written word was 
a means of achieving both a certain liberty and self-con­
straint through the working over and the manipulation of 
terms.18 And it is a rather remarkable piece of writing 
that the marquise offers to her child while Mme de Gri­
gnan was visiting her: 
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II faut, ma chere bonne, que je me donne le plaisir de 
vous ecrire, une fois pour toutes, comme je suis pour vous. 
Je n'ai pas l'esprit de vous le dire; je ne vous dis rien 
qu'avec timidite et de mauvaise grace; tenez-vous done a 
ceci. Je ne touche point au fond de la tendresse sensible et 
naturelle que j'ai pour vous; e'est un prodige. Je ne sais 
pas quel effet peut faire en vous l'opposition que vous 
dites qui est dans nos esprits; il faut qu'elle ne soit pas 
si grande dans nos sentiments, ou qu'il y ait quelque chose 
d'extraordinaire pour moi, puisqu'il est vrai que mon at­
tachement pour vous n'en est pas moindre. II semble que 
je veuille vaincre ces obstacles, et que cela augmente mon 
amitie plutot que de la diminuer: enfin, jamais, ce me 
semble, on ne peut aimer plus parfaitement. (2:408) 
The perfect expression of her sentiments, the harmony, 
calm, and tranquillity which filter into that expression, 
can be obtained only through a letter. In choosing to com­
municate via writing, Mme de Sevigne implicitly states 
that although the relationship may seem imperfect, es­
pecially to Mme de Grignan, in essence it is sublime. The 
rest is appearance, sham, misunderstanding, a failure to 
relate. If the communication can be made more satis­
factory, so too can the relationship; hence, the recourse 
is to writing. "Mes lettres sont plus heureuses que moi­
meme; je m'explique mal de bouche, quand mon coeur 
est si touche" (2:400). 
This problem of what is "more real" is paramount in the 
letters. There is an ambiguity between absence and 
presence, imagination and reality, that is difficult to re­
solve. Aware of the possibility of defiguration, Mme de 
Sevigne proceeded, nevertheless, to (re)construct an elab­
orate, complex relationship far more successfully on the 
written level than on the "living" one. At the center of 
the correspondence is the altering of time, space, and the 
entire system of relating. Mme de Sevigne stressed the 
satisfaction of the individual psyche as the preeminent 
element in the structuring of a life "project," and conse­
quently was governed only by that which could conform to 
it. The organization of her mental world had to fit the 
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emotional demands she imposed upon it. Moreover, her 
fantasizing, her reconstruction of the world around her 
through the use of the written word, was exactly the op­
tion of an Esprit, of a Saint-Evremond, or of a La 
Rochefoucauld, although her demands differed consider­
ably from each of those writers. If we feel more keenly 
her attempt to transform the universe to certain needs, 
it is perhaps because her effort was so obviously an in­
timate one, painted as such, with no recourse to an anony­
mous on. The dream somehow seems more fragile, the 
attempt to rebuild more vulnerable, because she left her­
self so exposed. 
If, however, the marquise's struggle resembles in struc­
ture those of other classical moralists, particularly in the 
firm belief in the power of the word, her desire to live 
through her love, and the incessant expression of it, was 
not at all consistent with the three prevailing "moralist" 
currents: Jansenism, Epicureanism, and la mondanite. 
The latter two were challenged by her refusal—conscious 
or subconscious—to be guided by desire for repose or social 
adaptability. The letters to Mme de Grignan are far too 
intense ever to be considered as part of the gallant code, 
and in her refusal to live a present-oriented life, unin­
volved and disponible, she clearly violated the precepts of 
Saint-Evremond and the Epicureans. In both cases it was 
the overwhelming totality of her passion—one that left 
little room for anyone or anything else—that was in opposi­
tion to the current vogues. 
Nor do either of the codes seem to have obviously af­
fected her. This was definitely not the case, however, for 
Jansenism, which appears, at first, to have been the 
greatest obstacle to Mme de Sevigne's involvement with 
her daughter. Clearly, her love for her child could never 
be tolerated by the Jansenists, for whom terrestrial love 
was viewed as a direct rival to man's love of God. How­
ever, the marquise's intellectual battle with Jansenism 
can be seen as the socialized form of her own private guilt, 
and as the sole force—sufficiently structured and well de­
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veloped—able to control what she undoubtedly saw as a 
violent, potentially self-destructive passion. Recourse to 
the Jansenist ideals was her only means of counter­
balancing her obsession, and although its tenets could not 
destroy her feelings, at least she could use them as a 
moderating power. 
Mme de Sevigne experienced a vague, nebulous guilt 
concerning her passion for her daughter, although it is 
impossible to describe the precise source of that feeling. 
She had grave concern over the emotional demands and 
sacrifices that the relationship had placed upon both Mme 
de Grignan and herself. There are allusions to her own 
anxieties over the nature of her love, for example, when 
she finds it necessary to clarify for Francoise-Marguerite 
(and perhaps for herself as well) that when she says 
"amour" she means "amour maternel" (2:677-78). In any 
case, whatever the exact cause of the guilt, which runs 
through the letters, its most satisfactory expression was 
in religious terms. 
The marquise thus came to perceive that her sentiments 
for her daughter were a violation of God's law. Mme de 
Sevigne was fully aware that in loving, in adoring, her 
daughter as she did, she was going counter to the stern 
Jansenist principles and therefore was not truly surprised 
when Arnauld d'Andilly scolded her for "idolatry" toward 
her daughter, or when a priest refused her absolution and 
communion during Pentecost (1:276, 729). How deeply 
she was concerned over the reprimands is questionable, 
as is the entire question of her involvement with Jan­
senism. What can be said is that the rigorous, Jansenist 
code served as a slight braking force on what would other­
wise have been a totally uncontrolled passion. That she 
felt guilty, as most critics view the situation, for violating 
the Jansenist principles is not certain; what seems far 
more probable, judging from certain tones in the letters, 
is that she experienced a rather strong sense of guilt, and 
that Jansenism was a sound philosophy for tempering, 
even only moderately, her obsessive passion. 
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But the long, emotional struggle with this braking force 
was not a very successful one. Aware that her feelings 
bordered on deification, Mme de Sevigne nevertheless 
failed to make use of the Jansenist tenets in any sub­
stantial way. Ultimately, she opted for idolatry and for 
the free expression of her emotions. By judging and con­
ceding her failure in advance, by stating multifold times 
that she was too weak to oppose her passion, she thereby 
allowed for the liberty of living and expressing herself as 
passionately as she did: "Et quand nous sommes assez 
malheureux pour n'etre point uniquement occupes a 
Dieu, pouvons-nous mieux faire que d'aimer et de vivre 
doucement parmi nos proches et ceux que nous aimons" 
(2:643). Jansenism was there to serve as a constant re­
minder to her of the extent of her involvement, to temper 
the tendencies toward uncontrol, but it was also pre­
judged unsuccessful. 
The only substantial comfort she obtained from the 
precepts of Jansenism was through the idea of a Provi­
dence that she came to see as "willing" the separation of 
mother and daughter. But this too offered only a means to 
emotional equilibrium that she could not easily realize. 
An increasingly strong reliance upon submission to Provi­
dence can be detected over the span of twenty-five years, 
thus giving rise to a theory of religious conversion.19 
Nevertheless, it seems most accurate to conclude, as has 
Harriet Ray Allentuch, that the heavy dependence upon 
the ways of Providence was not only "a substitute for 
painful thoughts" but also a means to absolve both her­
self and especially Mme de Grignan of any responsibility. 
"If Madame de Sevigne conceived the suspicion that her 
daughter might not be doing her utmost to arrange the 
Grignans' permanent return to Paris, she need only push 
the phantasm aside."20 
Too much time has been devoted, however, to the prob­
lem of Jansenism in Mme de Sevigne's life and letters. 
The strict tenets were primarily a means to self-control. 
The central problem of the correspondence still remains 
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one of penetrating the nature of its origins and expression. 
A definite choice of structuring life was made, along 
grounds that were at once personal and general. The ob­
session with Mme de Grignan was individual, try as the 
marquise did to endow it with a sense of collective con­
cern. But to base an entire adult life upon this passion, to 
write about it, to interpret it again and again, to explain, 
to justify, are needs whose limits are precisely and per­
sistently intertwined in the double domains of love and 
language. 
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Chapter Six 
JACQUES ESPRIT

'T NO MOMENT of French literary his­
tory has Jacques Esprit been favored 
with critical appreciation. Twentieth-
century critics, if they mention at all his 
work La Faussete des vertus humaines, 
usually dismiss the Jansenist writer as being too didactic 
and consequently of little interest to the modern reader. 
Even if this were the case, it would not explain why we 
read and study the works of other moralists whose tone 
is scarcely less didactic than that of Jacques Esprit. Among 
the seventeenth-century prose writers, Esprit has indeed 
been virtually ignored. But the reason lies perhaps not in 
his didactic style, so common to the time, but rather in the 
position his work occupies in relation to La Rochefoucauld's 
Maximes. The two writers were close friends over a long 
period of time, and unquestionably, a mutual influence 
exerted itself in their writings.1 
The Maximes is surely the stylistically superior work. 
Its barbs, its stings, its highly structured, terse sentences 
overshadow the long-winded and frequently repetitious 
pronouncements on human behavior in La Faussete des 
vertus humaines. Esprit's book, pontifical and heavily 
dosed with Jansenist doctrine, becomes a foil against 
which the critics can better measure La Rochefoucauld's 
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finesse. When he is not tightly bound to the author of the 
Maximes, Esprit is grouped among several "moralistes 
jansenisants"2 whose ideas are then studied collectively. 
Neither method does justice to Esprit's work. 
My analysis of La Faussete des vertus humaines is 
necessarily limited here to the ideas on human relation­
ships, which form perhaps the most vital parts of the work, 
for terrestrial love constitutes the greatest threat to man's 
tie to his God. Before entering into that subject, how­
ever, it is necessary to situate more fully M. Esprit's work. 
Published in 1677 and 1678, the two-volume work 
lashed out above all at devout humanism. The belief in 
man's "good nature" is systematically destroyed, as are 
all notions of the human creature rivaling God for ultimate 
worth. Man's "virtue" (understood to mean his generosity, 
his kindness, and all other humanistic elements forming 
the composite homme vertueux), is shown to be an un­
mitigated sham. Underneath the appearances, below the 
surface, there are hidden motives and concealed reasons 
that have always our own well-being at stake.3 L'amour­
propre is the leitmotiv of La Faussete des vertus humaines 
and, for Esprit, the central pivot of all human behavior. 
Man is a monster of self-interest, and Esprit digs in hard, 
seizing every opportunity to rip off the mask of virtue.4 
In fact, the criticism that has long centered upon La 
Rochefoucauld's effort to strip man bare, to reach the ir­
reducible unit of Vamour-propre (a theory questioned in 
my chapter on the author of the Maximes) is far more 
applicable to Esprit, for whom self-interest does consti­
tute the one most fundamental element of human be­
havior. 
What emerges is an attack against man's volonte, what 
Esprit sees as his wish for strong moral fiber, as well as 
his bonne volonte, which man believes generously leads 
him into relationships with his fellow men. Stoicism is 
laid to rest, as is the flexible Christian doctrine of the 
devout humanists, offering room for both man and God at 
its center. Esprit demands a constant stripping bare, a 
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persistent awareness that appearance and reality share 
nothing at all. His center of authenticity is always situated 
in le coeur, whereas modern-day psychology postulates 
a more complex and less regionally specific division (al­
though generally mental) between act and motivation— 
the subconscious. Nevertheless, both reflect a constant 
trend in Western thought, the wish to somehow attain 
the "true" self. Indeed, it appears that Jacques Esprit ex­
pressed the entire concept of authenticity as fully as con­
temporary psychology, perhaps with less verbal acumen 
but with no greater degree of abstraction. Modern psy­
chology and psychoanalysis have merely strengthened a 
culturally significant phenomenon, that of a functioning 
system independent of, and separate from, a center of 
conscious behavior. It has not yet explained or proved 
anything. The supposition of an unconscious remains 
hypothetical, although centuries of Western thought— 
through one vocabulary or another—have solidified it 
enough for us to schematize whole patterns of behavior. 
But it would be erroneous to suggest that La Faussete 
des vertus humaines is simply a psychic denuding, where 
fifty-three "virtues" are denounced as false for masking 
and hiding the one real motivating force in man, his self-
interest. What also emerges from the work is a strict effort 
at controlling human behavior on all levels, from thought 
to act, through the word. It seems quite possible that at 
some junctures the severe Jansenist doctrine was in agree­
ment with the prevailing social mood. Critics of the period 
have suggested that the general turbulence of the second 
half of the seventeenth century was a disturbing factor to 
large segments of the French population, and the sense of 
moral decay was eventually linked, unjustifiably or not, to 
the flexible complacence of the clergy.5 The civil dis­
orders had brought about a general awareness of society's 
fragile vulnerability, and the Jansenist tendency toward 
control, individual and social, matched the prevailing 
mood of restraint. For the Jansenist writers, what was 
needed were not the optimistic ideas that the church had 
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readily espoused as a reconciliation between two totally 
distinct moral systems (the rivaling prerogatives of God 
and the self), but a rigorous separation of earthly and 
divine. In Jacques Esprit's work there is indeed no transi­
tion from one domain to the other. 
He avoids a chapter directly on love, since Jansenism 
could not envision any terrestrial competition for adora­
tion of God. Love, then, for Esprit, would not be consid­
ered a false virtue; it would simply be hors du jeu. But 
the truth is that Jacques Esprit does devote several pages 
to the subject in three different chapters of the second 
volume: "La Temperance," "La Modestie des femmes," 
and "L'Honnetete des femmes." The first discusses love 
within a rather general context of sentiment and emotion, 
whereas the latter two chapters focus specifically on 
Vamour. It is significant that Esprit is concerned with 
physical love in these chapters. He leaves Platonic rela­
tionships for the section on friendship.6 
Writing on temperance, he pits himself directly against 
Aristotle, for whom desires were dangerous only if uncon­
trolled by a moderating spirit. For Esprit, however, desire, 
no matter how weak, is dangerous to man's psychic well­
being. He decries most vehemently, however, the aliena­
tion that results from intensely experienced emotion. The 
individual who allows himself to be governed by the reign 
of passion denies that which is, for Esprit, most funda­
mentally human: reason. Within the context of the work, 
such a shift is basically a deviation from the psychic 
norm and is considered therefore as highly undesirable. 
Unable to control himself—unable, perhaps more impor­
tantly, to be controlled—man succumbing to the sway of 
violent feelings becomes not only asocial but inhuman. 
As protection against these psychologically and socially 
destructive impulses, the individual must combat them 
from incipience: 
[L'experience] apprend a tout le monde que les passions 
sont seditieuses et dereglees en quelque etat qu'on les 
considere: car si on les considere dans leur naissance, les 
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plus faibles de meme que les plus violentes previennent 
la raison, et n'attendent pas ses ordres pour s'elever. Or 
c'est un dereglement manifeste, puisque c'est a la raison a 
donner le branle a toutes les puissances de Fame, et que 
pas une ne doit se remuer que par sa direction; que si Ton 
examine ce qu'elles font des qu'elles sont elevees, on voit 
qu'au lieu d'etre souples et obeissantes a la raison, elles 
lui sont rebelles; qu'elles la combattent et qu'elles lui otent 
la liberte de juger, ou corrompent ses jugements. De plus, 
chaque passion apres avoir aveugle l'homme, l'asservit et 
l'attache a son propre objet.7 
The servile state of man ruled by his emotions is re­
jected by Esprit, who seeks to install, or to reinstall, the 
reign of lucid reason. (Like Rousseau, a century later, 
he creates a myth-like fantasy of a golden time before 
man's essential corruption, an era, for Esprit, when man 
loved God alone, and the human creature was no rival.) 
Felicity is calm, sure, steady; and only a true Christian, 
one who abstains from sensual pleasure for love of God, 
not for a "false" reason such as avarice, can find such 
happiness. 
His attack is a major thrust against the prerogatives of 
the self and the aristocratic code. As Paul Benichou has 
written, noble society had never considered the censuring 
of passion, of the passions, as a condition of human worth. 
For the aristocracy, from the Middle Ages through the 
seventeenth century, "virtue" (grandeur of soul and spirit) 
was not in the denial of the passions but rather in their 
full expression. Medieval Christian moralists had found it 
necessary to denounce this "natural" moral, for it was in 
direct contradiction to the Bible's teachings.8 In the seven­
teenth century a flexible form of Christianity, granting a 
high place to terrestrial love once freed from its grosser 
elements, combined with, or at least leaned upon, the 
courtois idea of love and its sublimated impulses, and 
thereby offered a successful compromise between a natu­
ral moral and a rigorously Christian one. For Jacques Es­
prit no such reconciliation is possible. His is a total rejec­
tion of nature's way, and sexual abstinence is requisite. 
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Although the chapter on temperance contains several 
pronouncements against the dangers of la volupte, Esprit's 
strongest attack and censure appear in two other chapters: 
"La Modestie des femmes," and "L'Honnetete des 
femmes." In La Faussete des vertus humaines, the burden 
and guilt of loving fall directly upon the woman, and 
Esprit's attitude contrasts sharply with the portrayal of 
women and love in the novels of the century, which were 
direct descendants of medieval courtoisie. The dependent 
position of women in seventeenth-century French society 
has been detailed by many critics and scholars, perhaps 
most thoroughly by Gustave Fagniez. It is not my inten­
tion here to repeat that position. But Esprit's ideas are 
unquestionably more in accordance with prevailing social 
standards for women than with the romanesque picture. 
Traditional ideas on woman's submissive role were strong, 
and as Moliere expressed in L'Ecole des femmes, signs of 
revolt—fine clothing, makeup, flirtations—were vehemently 
condemned. 
In both chapters Esprit is eager to explain the close atten­
tion he accords to women and their societal role. He clearly 
states that there are virtues appropriate to men and others 
that are the lot of women. Modesty is among the latter, 
for women have a "natural timidity" and coldness that are 
conducive to such caution (p. 91). The chapter on I'honnetete 
begins with a bitter denunciation of woman's position in 
society, only to change quickly into a facile acceptance of 
the status quo: 
Mais peu de gens s'apercoivent que l'amour propre a rendu 
tous les hommes de vrais tyrans, et que leur tyrannie, qui 
est cachee dans leur coeur, eclaterait par leurs cruautes si 
l'impuissance ne retenait leur ferocite et leur violence. 
. .  . Si quelqu'un trouve de la difficulte a croire qu'il soit 
generalement vrai que le naturel de l'homme est fier, 
farouche et inhumain; il n'a qu'a jeter les yeux sur tous les 
endroits du monde; il verra que les personnes riches et 
puissantes oppriment partout celles qui sont pauvres et sans 
appui; il verra que les hommes se prevalent partout des 
avantages que leur sexe leur donne sur celui des femmes; 
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qu'ils les traitent avec tyrannie, les font vivre sous des lois 
injustes et rigoureuses. . . . Ainsi le joug du mariage qui 
assujettit aux memes lois les femmes et les maris, n'asservit 
plus que les femmes; ainsi la chastete qui doit etre commune 
a Tun et a Tautre sexe, est devenue la vertu des femmes et 
des filles; et c'est ce qui m'oblige a la leur attribuer parti­
culierement, et a parler de Thonnetete comme si c'etait une 
vertu qui ne fut propre qu'a elles. (Pp. 100-102) 
A bit too prompt to accede to the "way things are," Es­
prit's early criticism dissolves in face of his severe standards 
for judging women's conduct. Perhaps he felt self-
exonerated after his profession of innocence. However, it 
is easy to penetrate beneath the surface protestation and 
glean a quick acceptance of the double standard. Since 
passion is woman's business, Esprit will offer her ways of 
protecting herself and, consequently, society against its 
demands. 
It is against the tradition of la courtoisie and Vamour 
honnete that Esprit directs his anger. Seventeenth-century 
fiction writers are to be held responsible for the current 
vogue of sentimentality, for the depiction of love as a pure 
and generous sentiment: "Les Auteurs des Romans ont 
reussi dans l'entreprise qu'ils ont faite de persuader au 
monde que les femmes peuvent etre galantes vertueuse­
ment et faire l'amour avec innocence . . .  " (p. 105). For 
Esprit, this mixed moral of love and virtue is a radical 
impossibility, since the woman involved in a love relation­
ship is "possessed." No longer governed by reason, sub­
ject to insensate anxiety, she is alienated from virtue. 
The marks of her soul are rage and jealousy: "Dire que 
l'amour est une passion honnete, c'est assurer qu'il est 
honnete d'etre tourmente par une furie, et de sentir tous 
les traits de la jalousie, de la rage et du desespoir" (p. 
106). 
Terrestrial passion, far from being innocent, is guilty of 
the most monumental of crimes: it detracts from divine 
love. There is no question for Esprit and the Jansenists 
of viewing love relationships, even chaste, as an imperfect 
form of divine love. Such affection is a rival, a serious 
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threat to man's devotion to God; energy and time that 
might be used for religious worship are consumed in un­
worthy occupations directed toward the "other." 
In "L'Honnetete des femmes," Esprit returns to his 
leitmotiv of self-interest. Enumerating "false" motives for 
woman's wish to appear virtuous to the world, he methodi­
cally destroys whatever pride she may have in her con­
duct. Outside controls—a sound moral education, fear of 
punishment, desire to marry and remove herself from 
parental control—are not sufficient in Jacques Esprit's moral 
universe. He demands control from within, unmotivated by 
self-interest; and although his ideas at first reading some­
times appear banal, his thought, as it develops, frees itself 
from empty terms and becomes indeed a potent expression 
against immodesty. 
Thus he first predictably states that "il n'y a que la 
modestie des femmes Chretiennes qui soit une vertu veri­
table" (p. 98). Nevertheless, pushing further, he constructs 
an absolute standard for self-governance: "L'on peut . . . 
dire qu'une femme veritablement honnete ne doit pas seule­
ment imposer silence aux vaines passions, mais aussi les 
etouffer des leur naissance, et meme les empecher de 
naitre" (p. 109). Esprit is now at antipodes from the more-
or-less refined love of the courtois novel and from "le 
christianisme de sublimation" with its emphasis on adora­
tion of saints and mystics. His vocabulary is one of total 
sexual repression—"imposer silence," "empecher," "etouffer." 
Nor does Esprit stop there. Not only must a woman (he 
never varies from the emphasis on female conduct after his 
lengthy self-exonerating introduction) appear so morally se­
vere that no man dares approach her, she is also responsible 
for banishing all verbal expressions judged "impure" from 
her conversation: "II faut encore qu'une femme veritable­
ment honnete fasse comprendre . . . qu'elle n'entend pas le 
langage de ces passions, ni les signes qui font l'office de ce 
langage" (p. 110). 
It is perhaps a result of the Cartesian revolution in the 
field of language that Esprit's work is so heavily impreg­
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nated with allusion to the spoken and written word's enor­
mous force. For him la parole is concomitant to I'acte, no less 
powerful or significant. Esprit clearly saw that the emotional 
charge of a word is as conducive to "immodest" desire as 
actions themselves. What he calls des paroles sales were in­
vented by "les voluptueux . . . pour regouter leurs sen­
sualites par leurs entretiens, et pour allumer et irriter leur 
passion brutale" (p. 83). 
Esprit delves even further. The stripping off of "layers" 
never reaches an end. There is always one more level under­
neath. Authenticity seems to be fleeting, at best. Unsatisfied 
with dissolving the layer of outer manifestation—first act, then 
word—Esprit comes to exact absolute control over the thought 
process, with God alone as judge. Following a semi-Platonic 
view, he states that thoughts, like words, are images of things, 
and therefore to be reckoned with as active, powerful forces. 
The secret language that is thought must be as free of long­
ing and desire as the words and actions that interpret them. 
Even with this, he has not reached the final "layer" of the 
self. "Below" the levels of action, word, thought, there is the 
motive for all these, and it too must be chaste, pure: "II ne 
faut pas se contenter de savoir que leurs moeurs et leurs 
sentiments sont honnetes; Ton doit encore tacher de decou­
vrir par quel motif elles gardent l'honnetete, et etablir aupara­
vant quel est le motif qui la rend vertueuse" (pp. 115-16). 
In other words, there can be no distance between action, 
word, thought, and cause. No false motive must interpolate, 
and God alone shall judge: "Le coeur humain est un grand 
mystere. Les pensees et les desirs s'elevent sur sa surface, 
et peuvent etre apercus. Cest pourquoi il n'y a personne 
qui ne sache ce qu'il pense et ce qu'il desire; mais les motifs 
des pensees et des desirs sont caches dans sa profondeur, 
qui n'est penetree que des yeux de Dieu" (pp. 113-14). 
What Jacques Esprit posits here, in his ultimate bow to 
divine wisdom, is essentially the same control modern psy­
choanalysis would see in the authoritative domination by the 
"superego," a construct no less questionable than "the 
eyes of God." In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud, 
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tackling the same problem as Esprit, that of the conflicting 
demands between the erotic and the social, hypothesizes a 
mental process akin to what Esprit had formulated in his 
work: 
The super-ego is an agency which has been inferred by us, 
and conscience is a function which we ascribe, among other 
functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping 
a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judg­
ing them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the 
harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the 
severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego 
has of being watched over in this way, the assessment of the 
tension between its own strivings and the demands of the 
9super-ego.
All this is not to suggest, of course, that Freud and his 
followers accorded the same moral supremacy, as if by right, 
to such "authority." They clearly saw the dangers for the 
individual in denying sexual fulfillment. What is significant 
is the similarity of the schematization drawn by seventeenth-
century moralists and modern psychologists. The essential 
divisions of control and subordination, differing only in con­
text (religious and "scientific"), remain the same. 
There is at least one other important similarity between 
Esprit's ideas and the concepts of twentieth-century psychol­
ogy and psychoanalysis. Both schemas seem to show that by 
stripping off the "layers," by probing "deep down," by peer­
ing beneath the surface to reach the hidden motives, we will 
eventually dispel them. Once a state of psychological trans­
parency is achieved, the individual will return to a healthy 
state of mind, able to control impulses that may threaten his 
equanimity. Esprit's book is consequently a careful, explana­
tory work, showing the way to total self-knowledge, leading the 
reader step by step from action to motivation, toward ulti­
mate personal frankness. Self-deception can be chipped away, 
and the individual can achieve heightened awareness, allow­
ing him to govern his strong desires. 
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Chapter Seven

THE LETTRES PORTUGAISES

UIS-JE OBLIGEE de vous rendre un compte 
exact de tous mes divers mouvements?"1 The 
letters of la religieuse portugaise are thus 
abruptly terminated, the final question a 
metacommentary on the entire project: a 
delineation of the multiple crosscurrents—conscious and 
subliminal—that filter through the nun's mind, reflecting 
her one obsession (the betrayal) in shifting, rotating per­
spectives. The silence that follows is complete; there is no 
intervening explanation, no addendum, no conclusion by a 
third party, no hints of the future at all. Unlike Les 
Liaisons dangereuses and Adolphe, both works that concen­
trate upon obsessive passion and authoritatively allude to 
the punishments of the diverse characters, thereby offering 
a moral stamp, the Lettres portugaises fall into an am­
biguous silence, total, but as troublesome as the muteness 
that overtakes Berenice, expressed in Antiochus' with­
ered "helas," silence without clarification, without con­
clusion, without poetic order. This ambiguity alone would 
seem to have demanded critical notice, and yet it is only 
recently, in the article of Leo Spitzer in 1953, that the 
Lettres portugaises have been explored beyond the pre­
liminary level of authenticity and beyond an insidious 
effort to re-create the tale of the nun in a heavy, supinely 
romanesque fashion.2 
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The long debate over authenticity (Stendhal, Sainte-
Beuve, Rilke, and various scholars convinced that the 
letters are indeed those of Mariane Alcaforado, "religieuse 
a Beja entre TEstramadoure et l'Andalousie,"3 thus sub­
stantiating the claim of the original publisher, Claude Bar-
bin; Rousseau, Barbey d'Aureyvilly, and other critics sure 
that the letters are apocryphal) has been decided in favor 
of the latter group: Guilleragues, a seventeenth-century 
man of letters and friend to Racine, is now the accepted 
author.4 A careful reading of Guilleragues' Valentins readily 
supports the case for his authorship of the Lettres, so fre­
quently do certain basic themes recur. Literary history 
aside, however, the Lettres portugaises offer a complex web 
of psychological intrigue, layers of motivation and manipu­
lation, and, above all, a decided pattern tracing the move­
ment of a passion, inevitable in both its birth and death. 
The work is short: five letters to the unfaithful French 
lover who has abandoned Portugal and his mistress to re­
turn to France. It is perhaps the brevity of these letters 
that inhibits the critical output, but their concision is pre­
cisely why they are of significance in a study of Vamour­
passion in the classical age. More than any tragedy of 
Racine, they observe the demands of unity5—the walls of 
the convent restrict the boundaries of space, and although 
approximately one year is allowed to elapse, there is never 
really any sense of time passing, only a monotonous, 
stagnated repetition, an amassment rather than a con­
tinuous flow. Temporally, spatially, everything is limited, 
closing in upon itself. 
The restriction of time and space corresponds perfectly 
to the reduction in action. Beyond Mariane's obsession 
there is nothing else: no decor to speak of, local flavor 
being almost totally excluded; no delineation of character, 
the French lover singularly colorless; no action exterior 
to the diverse movements, impulses of the passion itself. 
The reactions of the lover in the few brief lines he sends 
are never made truly clear—it is only his silence that is 
revealing. Mariane herself is interesting only in her mono­
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mania. What emerges from the complete absence of decora­
tion, from this total nudity of situation, is a barren, harsh 
exposure of I'amour-passion, with the incessant monologue 
repeating its one theme of betrayal. Ultimately, there re­
mains only the voice of the passion itself, Mariane's 
particular drama serving merely as the backdrop. 
And yet the Lettres portugaises offer the portrait of one 
struggle not only against I'amour-passion but also against 
the entire myth of passion. The myth is that of Tristan 
and Isolde, and Guilleragues was in firm command of the 
legend. The close alliance between Vamour and la mort, an 
alliance that Mme de Lafayette did not fail to develop, is 
of prime importance in the Lettres portugaises, not merely 
as the private struggle of la religieuse, but also as literary 
convention that operates as a powerful controlling force 
within her emotional universe. Moreover, it is understand­
able that the seventeenth century would find in the Tristan 
myth a satisfactory expression of the problem of I'amour­
passion. In Denis de Rougemont's LAmour et I'occident, a 
case is made for the medieval formulation of the Tristan 
legend: "Le mythe, au sens strict du terme, se constitua 
au douzieme siecle, c'est-a-dire dans une periode ou les 
elites faisaient un vaste effort de mise en ordre sociale et 
morale. II s'agissait de 'contenir,' precisement, les 
poussees de l'instinct destructeur: car la religion, en 
l'attaquant, l'exasperait."6 The problem of l'instinct 
destructeur was strongly at issue in classical France. A 
revival of the Tristan legend as legend, that is, as literary 
convention, seems likely in an age caught up with the 
attempt at subduing, suppressing, unreason. 
Passion, then, as a desired ideal, desired even for the 
suffering inherent in it, functions in the Lettres portugaises 
at once as a new, private force—Mariane's own particular 
conflict—and as a conventional one that may be even 
stronger—the entire socio-literary tradition of I'amour­
passion. As in the Tristan legend, death comes to assume 
for Mariane the qualities of action and voluntarism that 
are most thoroughly contradicted by passion, by that which 
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is endured, by that to which we are resigned. Thus she 
believes that a self-determined demise, a suicide, alone can 
restore the autonomy of the self. Mariane craves death, 
or at least attempts to crave it. Her letters are filled with 
allusions to her failing health, to her wish to "die of grief." 
And yet, in the end, she assumes a radically new stance, 
strives to throw off her illness and her passivity in favor 
of calming the irrationality that has dictated her every 
thought since the departure of the lover. 
Mme de Lafayette, in La Princesse de Cleves, adhered 
firmly to the Tristan legend, allowing the heroine to die at 
the end, but virtually through her own volition; not as a 
passive agent, but rather as the determining force of her 
own destiny. Thus Death becomes the sole counterforce 
to Eros. The nun of the Lettres portugaises, however, 
chooses her purge not in a transcendent death but rather 
through the outlet of her mind, through what Spitzer has 
seen basically as a Cartesian breaking-down process.7 
In effect her deductions, her analysis (particularly strong 
in the fifth and final letter), her eventual acceptance of 
the nature of her obsession, all testify to a striving to curb 
the disturbing, irrational element of the psyche. At the 
end not only is her passion laid to rest, but along with it 
the entire Tristan legend of the Liebestod. Through the 
sorting-out process, Mariane achieves a new freedom, a way 
out of her own psychic disarray and, most importantly, a 
way out of the myths handed down by generations. 
But although it is necessary to have established first 
the direction of the Lettres portugaises, to have shown that 
Mariane's struggle is at once private and collective, that 
she is battling not only her own passion but the convention 
of passion also, it is nevertheless essential to trace the 
letters from their beginning rather than to remain fixed 
on the end passages, important as they may be. There are 
two principal structures in the five letters, reflecting two 
different time sequences. (There is really a third time struc­
ture, also, that of the reader who is the "recipient" of the 
letters, and whose forced complicity and guilt in the entire 
affair are natural results of the letter format.) 
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There is first of all the interval of the year, or slightly 
more than that, between the lover's departure for France 
—a departure that Mariane readily criticizes for its lack of 
true explanation—and the fifth letter, the final one in the 
series, which both closes out the past and opens onto the 
future, in a constant juxtaposition of remorse and anticipa­
tion. Within this time span, traceable from one letter to the 
next and especially noticeable in a contrast between first 
and last letters, various transitions occur, what Mariane 
refers to as "divers mouvements," and which may be fully 
analyzed by la religieuse, or which, passing beyond the 
conscious level of the nun, may be grasped by the reader 
alone. The central passage, or movement, is from celebra­
tion of death to reflection upon life, a transition most 
obvious between the third and fifth letters, but apparent 
also in the first two letters through reference to fainting, 
a "temporary" death. As offshoots of this one underlying 
theme are diverse transitions signaling changes in the 
emotional state of la religieuse portugaise. Early submis­
sion and passivity give way, in the end, to overt anger 
and aggression; from a sense of "other-worldliness," of 
transcendence beyond the ordinary life condition, Mariane 
slowly achieves a new sense of community and reality; 
finally, the extraordinary emotional turmoil that colors the 
first four letters, in different shades and gradations, suc­
cumbs ultimately to a longing for tranquillity and repose. 
The gradual reenactment of the relationship between 
Mariane and le chevalier constitutes the second basic struc­
ture of the Lettres. The progression of the "love story" 
itself is in direct opposition to the state of the present re­
lationship. As the events fade into an increasingly more 
distant past, as the lover establishes his physical and emo­
tional distance from Mariane, she in turn more vividly re­
creates the drama of their encounters, and her erotic 
souvenirs assume an increasingly sharper coloration. Thus 
their romance remains nebulous, vague in the early letters 
and gradually affects precision and force. Only slowly does 
the reader learn of the secret meetings in the convent, and 
only slowly is the erotic nature of Mariane's preliminary 
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ties to her lover revealed. In a constant shifting of tem­
poral structure, Mariane moves back and forth between 
the past—increasingly more fulfilling—and the present with its 
rapid diminishing of satisfaction. 
It is properly the rapid interchange of these two move­
ments that is, that creates, the passion. The keen remem­
brance of past desire, desire that was then gratified, pro­
vokes the sharp descent, repeated multifold times, into a 
present void of fulfillment. In his analysis of Racine, and 
particularly in the short section he devotes to the Lettres 
portugaises as they may have influenced that writer, 
Charles Mauron reminds that it is only impeded, ob­
structed love, love that is therefore not realizable, that 
engenders the "passion" situation. L'amour-passion focuses 
on objects that are at once absent and present, desired 
and forbidden. "Le desir bloque se mue en angoisse, reflue, 
tourbillonne, se charge de persecution, de magie, de 
remords."8 However, Mariane's passion will eventually 
wither from what Spitzer has called "inanition sentimen­
tale," from lack of direct or indirect sustenance; and in 
the end she does achieve, or is at least on the way to 
achieving, a suppression of her feelings. A more detailed 
study of the five letters is now necessary in order to trace 
the nuances and modulations of Mariane's extraordinary 
preoccupation. 
"Considere, mon amour, jusqu'a quel exces tu as 
manque de prevoyance" (p. 39). Even as the more intimate 
tu quickly shifts to vous, the first letter remains familiar, 
cajoling, precieux in its tone. The flirtatious nature of 
this first communication will gradually give way to re­
proach, then to anger; but for now la religieuse is eager 
to establish what she perceives to be the reciprocity of 
sentiment. The unit of the couple is still strongly present 
in her mind, intact, and the movement toward emotional 
distance and separation, toward solitude, will come only in 
a slow, steady progression of awareness. For the time being, 
the Edenic situation is faithfully maintained: "Je suis 
resolue a vous adorer toute ma vie, et a ne voir jamais 
[130]

THE LETT RES PORTUGAISES 
personne . . .  " (p. 41). Thus Mariane successfully ex­
cludes the world, that is, her family and her religion. 
However, it is particularly the precieux-courtois tone that 
dominates the first letter, in sentences filled with allusion 
to an animated, significant (in the original sense) universe: 
"J'envoie mille fois le jour mes soupirs vers vous, ils vous 
cherchent en tous lieux" (p. 39). The ruling image is the 
Ovidian eye, the eye where love lodges, and, in an exten­
sion of the theme, where grief too resides. The entire in­
troductory section plays on the eye metaphor: 
Quoi! cette absence, a laquelle ma douleur, toute in­
genieuse qu'elle est, ne peut donner un nom assez funeste, 
me privera done pour toujours de regarder ces yeux dans 
lesquels je voyais tant d'amour, et qui me faisaient 
connaitre des mouvements qui me comblaient de joie, qui 
me tenaient lieu de toutes choses, et qui enfin me 
suffisaient? Helas! les miens sont prives de la seule 
lumiere qui les animait, il ne leur reste que des larmes, et 
je ne les ai employes a aucun usage qu'a pleurer sans cesse. 
(P. 39) 
Although the intense passion does communicate itself in 
this section, as in the entire letter (the sense of obstacle, 
of blockage, is already anticipated by Mariane), it is on a 
decidedly reduced level, and the nun's ties to her -lover 
are revealed through metaphor-charged language. The 
whole letter, as Spitzer points out, is viewed as a caress9— 
"Adieu, je ne puis quitter ce papier, il tombera entre vos 
mains, je voudrais bien avoir le meme bonheur"—and her 
suffering is still minimal enough to be expressed in terms 
of pleasure—"Adieu, aimez-moi toujours; et faites-moi 
souffrir encore plus de maux" (p. 42). 
But the consistent use of precieux imagery points to 
more than mere optimism on Mariane's part. She emerges 
as dominated by the myth of Vamour-passion, by the myth 
of passion as a desired, sought-after ideal, superior to any 
other life choice. Guilleragues' careful choice of metaphor, 
his overly lyric tones bordering on the banal, testify not 
only to Mariane's naivete but also to a sense of her control 
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by a potent code. Mariane is surely determined to love, 
determined by love, but it is as if determinism is here viewed 
as a seduction by powerful myths. 
By the second letter, however, the coquettish tone has 
virtually disappeared, and Mariane's progression toward 
the crisis becomes increasingly stronger, charged now with 
bitterness and rancor. She has adopted the traditional pos­
ture of the female subjugated by the male, and her outcry 
is molded by this role of submission. It is not her pride 
that dictates her words, nor any sense of fear of punish­
ment (this element is singularly absent from the work), 
but only her overwhelming preoccupation with the betrayal. 
The anguish is couched in metaphors of the woman-slave, 
and though the image ideally communicates the extreme 
limits of her depressive anxiety, it also echoes back to a 
long, literary tradition, (in the same way that later the 
allusion to a nun as the most perfect mistress, free from 
terrestrial preoccupations, will recall the medieval theme of 
the clerc as ideal lover):10 "Ah! j'envie le bonheur d'Em­
manuel et de Francisque; pourquoi ne suis-je pas incessam­
ment avec vous, comme eux? je vous aurais suivi, et je 
vous aurais assurement servi de meilleur coeur: je ne 
souhaite rien en ce monde, que vous voir" (p. 45). 
The persistent self-humiliation becomes increasingly 
more difficult to read, so much does la religieuse bow to 
the illusory perfections of her chevalier, her adoration 
bordering on idolatry, the cult of the lover replacing the 
one for God. Mariane herself announces a singular indif­
ference for religion: "Je suis ravie d'avoir fait tout ce que 
j'ai fait pour vous contre toute sorte de bienseance; je ne 
mets plus mon honneur et ma religion qu'a vous aimer 
eperdument toute ma vie, puisque j'ai commence a vous 
aimer" (p. 45). This chant, repeated in various fashion 
throughout the letters, becomes almost a litany of adora­
tion, religious expression constantly intermingling with 
erotic, private desire. In an almost direct appropriation of 
Christ's words to his God, she exclaims at the end of the 
second letter: "M'avez-vous pour toujours abandonnee" 
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(p. 46)? Indeed, the entire theme of abandonment, situated 
in this sacred decor, seems to exist frequently on a level of 
sacrilege. 
The second letter also marks the birth of two concepts 
subliminally perceived by Mariane, fundamental, however, 
to the work. It is now that the first substantial explana­
tion of the relationship is offered, and the vocabulary and 
images, before molded by la preciosite, thereby reducing 
their power, now assume an obviously erotic base: 
Mes douleurs ne peuvent recevoir aucun soulagement, et 
le souvenir de mes plaisirs me comble de desespoir: Quoi! 
tous mes desirs seront done inutiles, et je ne vous verrai 
jamais en ma chambre avec toute l'ardeur et tout l'em­
portement que vous me faisiez voir? mais helas! je m'abuse, 
et je ne connais que trop que tous les mouvements qui 
occupaient ma tete et mon coeur n'etaient excites en vous 
que par quelques plaisirs, et qu'ils finissaient aussi tot 
qu'eux; il fallait que dans ces moments trop heureux 
j'appelasse ma raison a mon secours pour moderer l'exces 
funeste de mes delices, et pour m'annoncer tout ce que je 
souffre presentement: mais je me donnais toute a vous, et 
je n'etais pas en etat de penser a ce qui eut pu empoisonner 
ma joie, et m'empecher de jouir pleinement des temoignages 
ardents de votre passion; je m'apercevais trop agreablement 
que j'etais avec vous pour penser que vous seriez un jour 
eloigne de moi. (P. 44) 
As the distance separating the encounters grows, the 
memories become increasingly more vivid, Mariane ex­
periences not only the diminishing of a reality found most 
satisfactory but, in reverse progression, a crystallizing of 
her emotional burn. Thus she (re-)creates her excitement 
through words, for they are all that subsist of the relation­
ship, the sole elements that can, she believes, sustain her 
passion. The attempt at creation, at transforming her 
experience into "literature," is truly the only means open to 
Mariane for loving. 
Finally, the second letter firmly establishes the limits of 
the role of the lover in the nun's world. The lack of a 
clear portrait, the scarce bit of information offered on him, 
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was not by chance. Rather, if the person was depicted 
minimally, this decision translates the nature of Mariane's 
involvement: the Augustinian amabam amare. The letter's 
concluding section definitively closes out any other pos­
sibility: "Faites tout ce qu'il vous plaira, mon amour ne 
depend plus de la maniere dont vous me traiterez" (p. 46). 
Her passion reveals itself as functioning totally inde­
pendently of the lover's reactions. It has now assumed a 
quality of complete autonomy, a trait that will prevail 
throughout the remaining letters. In the end, of course, 
Mariane's freedom is only from herself, from her rigid, 
self-created existence. Moreover, as the passion comes to 
function separately from the world of the lover, the concept 
of "writing" assumes an even greater role, and each letter 
becomes ever more difficult to close. 
One sentence, in particular, serves to illustrate the 
general mood and tone of the third letter: "Je ne sais ni 
ce que je suis, ni ce que je fais, ni ce que je desire: je suis 
dechiree par mille mouvements contraires" (p. 48). Mari­
ane has begun some critical questioning, and has at least 
broken ground in her appraisal of the situation. The move­
ment toward "uncoupling" is fully in action as she sepa­
rates herself from the lover, the increasing distance in space 
(as the chevalier continues his home voyage) corresponding 
to the distance she now perceives in their emotional states. 
But she is also questioning the nature of her own attach­
ment. Although, in the final words of the letter, Mariane 
returns to the passive, submissive state that has long been 
holding sway, nevertheless there is a heightened awareness 
of her continued detachment from the person of her lover, 
if not yet from her passion itself. "Traitez-moi severement! 
Ne trouvez point que mes sentiments soient assez violents! 
Soyez plus difficile a contenter! Mandez-moi que vous voulez 
que je meure d'amour pour vous. Et je vous conjure de 
me donner ce secours, afin que je surmonte la faiblesse 
de mon sexe, et que je finisse toutes mes irresolutions par 
un veritable desespoir" (pp. 49-50). This strong demand 
that the lover now force Mariane to new heights of feeling 
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translates her own confusion, as the nun slowly begins to 
see that she is freeing herself from the binds of the rela­
tionship. 
Thus la religieuse now comes to perceive that the ex­
pression of her despair surpasses the feeling itself. At the 
same time, she feels urges toward life—"Je fais autant de 
choses pour conserver ma vie que pour la perdre" (p. 49) 
—that contradict what she believes would be an attitude 
more in keeping with the pose of the abandoned mistress. 
Convinced that she should seek death, as ordered by tradi­
tion, Mariane recognizes, nonetheless, that a part of her 
yearns toward life, that even her passion is one means of 
realizing an intense existence, and thus concludes: "Je 
deteste la tranquillite ou j'ai vecu avant que je vous con­
nusse" (p. 50). In the love affair with the French soldier, 
she had emerged from a nonexistence, symbolized rather 
obviously by the convent and which she is now reluctant 
to give up, only to return to solitude and sexual repression. 
Thus the letters take on great meaning for her, as the means 
not only to make the passion endure but also as the transi­
tion back to the emotional vacuum from which she was 
abruptly removed for a short time. But that transition is 
not yet wholly achieved, and for the present, the important 
reference to letter-writing itself—"Mon desespoir n'est done 
que dans mes lettres"? (p. 49)—remains primarily an allu­
sion to creation, to art, to a pleasure entirely divorced 
from the chevalier himself. 
Writing is no longer only an outlet for Mariane, no 
longer that which interprets an inner state. Rather, it has 
assumed its own independent justification, has gone be­
yond that passion itself, in that it has prolonged what 
Mariane recognizes as the forced limits of her own feelings. 
Without writing there is nothing, and the inability to close 
the third letter (there are five adieux all followed by more 
words), translates her dilemma. The final sentence, para­
doxically, is nothing less than an opening: "Ah! que j'ai 
de choses a vous dire" (p. 50). 
Mariane's fourth letter, the longest of the series, 
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demonstrates her new understanding of the limits of love, 
and she now seems fully aware for the first time that a 
passion develops from obstacle, from refusal, from the 
partner's "no." In a sense this understanding legitimizes 
the chevalier's coldness and distance, for Mariane herself 
had too readily said "yes," although she twists further to 
claim that, knowing how vulnerable she was, he therefore 
never should have seduced her. The reproaches, however, 
fade as she allows herself to relive the entire first en­
counter and subsequent seduction, and clothes her descrip­
tion in the most romanesque terms, exciting herself again 
as she re-creates the day she first saw her lover executing 
some difficult maneuvers on his horse. As she pushes forth 
in her efforts to revive the past, she is by necessity thus 
forced into a deliberate exclusion of the present: 
Mais je suis sans cesse persecutee avec un extreme 
desagrement par la haine et par le degout que j'ai pour 
toutes choses; ma famille, mes amis et ce couvent me sont 
insupportables; tout ce que je suis obligee de voir, et tout 
ce qu'il faut que je fasse de toute necessite, m'est odieux; 
je suis si jalouse de ma passion, qu'il me semble que toutes 
mes actions et que tous mes devoirs vous regardent. (P. 54) 
It is, of course, not only the present time she is ex­
cluding but rather the entire network of societal pressures 
exhorting Mariane to quit her narcissistic universe. In 
the final lines of the above quote ("je suis si jalouse de ma 
passion"), the truly autonomous nature of her world as­
sumes its full measure. The passion itself, and not the 
chevalier long since departed, is definitively recognized as 
the force behind the monomania. Each letter is a stimulus 
for the next, and re-creation of the past affair through 
writing replaces any other possible form of existence: 
"Pourrais-je survivre a ce qui m'occupe incessamment, 
pour mener une vie tranquille et languissante? Ce vide et 
cette insensibilite ne peuvent me convenir" (p. 54). This 
overwhelming preoccupation with her narcissistic passion 
leads her to admit that she cannot conclude, that she can­
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not stop writing, for each halt in the flow of words is a 
recognition of the emotional vacuum awaiting her, each end 
a descent back into the passion-free society that surrounds 
her. Hence, she concludes that "j'ecris plus pour moi que 
pour vous" (p. 58). 
From the start the fifth and final letter will be "differ­
ent," announced so by la religieuse herself: "Je vous 
ecris pour la derniere fois, et j'espere vous faire connaitre, 
par la difference des termes et de la maniere de cette 
lettre, que vous m'avez enfin persuadee que vous ne 
m'aimiez plus, et qu'ainsi je ne dois plus vous aimer" (p. 
61). Although in part the general content of the last missive 
repeats several themes earlier established, notably that her 
involvement functions independently of its supposed source, 
the lover—"J'ai eprouve que vous m'etiez moins cher que 
ma passion" (p. 62)—nevertheless, certain new tones ag­
gressively assert themselves. The theme of vengeance ap­
pears for the first time, Mariane imagining the satisfaction 
derived from the possibility of delivering the chevalier into 
her parents' hands, or from that of taking, one day, a new 
lover. Significantly, for the first time, the Frenchman is 
dismissed by Mariane; but since his departure is an al­
ready established fact, the discharge can only be symbolic: 
"Je vous renverrai done par la premiere voie tout ce qui 
me reste encore de vous" (p. 61). This sudden assertion 
of aggressiveness, this burst of anger, this attack on the 
lover, all are accompanied by increased lucidity on the 
part of the abandoned mistress. In particular, there is a 
deepened understanding of the precise nature of her ob­
session: "J'etais jeune, j'etais credule, on m'avait enfermee 
dans ce couvent depuis mon enfance, je n'avais vu que des 
gens desagreables, je n'avais jamais entendu les louanges 
que vous me donniez incessamment" (p. 68). 
Thus the fifth letter will be properly the means of re­
bellion, Mariane finally accepting, although almost against 
her will ("Que ne me laissiez-vous ma passion?"), the 
lover's abandonment. Henceforth, she will be guided by 
desire for life—the suicide idea is absent here—and it will 
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be precisely the new lucidity and reasoning process that 
will allow for her liberation. All thoughts are now directed 
toward the cure, however arduous it may be. That the task 
will indeed be difficult, that Mariane's present resolutions 
cannot be definitively ascertained are perceptions present 
throughout the letter; there is a persistent vacillation be­
tween a desire for silence and one for continued words. 
Perceiving that her new movement toward liberation, and 
toward emotional solitude, toward a life without her pas­
sion, is still only nascent and hence fragile, la religieuse 
falls back readily into the temptations of the old pattern, 
into the unending monologue. "Je veux vous ecrire une 
autre lettre, pour vous faire voir que je serai peut-etre 
plus tranquille dans quelque temps" (pp. 67-68). But the 
final section of the letter concludes on a different note: 
"Mais je ne veux plus rien de vous, je suis une folle de 
redire les memes choses si souvent, il faut vous quitter et 
ne penser plus a vous, je crois meme que je ne vous 
ecrirai plus; suis-je obligee de vous rendre un compte exact 
de tous mes divers mouvements?" (p. 69). 
Although the resolution is not yet firm, the seed is 
planted now for Mariane's freedom. However, the liberation 
that she seeks—a liberation that will paradoxically return 
her to the restraints of the convent—is less from the person 
of her lover than from the self-imposed shackles of her 
correspondence, from the solipsism that translated itself 
through the written monologue. By the end—indeed, from 
the beginning, but most evident in the concluding letter— 
all that remains are the words, and the final recognition 
is that even they have failed to maintain the force of the 
passion. 
The direction that Mariane will now choose, although 
never directly stated, emerges clearly. She rejects any 
transcendence. Tristan and Isolde's Liebestod, Heloise's 
movement toward spiritual purification, Mme de Cleves' 
descent into illness and death, are not the options of la 
religieuse portugaise. Rather, hers is a decision firmly 
grounded in the emotional and metaphysical framework of 
the seventeenth century. 
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In her strivings to achieve a new emotional freedom, 
one that will by necessity force her back into the convent 
and family, thus really liberating her only from herself, 
Mariane envisions precisely the goal of her efforts. She 
yearns now for repose, for tranquillity: "Je connais bien 
que je suis encore un peu trop occupee de mes reproches 
et de votre infidelite; mais souvenez-vous que je me suis 
promis un etat plus paisible, et que j'y parviendrai" (pp. 
68-69). Yearnings for emotional peace constitute one of 
the major currents of the classical moralist literature. The 
influence of Jansenism cannot be overlooked, although it 
is significant that the theme appears frequently in Saint-
Evremond's works, a writer who at least consciously 
divorced himself from the heavier mood of the century. 
Descartes, Bossuet, Pascal, Mere, Mme de Lafayette, 
Saint-Evremond, all were caught up in a vast, sweeping 
trend toward emotional repose, toward strict effort at con­
trolling irrationality, from Descartes' well-structured, 
compact beast-machine theory11 to Saint-Evremond's 
gamesmanship. Thus Mariane's letters come also to reflect 
this fundamental problem, and by the end of her cor­
respondence, the struggle between reason and irrationality 
is fully absorbed. In the Lettres portugaises, the aspira­
tion toward control appears as a decided reaction against 
Mariane's sexual awakening, and in this context the role 
of the convent is primary. 
It is not that the convent functions as a striking inhibi­
tion of a religious nature. Mariane readily assures the 
chevalier that her ties to her religion are limited, at least 
in comparison with the emotions that bind her to him. 
There is, moreover, no fear of divine wrath, of punish­
ment. But this does not mean that the convent is without 
significance; rather, the overwhelming sense of enclosure 
inherent to the convent setting is the ideal metaphor for 
translating Mariane's dormant state prior to the encounter 
with the Frenchman. Her bitter cry in the first letter, an 
outburst that contrasts with the generally teasing tone— 
"que ne me laissiez-vous en repos dans mon cloltre?" (p. 
41)—states perfectly her condition before and after the love 
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affair. The arrival of the French soldier was very much her 
Pandora's box. The convent is not omnipresent throughout 
the letters, but by the end its power has reemerged as a 
strong, controlling force, in the form of Mariane's sudden 
new remorse. Her passion is dying, on its way to being 
successfully cloistered, no longer a threat to Mariane nor 
to the society that envelops her. 
It is as if Mariane and her obsession have been swal­
lowed up, obliterated, by an imposing structure, given 
concrete form through the convent. But as has been pre­
viously shown, Mariane's battle is twofold: against the 
private obsession and also against the collective myth of 
/'amour-passion. The acts of destruction that occur in the 
final letter, or at least the menace of those acts—the urge 
to deliver the French soldier into her parents' hands, the 
desire to burn his letters and mementos, and the final, 
abrupt movement into silence—are impulses that counter­
act both Mariane's private anxiety and the legend of love. 
In swiftly moving, analytical language, la religieuse is 
extricated from the grips of her obsessive passion, and 
from the entire tradition of erotic love as a desired ideal. 
Her repression is thus total. 
However, if Mariane's movements to free herself are 
tied in part to certain conventions, social and literary in 
nature, then it would appear that many themes of the 
Lettres portugaises would be decidedly conventional also. 
The limits of Mariane's anguish are defined by her referen­
tial system, a system dependent upon a constant juxta­
position of private depression with literary convention. 
She perceives her own entanglement in terms of a specific 
tradition, craving death, for example, not only as a release 
but as the correct form the battle must assume. This yearn­
ing, however, is persistently worn down by her concomi­
tant struggle toward life, an existential choice that she 
correctly views as violating the code. 
Guilleragues, it should be noted, is also the author of 
sixty-four Valentins, a literary adaptation of a game, as he 
explains in "Au Lecteur": 
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II y a longtemps qu'on a invente le jeu des Valentins; 
mais on les a faits depuis peu en vers: voici ceux qui me 
sont tombes entre les mains. II faut, pour bien composer le 
jeu des Valentins, mettre le nom de trente hommes et celui 
de trente femmes, dans soixante morceaux de papier 
separes, et copier separement aussi les soixante madrigaux. 
Apres avoir tire separement le nom d'un homme et celui 
d'une femme, on tire deux madrigaux, pour voir ce qu'ils 
disent l'un a l'autre. Si ce sont des choses tout a fait 
eloignees, ou tout a fait vraisemblables, les effets differents 
du hasard peuvent etre quelquefois assez agreables, et 
j'espere que cette diversite d'epigrammes sur toute sorte 
de sujet te divertira.12 
The intention is clear; at stake is a game—by necessity 
structured, with predetermined rules—whose strategy de­
mands easy recognizability. Convention is at a premium, 
for it is absolutely necessary that familiarity and generality 
submerge the particular. Curiously enough, in the thirty-
two pieces directed to men by women, the basic themes 
of the Lettres portugaises are readily duplicated. Abandon­
ment is the background for both works, but even in their 
detail the two correspond. Thus Mariane's early, precieux 
desire to be duped finds a corollary in the Valentins: "Vous 
voulez rompre notre affaire. / Helas, cet aveu sincere / 
M'accable de desespoir; / Trompez-moi, je vous en con­
jur, / Et continuez de me voir: / Du moins abusez-moi, 
parjure" (p. 101). 
In a similar fashion Guilleragues writes his epigrams to 
point to disillusionment, to fatality, to weak excuses for 
departures, to anxiety over a lover's lies. And Mariane's 
final resolution toward self-control is mirrored in yet 
another piece: "Puisque je ne suis plus aimable, / II faut 
tacher de n'aimer plus aussi" (p. 110). Thus tradition-laden 
themes of betrayal, of female masochism, of beguilement, 
of fate, and of death, all enter into an "original" work 
such as the Lettres portugaises and into a heavily con­
trived one like the Valentins. The easy conclusion would 
be that Guilleragues was simply limited in his expression, 
that he could barely move from "play" into something more 
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"serious." But his use of convention in the letters is not 
in order to define, to explain, Mariane's upset state; rather, 
it functions as the expression that la religieuse herself 
adopts in her struggle. Tied in by her own set of reactions 
to the betrayal situation, she is also bound by the tradi­
tion of writing her feelings, of translating passion into 
literature. Seeking to conform, she naturally has recourse 
to conventional language. 
Yet her efforts are truly in vain, and the results fall 
far short of the expectations. Mariane's is a double failure, 
for she is a double victim, one who is successfully manip­
ulated by the chevalier, but also by myth-making. In the 
end she is definitively abandoned, unable even to deceive 
herself. Moreover, her one creation, the letters, have failed 
her as well, for they are able neither to sustain her pas­
sion nor to translate it into original art, freed from con­
vention and capable of generating a heightened existence. 
That is why there is no ultimate transcendent death, no 
transcendence of any sort, but only the lucid acceptance of 
her solitude; and that is why the ending is not a conclusion, 
but only a rupture, a breaking off into silence. It is a 
termination that corresponds, curiously enough, to that of 
Racine's Berenice, a tragedy based precisely on an in­
ability to say adieu (Antiochus and Titus both experience 
this difficulty). The word itself, just as in the Lettres por­
tugaises, assumes an ironic importance, for closure of any 
sort is impossible. When finally Berenice assumes control 
and utters her adieu, it is the entire tragedy that is ac­
companying her into the Orient, into silence. There can 
be no true "conclusion," nothing but a cessation, and the 
rupture-end is as necessary to Guilleragues' work as to 
Racine's. Tragedy and letters are thus banished. There is 
no other way out, except to stop writing; otherwise, the 
play continues, and so do the letters. A cutoff must occur, 
and does. 
It is thus not only to her passion that Mariane is bidding 
adieu (significantly, when the rupture does occur at the 
end of the fifth letter, there is no pronouncing the word, 
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for it was in itself too literary a stance for Mariane; her 
release had to be achieved by different means) but to art, 
for it has proved an unsatisfactory alternative, not able to 
sustain her passion or to subsist on its own without turning 
in a labyrinth of convention. Early in the letters, Mariane 
perceived that her death, a suicide, would be ultimately 
more authentic than her words—"mon desespoir n'est done 
que dans mes lettres?" (p. 49)—that there was something not 
genuine in this creation. But thoughts of death revealed 
themselves, too, as strictly conventional, and Mariane's 
final decision, to stop writing, is truly the only authentic 
one. Silence alone can halt the cycle. 
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Chapter Eight

LA BRUYERE

| HE FIRST EDITION of the Caracteres 
"appeared in 1688. Seven editions fol­
lowed, the final one in 1694. By date 
La Bruyere does not belong to the group 
of writers under consideration here, 
whose works were published during the 
1660s and 1670s. By tradition, however, he does. More 
often than not, the author of the Caracteres is included in 
studies devoted to the classical moralists. Such critical 
flexibility may be explained by the work's fragmented 
form, akin to the Pensees and the Maximes, or by La 
Bruyere's extensive use of the character portrait, a literary 
phenomenon dating back to 1650 and to Mile de Scudery's 
Grand Cyrus. In short, the Caracteres are viewed as the 
culmination of a long-standing social and literary trend, 
as "a summa of seventeenth-century portraiture, the end-
term of a society's effort to portray, take stock of, and give 
meaning to itself."1 
There are major differences, however, between the 
Caracteres and the works of the moralists studied in this 
group of essays. Yet, it is only recently that La Bruyere 
has begun to receive his due as a decidedly un-classical 
writer. In particular, two studies by Jules Brody have em­
phasized aspects of La Bruyere's book that differentiate it 
LOVE AND LANGUAGE 
from the works of his predecessors. Brody concentrates 
on La Bruyere's portrayal of a morally and spiritually 
empty generation, dedicated to money and social promo­
tion, whose vapid lives the writer captured by a new and 
extensive use of a vocabulary that stressed the physical, 
material world: "Si La Bruyere s'obstinait a peindre ses 
contemporains par le dehors, c'est tout simplement parce 
que ses contemporains, surtout nobles, ne lui montraient 
plus autre chose."2 In support of this view, Brody cites the 
following passage: 
La cour n'est jamais denuee d'un certain nombre de gens 
en qui l'usage du monde, la politesse ou la fortune tiennent 
lieu d'esprit, et suppleent au merite. Us savent entrer et 
sortir; ils se tirent de la conversation en ne s'y melant point; 
ils plaisent a force de se taire, et se rendent importants par 
un silence longtemps soutenu, ou tout au plus par quelques 
monosyllabes; ils payent de mines, d'une inflexion de voix, 
d'un geste et d'un sourire: ils n'ont pas, si je l'ose dire, 
deux pouces de profondeur; si vous les enfoncez, vous 
rencontrez le tuf. ("Cour," 83)3 
From this perspective the Caracteres portray a super­
ficial society, one without moral values, where life has be­
come a routine of purposeless, mechanical repetitions, 
exemplified best by the courtier, whose movements are 
never progressive, only repetitive: "II fera demain ce qu'il 
fait aujourd'hui et ce qu'il fit hier" ("Ville," 12).4 
The mood of the Caracteres is thus quite different from 
the works of La Bruyere's predecessors who feared not 
monotony but emotional chaos, not an empty spirit but an 
overburdened one. Strongly evident in their works is belief 
in control of the self, an idea that is most sharply defined 
perhaps by writers such as Saint-Evremond and Jacques 
Esprit, but obvious also, for example, in the letters of Mme 
de Sevigne, who sought to reorder the imperfections of 
the "raw" relationship through the medium of the written 
word. 
For many of the writers studied here, emotional repose 
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is one solution to what they viewed as an upsetting moral 
climate. Recognizing the limits of Logos in a psychological 
universe governed by Eros, Mme de Cleves' retreat to the 
convent is a radical denial of the life forces. Silence and 
death become her sole means to freedom. Similarly, the 
Lettres portugaises, though offering the hope of a re­
gained will, nonetheless depict a renouncement that spir­
itually leads nowhere. Mariane will return only to the 
embryonic existence she led prior to her encounter with 
the chevalier. Her victory is Pyrrhic: though she liberates 
herself from the binds of an unreciprocated love, Mariane 
is only "free" to return to the shackles imposed by convent 
life. The "win" over passion is a "loss" of vitality, a retreat 
into dormancy. But this inert existence, not unlike that of 
the princesse de Cleves, and perhaps only an intensified 
form of ataraxia is ultimately seen by Mariane as a de­
sirable alternative to the turmoil of love. 
The moralists grouped in this study, seeking to perfect 
an "outer self capable of controlling erotic energy, es­
tablished a distance between the emotive and the rational 
parts of the personality. To give in to the disorganizing 
life of passion meant renouncing psychological and social 
equilibrium. The age's hero, not surprisingly, was I'hon­
nete homme, the incarnation of the controlled, aesthetic 
ideal. There is an urgency in these writers' works to reform 
the raw stuff of emotion, to harmonize the individual with 
the social, to tranquilize both. In this context alienation 
implies a loss of reason and control to the unconscious, 
spontaneous force of love. 
Alienation is also, of course, a theme in the Caracteres. 
Loss of reason is still implied, for the machine-like exis­
tence of the "characters" is totally antithetical to rational, 
reflective behavior. But the threat is different from the one 
perceived by the preceding generation, originating not in 
love but in the mindless pursuit of money and social status. 
The problem is no longer one of attempting to control the 
disorganizing but energy-charged love force. Instead, the 
Caracteres portray a silly, petty, often grotesque universe 
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where if emotions (other than financial gain and social 
climbing) have been checked, the resulting society is no 
better off for it. Love per se is not a problem for La 
Bruyere, who did not fear the violent eruption of spon­
taneous emotion. Rather, the society he saw about him 
had become so depersonalized, its members so superficial, 
that the passions could pose relatively little threat. They 
are dismantled in the Caracteres, but not through a morale 
devoted to control. Indeed, they seem merely to fade in a 
non-committed society of moral lightweights, where love is 
yet one more superficial emotion confirming man's and 
society's mediocrity-
La Bruyere's pronouncements on love appear in two 
contiguous chapters, "Des Femmes" and "Du Coeur." Al­
though neither chapter deals exclusively with the problem, 
love is at least the underlying force of the section on 
women; it is only one among many emotions described in 
"Du Coeur." (The seventeenth-century connotation of 
"heart" was highly inclusive, suggesting all non-reflec­
tive, spontaneous reactions.) "Des Femmes" is far more 
acerbic than "Du Coeur," and at least superficially is 
reminiscent of the close alliance Jacques Esprit established 
between the burden of love and womankind. One of the 
few critics to discuss in detail La Bruyere's views on 
love, Rene Jasinski, has detected a Christian stance in the 
Caracteres, whereby the moralist comes close to por­
traying woman as a creature of perdition. If "Du Coeur" 
is more subdued, believes Jasinski, it is because the ele­
ment of female irrationality is absent.5 Although this 
distinction is valid, Jasinski fails to stress the component 
of grotesque absurdity in La Bruyere's portraits of female 
behavior, which separates the Caracteres from the rigorous 
mood of Esprit's La Faussete des vertus humaines. Never­
theless, "Des Femmes" offers a more bitter portrayal of 
love than "Du Coeur," which is, as Jasinski has correctly 
perceived, a basically male-oriented chapter. 
Woven through both chapters are themes dear to the 
French moralists of the preceding decades. As in the writ­
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ings of Pascal and La Rochefoucauld, love is pitted against 
ambition: "Les hommes commencent par l'amour, finissent 
par l'ambition, et ne se trouvent souvent dans une assiette 
plus tranquille que lorsqu'ils meurent" ("Coeur," 76). In 
the Caracteres ambition is generally believed to last longer 
than love, and, in fact, is often one of life's constants: "Le 
cas n'arrive guere ou Ton puisse dire: 'J'etais ambitieux'; 
ou on ne Test point, ou on Test toujours; mais le temps 
vient ou Ton avoue que Ton a aime" ("Coeur," 75). This 
follows closely both La Rochefoucauld—"On passe souvent 
de l'amour a l'ambition, mais on ne revient guere de 
l'ambition a l'amour" {Max. 490)—and Pascal, in the 
Discours sur les passions de l'amour—"Qu'une vie est 
heureuse quand elle commence par l'amour et qu'elle finit 
par l'ambition! Si j'avais a en choisir une, je prendrais 
celle-la. Tant que Ton a du feu, Ton est aimable; mais ce 
feu s'eteint, il se perd. Alors, que la place est belle et grande 
pour l'ambition!"6 
"Des Femmes," however, brings a new dimension to the 
love-ambition dichotomy. In "Du Coeur" La Bruyere views 
the problem with a good deal of resignation, establishing 
an equilibrium between two passions that, although they are 
the cause of substantial unease, are not truly destructive. 
The tone is quite different in the chapter on women, where 
female ambition is explicitly portrayed as troublesome: "II 
est etonnant de voir dans le coeur de certaines femmes quel­
que chose de plus vif et de plus fort que l'amour pour les 
hommes, je veux dire l'ambition et le jeu: de telles femmes 
rendent les hommes chastes; elles n'ont de leur sexe que 
les habits" ("Femmes," 52). In the catalogue of female hor­
rors compiled by Bruyere, there is a passion still more dis­
quieting (for the male) than love: ambition. Significantly, 
however, the latter is a socially related emotion. What the 
moralist appears to fear most is not love's upsetting spon­
taneity but rather the adoption by the female of male-type, 
specifically social, behavior. The alienating power of love 
diminishes here, as estrangement from the self is charac­
terized as closely related to societal standards. 
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La Bruyere is perhaps most conventional in his praise of 
friendship. Not surprisingly, in "Des Femmes," the love-
friendship division is posed in terms of male-female charac­
teristics: "Les femmes vont plus loin en amour que la plupart 
des hommes; mais les hommes l'emportent sur elles en amitie" 
("Femmes," 55). When friendship is described in "Du Coeur," 
it figures as a rare but highly prized quality, much as in the 
writings of La Rochefoucauld and Saint-Evremond. Pure 
friendship is harder to achieve than love—"II est plus ordinaire 
de voir un amour extreme qu'une parfaite amitie" ("Coeur," 
6)—and the two passions are mutually exclusive—"L'amour et 
l'amitie s'excluent l'un l'autre" ("Coeur," 7). There is little 
new here, and La Bruyere seems to be making a concerted 
effort to be faithful to classical ideas and ideals. 
On the other hand, La Bruyere's deference to the tradition 
of praising simplicity and naturalness engenders new think­
ing. The early parts of "Des Femmes" concentrate on the 
value of simplicity in women, with La Bruyere rejecting arti­
ficiality of all types. This theme had been particularly well 
developed by the chevalier de Mere, with whom the author 
of the Caracteres is in ready agreement: 
II y a dans quelques femmes une grandeur artificielle, 
attachee au mouvement des yeux, a un air de tete, aux 
facons de marcher, et qui ne va pas plus loin; un esprit 
eblouissant qui impose, et que Ton n'estime que parce qu'il 
n'est pas approfondi. II y a dans quelques autres une gran­
deur simple, naturelle, independante du geste et de la de­
marche, qui a sa source dans le coeur, et qui est comme 
une suite de leur haute naissance; un merite paisible, 
mais solide, accompagne de mille vertus qu'elles ne peuv­
ent couvrir de toute leur modestie, qui echappent, et qui 
se montrent a ceux qui ont des yeux. ("Femmes," 2) 
The intensity of La Bruyere's criticism, however, distinguishes 
his views from similar ones in other moralists' works. Wom­
en who use too much makeup not only fail to please; they 
are horrible—"Je leur prononce, de la part de tous les hommes 
ou de la plus grande partie, que le blanc et le rouge les 
rend affreuses et degoutantes; que le rouge seul les vieillit 
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et les deguise; qu'ils haissent autant a les voir avec de la 
ceruse sur le visage, qu'avec de fausses dents en la bouche, 
et des boules de cire dans les machoires" ("Femmes," 6). 
Older women, La Bruyere writes in the following reflection, 
are "disfigured" by such attentions. Thus females who fail 
to conform to certain standards of beauty are grotesque and 
distorted. If La Bruyere is repulsed by such women, as 
Jasinski believes, his tone reflects, nevertheless, a well-
tempered horror. He sees the situation as nonsensical and 
irrational, but also as comical. His descriptions provoke a 
feeling similar to that produced by carnival distorting mir­
rors. One is simultaneously horrified and amused by the gro­
tesque images they produce. 
This tone dominates much of what La Bruyere has to say 
on women and love. Both "Des Femmes" and "Du Coeur," 
for example, stress that love is an involuntary force, spon­
taneously erupting with no forewarning: "L'amour nait 
brusquement, sans autre reflexion, par temperament ou par 
faiblesse: un trait de beaute nous fixe, nous determine" 
("Coeur," 3). Highly reminiscent of Mme de Lafayette's un­
varying emphasis on the spontaneous immediacy of love, 
La Bruyere's maxims and reflections are equally unvarying 
in their diagnosis of an uncontrolled and uncontrollable force. 
But there is, as usual, a qualitative difference between the two 
chapters. What in "Coeur," 3, is a generalized statement, 
faithful to the classical tradition, becomes in "Des Femmes" 
an exposition of women's highly bizarre inclinations in love 
matters: "A juger de cette femme par sa beaute, sa jeunesse, 
sa fierte et ses dedains, il n'y a personne qui doute que ce ne 
soit un heros qui doive un jour la charmer. Son choix est 
fait: c'est un petit monstre qui manque d'esprit" ("Femmes," 
27). The rapidity and the totality of the woman's decision, 
translated stylistically by the very brief "Son choix est fait," 
heightens its incomprehensibility. This quality of trouble­
some, inexplicable (at least to the male moralist) behavior 
adds to a general sense of female irrationality. In "Du 
Coeur" "un trait de beaute nous fixe, nous determine"; in 
the chapter on women, the determining trait is more often 
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the grotesque or the bizarre: "Est-ce en vue du secret, ou 
par un gout hypocondre, que cette femme aime un valet, 
cette autre un moine, et Dorinne son medecin?" ("Femmes," 
32). 
The association of the female with irrational behavior was 
hardly a new theme for the era. Jacques Esprit, for one, 
placed the burden and guilt of loving directly on woman; but 
despite this strong bias in La Faussete des vertus humaines, 
he allowed her some dignity by offering a means of salva­
tion: rigorous self-control. There is very little dignity in "Des 
Femmes," no hope that the language of reason and self-
control can tame the unpredictability of female behavior. 
For La Bruyere women's nature is hopelessly unreasoning, 
but this irrationality primarily takes the form of the gro­
tesque and the absurd. 
The consequences of such a shift are radical. Reading 
through "Des Femmes" and "Du Coeur," one may detect an 
implicit, but very strong, psychological freedom on the mor­
alist's part. Although it is true that women are painted as irra­
tional and seductive creatures, the portraits' tone reduces 
the menace considerably. Dorinne, who loves her doctor; 
Lelie, who worships only actors, musicians, and dancers; and 
Lise, who cannot stop making up; all are very silly, unrea­
sonable women. Their absurdities, however, are individual­
istic and idiosyncratic. Such portraiture sharply distin­
guishes La Bruyere from his predecessors, who exposed 
what they perceived as the typical, universal dangers of 
Vamour-passion. In this shift from the universal to the indi­
vidually idiosyncratic, love is not seen as an alienating force 
in itself. The potential for disruption does exist, of course, 
in individual whim and caprice that threaten to dismantle 
stable, traditional social values. But even these whims are 
portrayed as more ludicrous than fearsome. Many females 
are real "characters," to be sure, but nothing worse than 
that. Women may, moreover, be controlled by their confes­
seurs and directeurs (fools though they may be); but this 
dependent method of regulation would not have been accept­
able to Jacques Esprit, Mme de Lafayette, or la religieuse 
portugaise, who demanded inner, self-directed guidance. 
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The Caracteres, then, convey a sense of diminished dan­
ger. This mood may be achieved by what appears to be a 
deliberate reconstruction of a classical motif. Adopting a 
theme that had preoccupied La Rochefoucauld, the author 
of the Caracteres refers extensively to the end of love. Thus 
in "Du Coeur," the third reflection, which refers to love's 
beginning—"L'amour nait brusquement"—is followed immedi­
ately by one alluding to its end—"Le temps, qui fortifie les 
amities, affaiblit l'amour ("Coeur," 4). There is no transi­
tion here; the period between beginning and end is ignored 
or curtailed, thereby creating an impression of love's rapid 
disintegration. The moment of love always seems to have 
passed in the Caracteres: 
Ceux qui s'aiment d'abord avec la plus violente passion 
contribuent bientot chacun de leur part a s'aimer moins, et 
ensuite a ne s'aimer plus. Qui, d'un homme ou d'une femme, 
met davantage du sien dans cette rupture, il n'est pas aise 
de le decider. Les femmes accusent les hommes d'etre vo­
lages, et les hommes disent qu'elles sont legeres. ("Coeur," 
17) 
Love dies quickly, and even memories fade—"Les amours 
meurent par le degout, et l'oubli les enterre" ("Coeur," 32) 
—for the emotions are inherently limited—"Cesser d'aimer, 
preuve sensible que l'homme est borne, et que le coeur a 
ses limites" ("Coeur," 34). "Coeur," 17, is similar in theme 
to one of La Rochefoucauld's maximes supprimees: 
"Comme on n'est jamais en liberte d'aimer, ou de cesser 
d'aimer, l'amant ne peut se plaindre avec justice de l'in­
constance de sa maitresse, ni elle de la legerete de son 
amant" (62). Both the Maximes (particularly the Maximes 
supprimees) and the Caracteres establish the limits of the 
will in matters of love; both allude often to love's incon­
stancy. And both rely extensively on a vocabulary of sick­
ness to portray the body's total involvement in I'amour­
passion. This metaphor, however, changes drastically with 
La Bruyere. 
In both De l'amour et de la mer and De l'amour et de la 
vie, La Rochefoucauld seeks to convey the diverse transi­
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tions of the love cycle, from the early joys to the final, 
stagnant depression. In the Maximes he proceeds likewise, 
although the emphasis on the initial stages of love is less 
prominent. Most of the adages stress the stale end of love, 
its terminal moments. But whereas La Rochefoucauld 
chooses to focus on the theme of a decaying, warped spirit, 
La Bruyere centers immediately on the possibility of heal­
ing. If the emphasis in the Caracteres is on love as sick­
ness, the predominant word is still guerir. 
The healing process is a ready balm for all suffering: "On 
guerit comme on se console: on n'a pas dans le coeur de 
quoi toujours pleurer et toujours aimer" ("Coeur," 34). Even 
in "Des Femmes," where female irrationality and whim of­
fer the greatest threat of disorienting man, if not of de­
stroying him, recuperation is ever present: 
Le caprice est dans les femmes tout proche de la beaute, 
pour etre son contre-poison, et afin qu'elle nuise moins aux 
hommes, qui n'en gueriraient pas sans remede. ("Fem­
mes," 15) 
Les femmes s'attachent aux hommes par les faveurs 
qu'elles leur accordent: les hommes guerissent par ces 
memes faveurs. ("Femmes," 16) 
On tire ce bien de la perfidie des femmes, qu'elle guerit 
de la jalousie. ("Femmes," 25) 
In the Maximes, however, healing is viewed as a far less 
reliable force: 
II y a des rechutes dans les maladies de l'ame, comme 
dans celles du corps. Ce que nous prenons pour notre gueri­
son n'est le plus souvent qu'un relache ou un changement 
de mal. (Max. 193) 
II y a plusieurs remedes qui guerissent de l'amour, mais 
il n'y en a point d'infaillibles. (Max. 459) 
Where La Rochefoucauld evinces only skepticism toward 
emotional healing, La Bruyere quickly ushers in total res­
toration to good health. However, there is in the Caracteres 
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a decidedly negative side to this salubrity. The "characters" 
may be quickly restored since, in terms of the depth of their 
love, they have never been very "sick." They heal quickly, 
it is true, but perhaps only because of their moral tran­
sience. 
Inconstancy (fickleness is probably a more appropriate 
term) is one form of living adopted by this morally mobile 
society. Short-lived galanteries abound in the Caracteres. 
Rarely is there a mutually deep exchange; one partner is 
always playing, play-acting, genuinely free of emotional in­
volvement, and this freedom is achieved without the strug­
gle waged, for example, by Mme de Lafayette's heroines or 
by la religieuse portugaise: 
II coute peu aux femmes de dire ce qu'elles ne sentent 
point: il coute encore moins aux hommes de dire ce qu'ils 
sentent. ("Femmes," 66) 
II arrive quelquefois qu'une femme cache a un homme 
toute la passion qu'elle sent pour lui, pendant que de son 
cote il feint pour elle toute celle qu'il ne sent pas. ("Fem­
mes," 67) 
In a portrait where the elusive style reflects perfectly the 
story's moral, secretive Glycere feigns faithfulness to her 
credulous husband, all the while indulging in a quantity of 
illicit relationships. From passages such as these, there 
emerges a mood of sham and emptiness. Feeling is so in­
consequential that risk is always minimal. Inversely, as the 
superficial relationships indicate, there is never great depth 
of feeling. "Aussi bien," concludes Jasinski, "l'experience 
prouve-t-elle qu'il [l'amour] donne lieu a des entrainements 
violents mais souvent sans profondeur vraie, que dans 
l'immense majorite des cas il s'engoue de facon deconcer­
tante, multiplie les inconsequences et se perd dans la le­
gerete. La passion de toutes la plus puissante, celle par 
laquelle s'eprouvent le mieux les caracteres, confirme la 
mediocrite de l'homme."7 
In fact, the mediocrity of love is the basic theme of the 
two chapters. If there is no longer a need to harmonize, 
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to tranquilize, the emotions, it is because depth of feeling, 
and hence emotional risk, is forceably excluded in a switch­
ing and swapping society: "Un ancien galant tient,a si peu 
de chose, qu'il cede a un nouveau mari; et celui-ci dure si 
peu, qu'un nouveau galant qui survient lui rend le change" 
("Femmes," 19). What has destroyed the society of the 
Caracteres is not love, not the suffering and disorientation 
associated with it, but rather a lifestyle of material acqui­
sition, engendering, in turn, a loss of moral purpose and 
commitment. 
In such a world a writer will construct a reflection styl­
istically based on accumulation, but which thematically con­
veys a moral vacuum: "Une femme inconstante est celle 
qui n'aime plus; une legere, celle qui deja en aime un autre; 
une volage, celle qui ne sait si elle aime et ce qu'elle 
aime; une indifferente, celle qui n'aime rien" ("Femmes," 
24). The degree of verbal accumulation is in inverse pro­
portion to the aphorism's theme of emptiness. Characteri­
zation, moreover, relies upon a network of division and dis­
tinction. During the classical period, as Michel Foucault 
has shown, distinction was the principal method for classi­
fying in the natural sciences—"L'identite et ce qui la mar­
que se definissent par le residu des differences. Un animal 
ou une plante n'est pas ce qu' indique—ou trahit—le stigmate 
qu'on decouvre imprime en lui; il est ce que ne sont pas les 
autres; il n'existe en lui-meme qu'a la limite de ce qui s'en 
distingue."8 La Bruyere, in "Femmes," 24, utilizes this 
principle. But the fine distinctions he makes are only among 
degrees of spiritual and moral emptiness. The author of the 
Caracteres is dividing and distinguishing in a void. 
La Bruyere's firm insistence on the hollow nature of soci­
ety characterizes his work and separates him from the writ­
ers of the 1660s and 1670s. Those moralists had clearly 
posed the opposition between self and society, and, in favor 
of the latter, had sought to control the unreasoning, spon­
taneous side of man. In the Caracteres there is an emo­
tional and spiritual vacuum because the moralist no longer 
perceives the need to battle for some overriding value, more 
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essential than any individual's claims. Jules Brody has sug­
gested that La Bruyere intuitively discerned the final days 
not only of the noble class but also of la noblesse—"la no­
blesse comme temoignage d'une valeur sociale et morale 
non-negociable, d'une valeur a proprement parler meta­
physique."9 For the chevalier de Mere, perhaps the most 
ardent defender of the faith, Vhonnetete—the moral system 
devoted to the preservation of those values—was prized 
above all else. In La Bruyere's universe there is no strug­
gle to preserve an ideal, and the steady degradation of 
l'honnete homme is one outstanding mark of this meta­
physical shift. In a series of short reflections, La Bruyere 
places I'honnete homme ever closer to the pejorative habile 
homme, while increasingly distinguishing him from the ex­
emplary homme de bien: 
L'honnete homme tient le milieu entre l'habile 
homme et l'homme de bien, quoique dans une distance 
inegale de ces deux extremes. 
La distance qu'il y a de I'honnete homme a l'habile 
homme s'afTaiblit de jour a autre, et est sur le point de 
disparaitre. 
L'habile homme est celui qui cache ses passions, qui 
entend ses interets, qui y sacrifie beaucoup de choses, qui 
a su acquerir du bien ou en conserver. 
L'honnete homme est celui qui ne vole pas sur les grands 
chemins, et qui ne tue personne, dont les vices enfin ne 
sont pas scandaleux. 
On connalt assez qu'un homme de bien est honnete hom­
me; mais il est plaisant d'imaginer que tout honnete homme 
n'est pas homme de bien. 
L'homme de bien est celui qui n'est ni un saint ni un 
devot, et qui s'est borne a n'avoir que de la vertu. ("Juge­
ments," 55) 
In this social universe, l'honnete homme, by virtue of his 
close association with l'habile homme, has become an ac­
quirer, an accumulator. Mere's gentlemanly ideal has been 
tarnished in a world rapidly moving toward domination by 
the bourgeoisie. 
This class shift shatters other ideals of the classical gen­
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eration as well. The goal of ataraxie has been replaced by 
the reality of anomie. The "monster" is no longer the un­
tamed force of love, but rather the valueless, machine-like 
"characters," guided only by their spiritually barren and 
trivial vision of social success. There may be, as Jules 
Brody believes, redemption in La Bruyere's praise of unpre­
dictability (at least in matters other than love, where the 
moralist's tone is far less tolerant). In the Caracteres ten­
dencies toward automatic behavior are challenged by man's 
desire for change. Nevertheless, there is a large gap between 
believing that human worth is in unpredictability and as­
serting that it lies in the individual living at the peak of his 
physical and psychic energies. In La Bruyere's book the 
potential for such vitality is completely undermined by a 
morale of petty social aggrandizement. 
Thus although La Bruyere was writing only a decade or 
two later than the other moralists grouped in this study, 
he clearly deviated from the classical age's emphasis on 
control and language, on control through the language of 
reason and the destruction of courtly love myths. The change 
is radical, signaling a reformed vision of the individual and 
his society. And yet, despite the diverging moods, the shift­
ing emphasis, there is one strong, common bond between 
La Bruyere and his immediate predecessors. All ultimately 
emphasize the social at the expense of the individual. 
La Bruyere, perceiving the potentially negative results of 
a conforming, overmechanized, and status-oriented society, 
differs from earlier seventeenth-century French moralists, 
who sought to create an emotional state unthreatening to 
individual and social order. The society that La Bruyere de­
picts is far more trivial than the glamorous, overbearing one 
portrayed by Mme de Lafayette in the early pages of La 
Princesse de Cleves. But though he may nostalgically regret 
the loss of individual commitment in a world given over to 
banal social concerns, La Bruyere, at the same time, is 
intellectually captivated by society's hold. 
The general direction of social gravitation in the Carac­
teres is toward the monarch, or at least toward the arena 
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where he presides, the court. In both the provinces and the 
city, la cour represents the epitome of social success; and 
for those already there (the courtiers), proximity to the 
monarch is the sign of one's standing. It has long been a 
commonplace in La Bruyere scholarship that the chapter on 
the sovereign figures at the center of the Caracteres, there­
by transmitting a strong sense of order and authority that 
inherently limit the individual's importance. There is, 
moreover, no real challenge to the monarch's authority in 
La Bruyere's book. Despite the admittedly trivial nature of 
life at the court, the sovereign's command is unquestioned. 
That the courtier is frequently ludicrous in his efforts to be 
"placed" does not detract from an awareness of the mon­
arch's total control. 
With the generation of moralists who preceded La Bru­
yere, social order and authority may sometimes be less ob­
viously prominent. Although strongly evident in writers such 
as Mme de Lafayette and Guilleragues, allusions to abso­
lute rule may be perceived less directly in Jacques Esprit's 
work or in the writings of the chevalier de Mere. Never­
theless, even when forthright allusions to the monarchy are 
shunned, it is impossible to ignore the moral authoritarian­
ism of these works. The repression of individual and highly 
intense emotion, the yearning for repose, that dominate the 
classical generation's moralist literature parallel the growth 
of French absolutism. In La Bruyere's work the need for 
repression diminishes, since the individual is no longer a 
threat to the social universe portrayed by the moralist. 
Instead, the Caracteres paint a picture of man identifying 
totally with society's norms and demands. But this complete 
adjustment of goals only serves to strengthen the mood of 
authoritarianism. The diminished stress on individual claims 
to life in the age's writings, from Saint-Evremond and 
Mere up through La Bruyere, suggests an effort toward 
containing emotional freedom, an effort that, moreover, 
stands in direct opposition to the reality of sexual mores in 
the grand siecle. It was not, however, reality that the mor­
alists sought to depict. Rather, their works offer the vision, 
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conscious or unconscious, of that reality controlled in favor 
of what the age perceived to be as higher ideals. 
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might of erotic love, and sought release from 
its power in some moderation of its excesses 
through language. The general fascination, for 
example, of many of these writers with the 
notion of I'honnete hommc. which left its 
mark so decisively on much of the literature 
of the period, was dependent upon a successful 
manipulation of form and style aimed at dis­
pelling, and ultimately purging, the disruptive 
impulses of lamour passion. 
In a different vein, Mme de Sevigne, in her 
letters to her daughter, sought to reform and 
to restructure the love relationship into a more 
aesthetically and emotionally satisfying experi­
ence. So, too, did Jacques Esprit urge conduct 
of the most rigorous and repressive inner dia­
logue as the means to mastery over the undis­
ciplined self. So, too, did Saint-Evremond 
cultivate an emotional distance in his letters 
of advice that simultaneously allowed for an 
enticing flirtation with questions of love and 
sexuality while providing a safety /.one of escape 
that was securely defined by the boundaries 
of the page on which he wrote. And a novelist 
such as Mme de Lafayette, in an effort not 
dissimilar from that of Guilleragues, the author 
of the Lettresportugaises, used fiction and myth 
as a means first to emphasize and then to reduce 
the potential chaos of love. The moralists1 
effort traverses the classical period, culminat­
ing, but also shifting suddenly and radically, 
in La Bruyere's Caracteres. 
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